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Introduction 
The fifth report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013) estimates 
that global mean surface temperature could be up to 4.8°C higher in 2081-2100 relative to 
1896-2005 if greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) continue unabated. Climate change could not 
only have impacts on eco-systems, but also on all the matters of human activities, including 
food availability, human settlements, public health and water availability and quality along 
with industrial and economic activities. 
This PhD dissertation aims to understand how energy-related investment decisions will 
contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation, defined as all the adjustments “in 
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate stimuli or their effects, 
which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC, 2001). It focuses 
principally on the residential sector, which represented the non-negligible share of 24.7% of 
final EU energy consumption (29% of electricity consumption) in 2011 (Eurostat, 2013) and 
in which the main decision makers are households whose investment behaviour arguably 
differs from that of corporations, a pattern that should influence policy design. 
This PhD dissertation is divided into two parts and four papers. Although, the papers deal 
with related issues, each can be read on its own. Importantly, their nature is different. Two 
of them are research papers which seek to contribute to the economic literature on 
investment behaviour in energy activities. The other two are policy-oriented. They review 
the academic and policy literature in order to derive policy lessons for regulators. 
The first part looks at energy efficiency investments as a way to mitigate climate change, 
taking domestic appliances as a case study. It is composed of two chapters. Chapter 1 is 
about consumer behaviour and the impact of energy prices on the energy efficiency of sold 
appliances whereas Chapter 2 is a policy paper dealing with the impacts and the 
implementation of the EU Energy Label. The second part of this PhD dissertation also 
includes two chapters and focuses on the impacts of climate change on energy investment 
behaviour. Chapter 3 is a policy-oriented review of the literature on climate vulnerability 
and adaptation to climate change of electricity supply. Chapter 4 looks at how homeowners 
adapt their dwellings to climate change using microdata from 1985-2011. We briefly present 
below each part of this PhD dissertation and our contribution to the existing literature. 
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Investing in Energy Efficiency for Climate Change 
Mitigation: the Case of Domestic Appliances 
Energy production and consumption are responsible for the great majority of worldwide 
GHG emissions. They are consequently the principal focus of mitigation policies. Energy 
efficiency is of particular importance as decarbonising energy production has certain limits. 
Existing energy infrastructures relying on fossil fuels cannot easily be swapped with 
renewable sources of energy due to high replacement costs. Moreover, the intermittency of 
renewable sources of energy (i.e. wind and solar) makes it difficult to raise their share in the 
energy mix without damaging energy security.  
The focus of our study on domestic appliances may be justified on several grounds. First, 
domestic appliances are responsible for a large share of the energy consumed by 
households: 16% of the energy consumed in the residential sector and more than 60% of 
residential electricity consumption in 2009 (Enerdata, 2010).2 Moreover, the potential for 
energy efficiency improvements is high: for example, an energy efficient refrigerator can be 
five times less consuming as an energy inefficient one.3 There are various market failures 
that may hinder the diffusion of energy efficient domestic appliances. Finally, these products 
have benefitted from a large scale information-based policy since 1995: the EU Energy Label.  
Numerous policies are being implemented in order to promote energy conservation. In the 
EU, the MURE database4 registers around 550 energy efficiency policies that have been or 
are currently implemented in the European Union, targeting households, transports, 
industry or the service sector. These policies all contribute to the objective set by the EU to 
reduce primary energy demand by 20% in 2020 as compared with a “no policy” scenario. In 
the US, the energy efficiency programs implemented at State level or municipal level is 
backed up by federal regulations and commitments. For instance, the National Energy 
Conservation Policy Act was implemented in 1978 and has frequently been updated. 
                                                          
2
 Most of the energy consumed in the residential sector is used for space heating (67% in 2009). Apart 
from domestic appliances and lighting, the other uses are water heating (13%) and cooking (5%). 
3
 This ratio is based on the difference in energy efficiency rating between an “A+++” labelled 
refrigerator and a “D” rated appliance. 
4
 http://www.muredatabase.org/aboutmure.html  
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Evidence from the EU however suggests that these policy efforts may not be sufficient. A 
midway assessment has revealed that the EU was only to reach half of his objective of a 20% 
reduction in primary energy demand unless additional efforts are made (European 
Commission, 2011b). This calls for the reinforcement of existing instruments and/or the 
introduction of new ones. In October 2012, the European Commission adopted a new 
Directive on Energy Efficiency with provisions for both end-use sectors and energy supply 
(European Commission, 2012), requiring Member States to establish national energy 
efficiency schemes and to put more emphasis on increasing energy efficiency in buildings. In 
the case of domestic appliances, increasing their average energy efficiency could reduce 
substantially residential energy consumption because consumers have the choice between 
appliances with very different energy efficiency levels.  
It is often argued that these policies should mitigate two market failures (Allcott and 
Greenstone, 2012): imperfect information on energy performance and cognitive constraints 
on one side; and negative externalities on the other. 
Imperfect information arises because energy efficiency is not directly observable by the 
buyer at the time of purchase. As such, the lack of information on energy costs could hinder 
consumers’ evaluation of the energy costs of domestic appliances. Therefore, informing 
consumers about energy efficiency and energy savings constitutes a necessary step to 
market transformation. However, even when consumers can access information, it is often 
argued that they do not compute the expected and discounted energy savings of their 
energy efficiency investments in a perfectly rational manner. Other cognitive constraints 
would lead informed consumers to undervalue energy costs. The externality problem is 
more general: energy production and use generate health and environmental costs which 
needs to be properly internalized in energy prices.  
The first paper of this PhD dissertation evaluates how energy efficiency of appliances is 
affected by energy prices. It tests if consumers’ purchases of energy efficient appliances 
under-react to an energy price increase, principally because they would be myopic. To do so, 
we perform an econometric analysis on sales data of the UK market for refrigerators 
between 2002 and 2007, at a time when the EU Energy Label was already a mature policy 
and consumers knew about the energy consumption of the products that they were buying.  
Since the 1980s, many scholars and policy-makers have argued that an “energy efficiency 
gap” could exist (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994), meaning that privately profitable investments in 
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energy efficiency were not performed in practice by households and firms. The indication of 
an energy efficiency gap had been provided by various empirical estimations of implicit 
discount rates, the rates consumers and firms would be applying when purchasing energy-
using products to weigh up future energy costs. Estimates reported for refrigerators ranged 
from 39% to 300% (Revelt and Train, 1998; Hwang et al., 1994; McRae, 1985; Meier and 
Whittier, 1983; Gately, 1980; Cole and Fuller, 1980); for air conditioners between 19% to 
77% (Matsumoto, 2012; Train and Atherton, 1995; Hausman, 1979; Kooreman, 1995); and 
for water heaters between 67% and 84% (Hwang et al., 1994; Goett and McFadden, 1982). 
Various reasons have been given to the energy efficiency gap in the case of appliances. The 
most frequently cited market failure is consumers’ lack of information about energy 
efficiency or consumptions leading them to undervalue energy costs. In this respect, Newell, 
Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) show that the provision of information to consumers has an impact 
on consumers’ sensibility to energy prices at the moment of purchasing room air 
conditioners and water heaters: informing consumers would therefore contribute to 
rationalize their choices towards more energy efficient products. 
From a methodological perspective, the estimations of the implicit discount rate cited above 
have been made on a cross-section of products, by comparing their purchase price to their 
expected future energy costs while controlling for other observed product features. The 
major drawback of such estimations is that they cannot control for unobserved differences 
in the products that could be correlated with energy efficiency. Would there be such 
unobservables, the estimates of the implicit discount rates with such methods would be 
biased.  
Panel data methods can control for time-invariant unobservables by construction. Allcott 
and Wozny (2011), Sallee, West, and Fan (2011) and Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2012) 
have applied such methods on data from the automobile market and found that consumers’ 
myopia could be much smaller than previously estimated. However, all these contributions 
have been conducted on cars, which is a relatively complex good to analyse. In particular, 
consumers can adapt their gasoline consumption to prices and these authors must therefore 
rely on assumptions regarding consumer use of cars to properly evaluate the energy 
efficiency gap. 
With our data and a panel data econometric method, we find that there is an energy 
efficiency gap, as consumers would underestimate energy costs by about 35%. However, like 
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in the studies on the automobile market, this energy efficiency gap is much smaller than 
what was previously estimated. The corresponding implicit discount rate that we find is 
around 8.7%. 
Furthermore, we are able to quantify the impact of another mechanism that could widen 
the energy efficiency gap. Our econometric setting allows us to analyse both demand 
responses to energy price shocks and supply responses. We find that suppliers almost 
completely absorb energy price shocks by reducing more the price of energy inefficient 
appliances than the price of energy efficient ones. This asymmetric price response obviously 
reduces the consumer benefit of swapping for energy-efficient refrigerators. In the short 
run, almost all the energy savings from demand-side adjustments are compensated for. This 
is only in the long run that electricity price increases lead to energy savings as manufacturers 
progressively adapt to higher energy prices by launching new, more energy efficient 
products. 
The second chapter of this PhD dissertation is a policy note that was part of a larger report 
for the French Agency of Environment and Energy Management. It looks at the main 
information-based policy that applies to domestic appliances in the EU: the EU energy label. 
Launched in 1995, the EU Energy Label makes compulsory the presentation of energy 
efficiency and energy use features on each appliance sold on the market. Whereas suppliers 
must provide a standardized energy label to dealers, the latter must put the label on a 
visible part of each appliance they sell. On the label, appliances have been ranked on a 
coloured scale from A+++ (very efficient) to G (very inefficient) making the identification of 
energy efficient appliances much simpler for consumers. The starting point of this chapter is 
that the EU Energy Label has become increasingly popular and today’s consumers can know 
about the energy efficiency of main appliances when purchasing a new one in the EU. 
However, our analysis suggests that the effectiveness of the EU energy label does not solely 
depend on popularity, but on a list of key factors of success, including primarily that 
promised energy savings on the labels correspond to real energy consumptions. We 
conclude with suggesting indicators for policy-makers to monitor the Energy Label, and 
encourage them to intensify the controls on the accuracy of the energy label with the 
effective energy consumption of sold appliances.  
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The Impacts of Climate Change on Energy 
Investment Behaviour 
Energy-related investments have more often been studied for their potential for climate 
change mitigation than for their relevance for adaptation. However, energy systems are 
sensitive to climate constraints and global warming may substantially affect local conditions 
of energy production and use. For example, the cooling of conventional and nuclear power 
plants may become problematic if river waters are warmer (IPCC, 2007). In the residential 
sector, energy is principally used for space heating and air-conditioning. Households will 
therefore necessarily adapt their energy consumption to any change in climate. The use of 
air-conditioning to adapt to excessive heat in summer would increase. In this context, 
energy consumption could rise in some regions due to global warming (for example 
electricity in California, as studied by Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat, 2011). 
Chapter 3 is a policy paper that investigates to what extent current investors take into 
account future climate change in their long-run investment decisions. Based on a review of 
the existing literature, we draw the list of the various parameters that will affect electricity 
transmission and generation before presenting the decision-making tools currently available 
that could be used by the electric sector in the perspective of adaptation to climate change. 
Our literature review suggests that decision-making tools are available to investors to 
properly account for climate change in their long-run investment decisions. Therefore, their 
effective use mostly depends on increasing investors’ awareness on the potential impact of 
climate change on the energy system. 
Furthermore, we argue that a better understanding of consumer attitudes towards 
weatherization is particularly relevant to understand climate change adaptation and its 
impacts. 
Chapter 4 is an academic paper which studies the effect of household adaptation to climate 
change on residential gas and electricity consumption. Our research is based on data from 
14 waves of the American Housing Survey (1985-2011) that have been matched with 
temperature and precipitation data from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
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Administration covering 159 areas in the US. We adopt a two-stage approach. In the first 
stage, we assess long run adaptations by analysing how sensitive household decisions to 
perform home improvements are in relation to climate change. In the second stage, we run 
econometric equations of individual electricity and gas consumptions in which we take into 
account the likely changes in housing resulting from climate change. 
The results of the econometric analysis suggest that adaptation to climate change from 
households will shift demand from gas to electricity. This is likely to be due to the increased 
need for air-conditioning, but also to the reduced use of gas heaters. In a simulation of 
residential energy demand, we predict that overall energy demand should decrease by 1.9% 
in the US assuming a 1°F inland average temperature increase. However, because electricity 
is more carbon-intensive that gas, GHG emissions could increase slightly due to adaptation 
to climate change if current methods of generation were used to produce electricity. We 
therefore conclude that the shift from gas to electricity resulting from climate change in 
residential housing constitutes an additional motivation for reducing the carbon footprint of 
US electricity. 
Compared to other sectors, agriculture and food supply in particular, adaptation in the 
residential sector has been much less studied. Deschênes and Greenstone (2011) and 
Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (2011) have shown that electricity demand should be 
rising in the US due to climate change. They claim that this would be due to an increased 
utilisation of air-conditioning in summer. However, these two studies focus on the 
correlation between changes in temperatures and changes in energy consumption, and 
therefore do not directly look at the adaptations of the housing stock (including air-
conditioning) that may lead to higher electricity consumptions. Even though air-conditioning 
is likely to be the main reason that explain a surge in electricity use (Sailor and Pavlova, 
2003), it is unclear if the increase in electricity demand would be caused by the installation 
of new air-conditioners or the more intensive use of the existing ones. Furthermore, air-
conditioning is not the only adaptation measure available to households that could lead to 
an increase in electricity demand: consumer may also prefer to install electric heaters 
instead of gas heaters if temperatures increase. Their operating costs are higher but their 
installation is cheaper, so that they fit well in regions in which heating needs are moderate 
(Mansur, Mendelsohn and Morrison, 2008). 
The main contribution of chapter 4 is exploring the reasons behind the relationship between 
climate and energy use. We control for three types of investments in housing (major heating 
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and air-conditioning equipment; energy integrity; and other home improvements) and 
distinguish between the changes in energy consumption imputable to changes in intensity in 
use and the ones imputable to adaptations of the housing stock. We find that the decrease 
in the use of gas would very likely be due to changes in the equipment installed whereas the 
more intensive use of already installed air-conditioners could drive electricity consumption 
upwards on its own. To our knowledge, Chapter 4 constitutes the first attempt to assess 
both long run adaptation and short run responses in terms of energy demand to evaluate 
the impact of household adaptation on energy use and GHG emissions from residential 
energy consumption. 
In the end, the findings of the second part of this PhD dissertation are that increasing 
awareness about the potential impacts of climate change on the energy system is necessary 
for both suppliers and consumers of energy. In particular, various climate change adaptation 
strategies may exist, some putting more stress on the energy system (e.g. air-conditioning in 
the residential sector) than others (e.g. insulation). Our recommendation to policy-makers is 
that they encourage adaptations that can levy the burden that climate change will put on 
energy production and use, but also that they anticipate a higher demand for electricity and 
reduce the carbon footprint of its generation.  
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PART I. Investing in Energy Efficiency for 
Climate Change Mitigation: the Case of 
Domestic Appliances 
Chapter 1. The Impact of Energy Prices on Energy 
Efficiency: Evidence from the UK Refrigerator 
Market 
François Cohen, Matthieu Glachant, and Magnus Söderberg 
Abstract   
We use product-level panel data describing the UK refrigerator market from 2002 to 2007 to 
measure the impact of energy prices on energy use. The analysis deals with both demand-
side and supply-side adjustments occurring in the market when the electricity price 
increases. That is, the short term response of consumers who modify their purchase 
behavior; the mid-term response of manufacturers/retailers which revise their price, and 
the long-term response of manufacturers which change product characteristics. We find a 
modest long-term elasticity of -0.09. This is driven by two inefficiencies. First, consumers 
undervalue the savings from energy efficient refrigerators by 35%. This means a moderate 
consumer myopia as the implicit discount rate is 8.7%. Second, nearly two-third of the 
increase in energy costs (almost all the costs as perceived by consumers) is compensated for 
by suppliers through relatively larger price reductions of highly energy consuming products 
in the mid-term. This finding calls for moving attention in the energy efficiency debate to the 
pricing behavior of manufacturers of durables. 
Keywords: Energy Efficiency, Consumer Myopia, Energy Prices. 
 
JEL Codes: D12, L68, Q41. 
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Résumé du chapitre 1 en français 
A partir de données de panel qui décrivent les produits vendus sur le marché des 
réfrigérateurs entre 2002 et 2007, nous mesurons l’impact des prix de l’électricité sur la 
consommation électrique des produits. Cette analyse prend en compte tant les ajustements 
de la demande que ceux de l’offre qui se produisent sur le marché lorsque les prix de 
l’électricité augmentent. Nous évaluons ainsi la réponse à court terme des consommateurs 
qui modifient leurs comportements d’achat ; la réponse à moyen terme des 
producteurs/revendeurs qui révisent leurs prix ; et la réponse à long terme des fabricants 
qui modifient les caractéristiques des produits vendus. Nous trouvons une élasticité 
modeste de -0.09 à long terme. Ce résultat est l’effet de deux défaillances. Premièrement, 
les consommateurs sous-estiment de 35% les économies d’énergie des réfrigérateurs 
efficaces sur le plan énergétique. Cela signifie qu’ils ont un comportement d’achat favorisant 
modérément le court terme, correspondant à un taux d’actualisation implicite de 8.7%. 
Parallèlement, un peu moins des deux-tiers des hausses des coûts d’utilisation des appareils 
(presque l’intégralité des coûts tels que perçus par les consommateurs) sont compensées 
par des réductions de prix plus importantes sur les produits les moins efficaces à moyen 
terme. Ce résultat encourage à prêter plus attention aux stratégies de prix des fabricants et 
des vendeurs de biens durables dans le cadre du débat sur l’amélioration de l’efficacité 
énergétique des produits utilisés par les consommateurs. 
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1. Introduction  
In policy circles, it is common to believe that there exists an “energy efficiency gap” between 
the socially optimal level of energy consumption and observed consumption. At the 
international level, the International Energy Agency has been particularly active in 
disseminating this idea (see for instance, IEA, 2007, Ryan et al., 2011). Since a seminal paper 
by Hausman (1979) and the discussion of possible policy implications by Jaffe and Stavins 
(1994), it has also attracted considerable interest in the academic literature as shown in the 
recent survey by Gillinghan and Palmer (2014). 
As explained by Allcott and Greenstone (2012), there are two potential reasons why public 
intervention can improve social welfare in this area. The first is the classical externality 
problem: the production and consumption of energy, in particular of fossil fuels, generate 
major environmental and health externalities which could be mitigated by policies 
promoting energy conservation. The second is due to imperfect information and other 
cognitive constraints that could lead economic agents to discard privately profitable 
investments that may limit energy use, in particular households and small businesses that 
have limited time and resources to evaluate infrequent decisions. Allcott and Greenstone 
(2012) refer to the latter type of failures as “investment inefficiencies”.5 They are 
particularly intriguing as they suggest the existence of win-win options entailing both 
economic and environmental benefits. In practice, energy efficiency choices fundamentally 
involve decisions that trade off an upfront cost – the purchase of an energy-efficient 
refrigerator, a fuel efficient car, the installation of insulation – and a stream of uncertain and 
future benefits induced by lower energy consumption. The choice is then inefficient if, in the 
eyes of an external observer, the decision maker gives non-optimal weight to the upfront 
cost relative to future energy costs. If the decision maker gives too high weight to the 
upfront cost, s/he is myopic or, expressed differently, the implicit discount rate used to 
calculate the net present value of the investment is too high.  
The potential existence of investment inefficiencies has important policy implications 
(Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Verboven, 2002, Li et al., 
2009). The most important one is that energy price increases induced by energy taxation 
and other instruments like emissions trading are likely to have limited impacts on residential 
                                                          
5
 The nature of the underlying causes of investment inefficiencies is extensively discussed by 
Gillingham and Palmer (2014).  
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energy use if households underestimate the size of future energy costs. Accordingly, they 
constitute a major justification for numerous real-world policies that target the market of 
energy-using durables such as investment subsidies that encourage the purchase of water 
heaters and the installation of insulation in dwellings and regulatory standards mandating a 
minimal level of energy or environmental performances of new motor vehicles like the 
EURO norms in Europe or the US-equivalent CAFE standards, building energy codes... They 
also plead in favor of energy labeling to improve consumer information. 
The starting point of the present paper is the observation that the academic literature on 
the energy efficiency gap mostly concentrates on consumer behavior as illustrated by the 
recent review by Allcott and Greenstone (2012) and Gillinghan and Palmer (2014)6. We 
believe, and we will actually show, that what occurs on the supply side of the markets of 
energy-using durables is equally important. Consider, for concreteness, the case of 
refrigerators which will be studied in this paper.  An increase in energy price reduces 
consumer utility and thus induces a negative shock on demand in the refrigerator market. In 
that case, the theory of industrial organization predicts that suppliers (manufacturers and/or 
retailers) will adjust their prices. More precisely, as refrigerators are differentiated goods, 
the price of models with poor energy performance is expected to decrease, while that of 
energy-efficient models will decrease less or can even increase if the total demand for 
refrigerators is sufficiently inelastic. Importantly, the fact that this price response is 
asymmetric – producers subsidize inefficient models in relative terms – damages energy 
efficiency as it reduces consumer incentives to shift to efficient models. This is not the end 
of the story, though; producers will also modify their product offer by launching new energy 
efficient models and withdrawing inefficient ones. A full understanding of the impact of 
energy prices on energy use requires taking into account all these adjustments. 
In this paper, we use product-level panel data describing the UK refrigerator market from 
2002 to 2007 to measure the impact of energy prices on energy use of sold appliances. Our 
distinctive contribution is to analyze the entire sequence of adjustments. We thus provide 
answers to three questions: On the demand-side, how large are investment inefficiencies? 
On the supply side, how large are refrigerator price adjustments when the electricity price 
changes? And how large are adjustments of product offers? By answering these questions 
                                                          
6
 A remarkable exception is a theoretical analysis by Fischer (2005) who stresses the importance of 
the supply side factors (including innovation) when designing policy to promote energy efficiency of 
household appliances. 
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and measuring the different impacts, we will also be able to assess the importance of 
investment inefficiencies relative to supply-side issues. 
Methodologically, we develop a very simple discrete choice with differentiated quality à la 
Berry (1994) to describe demand and rely on first-difference panel data methods that allow 
us to control for time-invariant unobserved product attributes. We also control for product 
segmentation caused by product differentiation with a nested logit framework and address 
endogeneity concerns arising from refrigerators’ prices and quantities being simultaneously 
determined. Price and product offer adjustments responses are estimated using reduced-
form equations which impose less restrictions on how competition operates in this market. 
More specifically, we use first differences to estimate the impact of electricity price shocks 
on retail prices. To estimate how product offer is influenced by electricity prices, we take 
advantage of the fact that we observe in the data when a given model enters the market 
and when it exits (in the case where this occurs over the study period 2002-2007). We then 
estimate a dynamic fixed effect probit model by using the method of Wooldridge (2005). 
Refrigerators constitute a suitable case to explore these questions, in particular compared to 
motor vehicles which have recently been the subject of a lot of research on the impact of 
gasoline prices (e.g., Allcott and Wozny, 2014; Busse et al., 2013, Anderson et al., 2013). To 
start with, consumers cannot adjust energy consumption after purchase contrary to car 
drivers who choose how much they will drive.7 As a result, future energy consumption is 
exogenously determined by the characteristics of the product. This suppresses an important 
source of biases and of measurement errors.  A second advantage is that there is no market 
for used cold appliances. This is obviously not the case for cars and empirical analysis 
therefore needs to develop complex solutions and/or make several assumptions to deal 
with this issue. See for instance Li et al. (2009) or Allcott and Wozny (2013) who only 
examine the impact of gasoline prices on the second-hand market. Third, the product is 
simple compared to cars and less subject to subjective feelings. This is a major benefit as 
dealing with taste shocks and unobserved product characteristics, that tend to be correlated 
with energy performance, is a major methodological difficulty. Note also that energy 
labelling is mandatory since 1995 for all refrigerators sold in the European Union, meaning 
that information asymmetry on energy performance is partly mitigated. 
                                                          
7
 A consequence is that there is no “rebound effect” in this case. The work by Sallee, West, and Fan 
(2009) is an example of effective efforts to circumvent that problem with controls for odometer 
readings. 
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In our base specification, we estimate that consumers underestimate future energy savings 
by 35%. Even though this clearly indicates investment inefficiencies, their size is reasonable 
as it implies an implicit discount rate of 8.7%. There are several methodological reasons why 
our implicit discount rate is lower compared to what has been reported previously (from 
39% to 300%, see the literature review in Section 2). The most important one is that we rely 
on panel data that allows better controls of unobserved product characteristics. In this 
respect, when using a hedonic pricing model on a cross section of models, the approach 
adopted by Hausman for instance (1979), we find a discount rate of 72%. Recent studies on 
cars using panel data also find rates of magnitude similar to ours (for instance, see Allcott 
and Wozny, 2014). 
But as argued before, the most significant contribution of the paper is to estimate both 
demand- and supply-side effects. We confirm the theoretical prediction of an asymmetric 
price response to electricity price increases with producers decrease less the price of 
energy-inefficient models than that of efficient models. We also find a significant impact of 
electricity prices on the probability for a given model to be supplied in the market.  
We are then able to calculate the relative size of the different demand and supply 
adjustments. More precisely, we use our estimates to simulate the impact of an increase in 
electricity price on the average annual electricity consumption of sold appliances. The 
simulation includes three stages: first, we predict the impact of electricity price shocks on 
purchasing decisions, holding the purchase price and the set of products available in the 
market constant. Second, we predict the impact of electricity price increases on the 
refrigerator purchase prices and adjust market shares accordingly. Third, we correct the 
market shares of commercialized products according to their probability of being 
commercialized, which we estimate with our probit model on product offer. 
We find that, holding constant the supply behaviour, a 10% electricity price increase on 
demand induces a 3.2% decrease in energy use. In the second stage, price adjustments lead 
to almost cancel this impact – reduction falls down to 0.04% - as producers cushion the 
impact of electricity price changes by subsidizing selectively the least efficient products. 
Note that this effect would not occur if the refrigerator market was perfectly competitive. 
Under perfect competition, prices are equal to marginal production costs, implying zero 
price adjustments if marginal costs are constant, which sounds a reasonable assumption as 
our scenario does modify drastically the quantities produced. In the third stage, producers 
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however partly compensate this impact by offering more energy-efficient models in the 
market, leading to a long-term reduction of energy use of 0.9%.  
What lessons can be drawn from these figures? To start with, the inefficiencies due to 
consumer myopia and imperfect competition are far from being negligible: in the absence of 
consumer myopia and price adjustments, the long run reduction would be 7.1%, that is, 
seven times larger. We also able calculate the size of each inefficiency by simulating a 
scenario where only one of each is present. The simulation shows that imperfect 
competition reduces more the effectiveness of energy price increases than myopia: The long 
term impact of energy use would -1.5% if consumers were perfectly rational under perfect 
competition while it would be – 4.5% with myopic consumers under imperfect competition. 
Supply-side issues cannot be ignored when analysing the links between energy efficiency 
and energy prices. 
As inefficiencies are sizeable, this calls for complementing policy solutions based on energy 
price changes (e.g., energy taxation) with other instruments. The focus on demand is then 
clearly not sufficient when designing the policy mix. As an illustration, energy labelling can 
constitute a (partial) solution to demand-side failures, but it does not mitigate the 
asymmetric pricing problem. It can even exacerbate it as producers have more incentives to 
subsidize inefficient models if consumers pay more attention to energy efficiency.  Going 
further by evaluating the welfare properties of the different policy options is clearly beyond 
the scope of this paper, in particular because we use reduced-form supply equations. In any 
case, our results suggest that focusing on demand behavior and consumer surplus is not 
sufficient to derive robust policy recommendations. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we briefly review the 
literature. In Section 3, we develop a conceptual framework and address identification 
issues. Section 4 presents the data. We then present and interpret the estimated results in 
the following section. In Section 6, we run simulations to predict the impacts of a 10% 
increase of the price of electricity. In Section 7 we summarize our findings and formulate 
policy implications. 
2. Related literature 
The empirical literature on the impact of energy prices on energy efficiency is well 
developed. To the best of our knowledge, there exists however no work which studies the 
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impact of energy price changes on the entire sequence of demand and supply responses 
(quantity, price, and innovation). 
As explained above, the majority of the papers focus on demand and consumer myopia. 
Following the work of Hausman (1979) on room air conditioners, earlier research found 
implicit discount rates that are substantially larger than real financial discount rates. In the 
case of electric appliances, rates reported for refrigerators range from 39% to 300% (Revelt 
and Train, 1998; Hwang et al., 1994; McRae, 1985; Meier and Whittier, 1983; Gately, 1980; 
Cole and Fuller, 1980); for air conditioners between 19% to 77% (Matsumoto, 2012; Train 
and Atherton, 1995; Hausman, 1979; Kooreman, 1995); and for water heaters between 67% 
and 84% (Hwang et al., 1994; Goett and McFadden, 1982). 
Most recent works lead to revise downward these estimates. For refrigerators, Tsvetanov 
and Segerson (2014) find discount rates in the range 13-22% in a paper which looks at the 
impact on consumer surplus of energy labeling. The same pattern is found in recent papers 
dealing with gasoline prices and fuel efficiency. Allcott and Wozny (2014) whose 
methodological approach is similar to ours find a discount rate of 16%; Busse et al. (2013) 
produce several estimates under different assumptions, none of these exceed 20% and 
many are close to zero. The same pattern is found by Goldberg (1998). As evoked above, the 
main difference between these new results and the earlier literature is the use of panel data 
which allows controlling some of the unobserved product characteristics that tend to be 
correlated with energy performance. 
A few papers look both at price and quantity adjustments. An example is the recent paper 
by Houde (2014a) on the producer and consumer response to energy labeling in the US 
refrigerator market. Busse et al. (2013)’s work on the car market examine both the level of 
the discount rate and the price response of car manufacturers and retailers to gasoline price 
changes. Interestingly, they show that the price adjustment is much higher in the used car 
market than in the market for new cars. Verboven (2002) is primarily concerned by the 
pricing behavior of car manufacturers.  
Finally, there is a significant literature looking specifically at the impact of energy prices on 
innovation. A good example is the work by Jaffe et al. (1999) on energy-using consumer 
durables or by Popp (2002). 
Why is it then useful to combine the study of all adjustments as we do in this paper? The 
answer is very simple: it allows an assessment of the relative importance of the different 
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issues. Among other things, it then shows that the usual focus on demand and consumer 
myopia is far too partial to get a full understanding on how energy prices influence energy 
use and the policy solutions that can be introduced to complement energy taxation. 
3. Conceptual framework 
A simple model  
To begin with, we develop a simple discrete choice model of the refrigerator market derived 
from Berry (1994) to describe demand. There are T markets, each representing the UK 
refrigerator market during year t (with t = 1,…,T). For each market, we observe aggregate 
quantities sold, average prices, and product characteristics for J models of refrigerators.  
Consumers choose the product that maximizes utility. The indirect utility function of 
consumer i purchasing a new refrigerator j in year t is equal to  𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 where 𝑉𝑗𝑡 is 
the average utility and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is consumer i’s unobserved heterogeneity that captures 
deviation from the average. The average utility8 is: 
𝑉𝑗𝑡 = 𝑢𝑗𝑡 − 𝛼(𝑝𝑗𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑗𝑡)  
In this expression, 𝑢𝑗𝑡 captures the value of usage of the refrigerator j over its lifetime which 
depends on product characteristics such as size, whether the fridge is built-in or 
freestanding. 𝑝𝑗𝑡  is its purchase price, 𝐶𝑗𝑡 is the discounted electricity cost of the product. 
𝐶𝑗𝑡 has a negative impact on 𝑉𝑗𝑡 which is proportional to 𝛼, the marginal utility of money, 
and a parameter γ, which captures consumers’ perceptions about energy costs. If they are 
perfectly rational, we have γ = 1. If myopic, it is expected that they underestimate the 
disutility from energy costs so that γ < 1. Estimating this parameter is one crucial objective 
of the paper.9 
                                                          
8
  This form of the indirect utility can be derived from a quasilinear utility function, which is free of 
wealth effects. This is a reasonable assumption for refrigerators, which usually represents a tiny share 
of individual income. 
9
 Here, the modeling strategy is to adopt the standard rational choice model, except but the 
parameter γ. An alternative approach could be to adopt a behavioral economics framework, but this 
will prevent the measurement of efficiency gap, which is just exactly the gap between actual behavior 
and perfect rationality. This approach is for example developed by Segerson and Tsvetanov (2014). 
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Next we decompose the value of usage in two additively separable terms: 𝑢𝑗𝑡 = 𝑢𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡  
where 𝜉𝑗𝑡  captures the time-varying component of the valuation of observed and 
unobserved product characteristics. Hence, we have: 
                                                       𝑉𝑗𝑡 = 𝑢𝑗 − 𝛼(𝑝𝑗𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑗𝑡) + 𝜉𝑗𝑡                                                            
Berry (1994) generalises McFadden’s (1973)’s discrete-choice demand model by 
transforming the logit model into a linear model that can be estimated with market-level 
data. In Berry’s framework the probability good j is purchased asymptotically corresponds to 
its market share at time t. Hence: 
𝑠𝑗𝑡 ≡
𝑒𝑉𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑘𝑡𝑘≠𝑗
 
A consumer can also choose an outside option indexed 0 that consists in purchasing no 
refrigerator. Normalizing its utility 𝑉𝑖0𝑡 to zero, the market share of product j at time t can 
be compared with the market share of the outside good so that 𝑠𝑗𝑡/𝑠0𝑡 = 𝑒
𝑉𝑗𝑡 . In logs, this 
simplifies to ln(𝑠𝑗𝑡) − ln(𝑠0𝑡) = 𝑉𝑗𝑡. The problem is that this equation rests on the 
hypothesis of irrelevance of independent alternatives (IIA) which generate implausible 
substitution patterns in segmented markets. 
To relax this assumption, we adopt a nested logit framework in which consumers’ 
idiosyncratic preferences are correlated across refrigerators within the same “nest” 
(Corr(𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡) ≠ 0), and zero otherwise
10. The mutually exclusive nests are specified ex 
ante by grouping together products the analysist thinks are closer substitutes. Under these 
assumptions, Berry shows that: 
                         ln(𝑠𝑗𝑡) = 𝑢𝑗 − 𝛼(𝑝𝑗𝑡 + γ𝐶𝑗𝑡) + 𝜎 ln(𝑠𝑗(𝑔)𝑡) + ln(𝑠0𝑡) + 𝜉𝑗𝑡                          (1.1) 
                                                          
10
 Goldberg (1995) and Allcott and Wozny (2014) are other examples where the nested logit model is 
used.  A popular alternative is the random coefficient models. We believe the nested logit model is a 
good option here for several reasons. To start with, random coefficients cannot be eliminated 
through first-differencing we use in the subsequent analysis to control for unobserved quality and 
cost characteristics and the outside option. That means we would need to estimate a non-linear 
equation and we could not ignore the outside option, of which quantification is difficult and subject 
to measurement errors.  
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where  𝑠𝑗(𝑔)𝑡 is the market share of product 𝑗 as a fraction of the total sales within group g 
that includes product j and 𝜎 ∈ [0,1] is a scalar which parameterizes the within-nest 
correlations. Note that, we get a standard logit equation if 𝜎 = 0. 
In our specification, we construct the product groups based on two dimensions that create 
product segmentation in the refrigerator market: a binary capacity indicator (i.e. the 
refrigerator capacity is below or above the sample median capacity) and whether the 
appliance is a refrigerator or a combined refrigerator-freezer. This choice is based on a 
judgment of the degree of substitutability of different products. In this respect, we believe 
that consumers willing to purchase a refrigerator, unfortunately not available, are unlikely to 
go for a combined refrigerator-freezer instead. Similarly, the choice of the size is strongly 
influenced by family characteristics (size, food consumption habits…) and dwelling 
characteristics. In Appendix A1, we give results with alternative nest structures. 
We now turn to the specification of the discounted lifetime electricity cost 𝐶𝑗𝑡. The attention 
parameter γ is inserted in Eq. (1.1) to capture potential behavioural failures. As a 
consequence,  𝐶𝑗𝑡 should not be viewed as representing the valuation of the electricity cost 
by real-world consumers. It is the cost they would consider if fully rational. They would then 
calculate the net present value of the electricity cost with the standard formula: 
                                                          𝐶𝑗𝑡 = Г𝑗 ×∑
𝑞𝑡+𝑠
𝑓
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠
𝐿𝑗
𝑠=1
                                                         (1.2) 
In this equation, 𝐿𝑗 is product j’s lifetime, Г𝑗 is the level of energy consumption per time 
period, 𝑞𝑡+𝑠
𝑓
 is the electricity price at time 𝑡 + 𝑠 that is forecasted at the time of purchase 𝑡 
and 𝑟 is the discount rate. Note that forecasted electricity prices are unobserved as the data 
only include actual prices.  
Recall that the calculation of 𝐶𝑗𝑡 is based on strong rationality assumptions. Accordingly,  Г𝑗 
and 𝐿𝑗 are product energy consumption and lifetime evaluated by experts which are 
assumed to be perfectly known by the consumer, 𝑟 is the privately-rational discount rate. In 
the following, we will use the discount rate offered in financial markets in year t (the bond 
deposit rate). Finally, 𝑞𝑡+𝑠
𝑓
 is the future electricity prise estimated with a sophisticated 
forecasting model. 
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In this latter respect, we consider that a perfectly rational consumer makes an educated 
guess about future electricity prices based on the entire series of past prices. We construct 
this guess by applying an autoregressive integrated moving-average model (ARIMA) on 
monthly data on real electricity prices.11 ARIMA models are frequently applied in time-series 
econometrics to generate forecasts. This technique allows us to recreate the entire flow of 
future expected electricity prices that enter Eq. (2.2). 
The best fit with our data is obtained with an ARIMA process with one lag for the 
autoregressive term and one lag for the moving-average term: 
𝑞𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑞𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝜗𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑡 
where 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐 are parameters and 𝜗𝑡 is the error term at time t. The model can be used 
recurrently to make forecasts, using the predictions of the previous periods to make new 
predictions. We therefore run as many models as we have years covered with our data in 
line with the assumption of rational expectations. We then calculate the forecasted prices 
with the formula: 
                                                           𝑞𝑡+𝑠
𝑓 = ?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡𝑞𝑡+𝑠−1
𝑓                                                              (1.3) 
where ?̂?𝑡 and ?̂?𝑡 are estimates of 𝑎 and 𝑏  using all the data available on electricity prices up 
to time t.  
The demand equation is specified by combining (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3). To derive an 
econometric specification for sales, we add year dummies 𝜏𝑡 to (1.1) and then take the first-
differences in order to absorb the share of the outside option, the value of usage and any 
shift in the overall market share level. This leads to: 
                            ∆ln(𝑠𝑗𝑡) = −𝛼 (∆𝑝𝑗𝑡 + γ∆𝐶𝑗𝑡(𝑟)) + 𝜎 ∆ln(𝑠𝑗(𝑔)𝑡) + ∆𝜏𝑡 + ∆𝜉𝑗𝑡              (1.4) 
where ∆ is the first-difference operator and 𝜉𝑗𝑡  is now the econometric error term capturing 
unobserved time- and product-varying heterogeneity. 
                                                          
11
 In a recent paper, Anderson et al.(2013) show that US consumers tend to believe that gasoline 
prices follow a random walk, so that the current price is a martingale. Again, we do not specify 𝐶𝑗𝑡 to 
capture real-world expectations, so that we should not use a no-change forecast even if this belief 
also applies to UK electricity prices. We do however provide the results in Appendix under this 
alternative assumption as a robustness check. This leads to increase the size of γ (and thus to reduce 
myopia). 
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Price 
In contrast with the demand equation, we rely on a reduced form equation to describe 
refrigerator price adjustments induced by electricity price changes. Developing a structural 
approach to describe the supply would require taking into account both pricing and product 
innovation behaviour of multi-product firms. We would thus need to introduce multiple 
assumptions on how competition works. Reduced form equations impose much less 
restrictions.  
Recall that our interest is in the influence of electricity costs. Accordingly, our price 
equation12 is:  
                                       𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽 − 𝜂𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗,𝑡                                                 (1.5) 
where 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a vector of control variables to be described below. τ𝑡 and 𝜇𝑗  are year dummies 
and product fixed effects, respectively. Our objective here is to estimate 𝜂. Importantly, this 
parameter measures neither the characteristics of the demand curve nor those of the supply 
curve. Instead it estimates the impact of electricity costs on the equilibrium refrigerator 
price, once demand and supply responses are both taken into account, holding constant 
product offer. This estimate will thus allow deriving a mid-term elasticity after quantity and 
price adjustments. 
Product offer 
Turning next to product offer, we take advantage of the fact that the data describes the 
products sold in the market in year t. For many products, we thus observe when it has been 
launched and/or when it has been eventually withdrawn13. Again we expect an increase in 
electricity price would induce the launch of more energy-efficient models and the 
withdrawal of less efficient ones. 
Let 𝑑𝑗𝑡
∗  denote a binary variable indicating the availability of product j at time t. More 
specifically, 𝑑𝑗𝑡
∗ = 1 if the product is on the market and zero otherwise. In addition, we 
                                                          
12
 In a variant, we include both the electricity cost and its squared value to test for the existence of a 
non-monotonic relationship between product price and electricity costs. More specifically we could 
expect that energy price increases will decrease the price of the products consuming more energy 
while the price of energy-efficient models could increase if the total demand is inelastic. Results 
disconfirm this prediction; they are presented in Appendix A6. 
13
  The dataset also includes products that are observed every year. That is, products that have been 
launched before 2002 and that have not been withdrawn before 2007. 
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define 𝑑𝑗,𝑡 as the probability that product j is available at time t. We then use a dynamic 
probit equation which relates this probability to a set of explanatory variables: 
                                         𝑑𝑗𝑡 = Ф(𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝑘𝑐𝐶𝑗𝑡 + τ𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗)                                  (1.6) 
Ф(. ) is a cumulative normal function with zero mean and a variance equal to one and  𝑘𝑑, 
𝑘𝑝 and 𝑘𝑐 are parameters. The two crucial variables are the purchase price 𝑝𝑗𝑡  and the 
operating cost 𝐶𝑗𝑡 which are both expected to decrease the dependent variable (𝑘𝑝, 𝑘𝑐 <
0). We adopt a dynamic specification with 𝑑𝑗𝑡−1
∗  as an independent variable in order to 
control for path dependency: launching a product in the market is more costly than 
withdrawing it.   
Identification issues  
Sales 
A concern with the sales equation (1.4) is that the purchase price 𝑝𝑗𝑡  is endogenous as 
quantities and prices are simultaneously determined in the market equilibrium. It implies 
that unobserved product characteristics that vary over time are correlated with prices: 
[𝑝𝜉] ≠ 0. Or, to be precise, our problem is the time-varying valuation by consumers of 
product characteristics is correlated with the error term as the characteristics themselves 
are fixed. The log of the within-nest market share ln(𝑠𝑗(𝑔)𝑡) is also endogenous: 
mathematically, a higher value of 𝜉 causes more sales of refrigerator 𝑗 and because this 
product belongs itself to nest 𝑔, an increase in 𝑠𝑗𝑡  mechanically imply increases in 𝑠𝑗(𝑔)𝑡.  
The problem might not be too severe though as first differencing already controls for the 
correlation between prices and the linear component of product-specific unobserved quality 
that do not varies over time. As regards specifically the variable ln(𝑠𝑗(𝑔)𝑡), the source of bias 
is further limited by the fact there are a large number of product-by-year combinations in 
each nest. An instrumental variable approach is nevertheless adopted. Another reason for 
doing so is to circumvent a potential measurement error problem with the dependent 
variable as we do not observe transaction prices but a national average transaction price 
calculated by GfK (see detail below)14.  
                                                          
14
 This problem is likely to be less severe than in the auto market where list prices can widely diverge 
from the prices that are actually paid after commercial negotiations.   
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To construct the instruments, a classical approach takes advantage of the fact that the 
market is imperfectly competitive. It follows that characteristics of products 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 influence 
𝑝𝑗𝑡  but not the utility 𝑉𝑗𝑡. Berry (1994) suggests using the nest structure of the model. His 
proposed instruments are then the averages for different product features within and/or 
out of the product group that product j belongs to. This approach is extended in Berry et al. 
(1995).15 A weakness of this strategy is that taste shocks that affect the other products can 
also influence utility of product 𝑗. For instance, marketing efforts by a firm can induce a taste 
shock that will affect all its products. Or a given characteristics that concern several models 
might become popular among consumers. In this respect, the fact that refrigerators are 
quite standardized products, except in the dimensions we base the nests on, is not 
necessarily good news. That means that unobserved product characteristics are going to be 
correlated across nests and manufacturers. The underlying general problem is that we 
would ideally like to use variables that shift cost as they would be uncorrelated with the 
demand shock, but quality variables affect both utility and production costs. 
Our solution is to use instruments based on the price of products sold in outside markets. 
We consider two markets: the upright freezer market (i.e. not the chest freezer market) and 
the washing machine market. Freezer and washing machines present two useful 
characteristics. First, they are sold outside the refrigerator market, and thus to different 
consumers. One can thus assume that taste shocks are less likely to be correlated. Second 
they share some technical similarities with refrigerators as they are all large household 
appliances. It follows that some shocks affecting production costs – e.g., an increase in steel 
price – can be correlated across markets.  
In fact, we do not use directly the price of freezers and washing machines. This would 
produce too weak instruments for these two products differ significantly from refrigerators. 
Instead, we use the implicit price of two characteristics that also differentiate refrigerators: 
capacity and whether the appliance is built-in or freestanding. These implicit prices are 
estimated using a hedonic pricing model on product-level data for the UK freezer and 
washing machine markets between 2002 and 2007 obtained from GfK. The details are given 
in Appendix A2. 
                                                          
15
 They use the observed product characteristics (excluding price and other potentially endogenous 
variables), the sums of the values of the same characteristics of other products offered by that firm (if 
the firm produces more than one product), and the sums of the values of the same characteristics of 
products offered by other firms. 
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The price equation 
We also express equation (1.5) in first differences: 
                                              ∆𝑝𝑗𝑡 = −𝜂∆𝐶𝑗𝑡 + θ∆𝑋𝑗𝑡 + ∆τ𝑡 + ∆𝜖𝑗,𝑡                                             (1.7) 
In order to properly identify the parameter 𝜂, we need select the variables in the vector 𝑋𝑗𝑡 
that control for supply and demand factors, except the electricity cost, that vary over time 
and across products. On the demand side, this is the utility component 𝜉 that we have 
extensively discussed above. On the supply side, the main omitted variable is the time 
varying component of product 𝑗’s production cost. The price is also influenced through 
competition by other product characteristics. 
These considerations suggest using as regressors in (1.7) the instruments used in the sales 
equation. They are correlated with product 𝑗’s characteristics and thus 𝜉 and the production 
cost as argued before. 
The product offer equation 
For convenience, we rewrite the equation here:  
                                       𝑑𝑗𝑡 = Ф(𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝑘𝑐𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗)                                      (1.8) 
We use the method suggested by Wooldridge (2005) to estimate this dynamic model. His 
method consists in re-expressing a dynamic fixed effect probit model into a random effect 
probit model than can be more easily computed. The correlation between the fixed effect 𝜃𝑗 
and the initial value 𝑑𝑗,0
∗  is made explicit. In our case, this gives: 
                                                      𝜃𝑗 = 𝑘0 + 𝑘1𝑑𝑗0
∗ + 𝑘𝑧𝑍𝑗 + 𝜈𝑗                                                      (1.9) 
𝑍𝑗  is the row vector of all nonredundant explanatory variables in all time periods. It includes 
time-constant product features (e.g., size or energy efficiency rating) but also the purchase 
price of products at each time period (i.e., the price in 2002, in 2003...). To avoid 
multicollinearity, it however excludes year dummies and only includes the running cost for 
one year because they are calculated from Г𝑗, which does not vary over time.  𝑘0 and 𝑘1 are 
parameters, 𝑘𝑧 is a vector of parameters and 𝜈𝑗 is a random effect such that 𝜈𝑗|(𝑑𝑗0
∗ , 𝑍𝑗) 
follows a normal distribution.  
Combining (1.8) and (1.9) leads to a random-effect probit model except that 𝑑𝑗0
∗  and 𝑍𝑗  are 
included as explanatory variables: 
 27 
 
                     𝑑𝑗,𝑡 = Ф(𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝑘𝑐𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑘0 + 𝑘1𝑑𝑗0
∗ + 𝑘𝑧𝑍𝑗 + 𝜈𝑗)            (1.10) 
The estimation of (1.10) poses two problems. The first is that the information on 𝑝𝑗𝑡  is 
missing in the data for all the periods when product j is not available on the market (𝑑𝑗𝑡
∗ =
0). We thus need to make an assumption about the purchase price of this product in the 
years it is out of the market. The second problem is that the purchase price of appliances 
and the probability 𝑑𝑗𝑡 are simultaneously determined, implying that 𝑝𝑗𝑡  is endogenous. 
We resolve these two problems as follows. For all the products that are not commercialised 
at time t, we need to make an assumption about their purchase price if they had been 
commercialised. The simplest method is to perform a regression on observed purchase 
prices (when 𝑑𝑗𝑡
∗ = 1) and produce out-of-sample predictions for 𝑝𝑗𝑡  when 𝑑𝑗𝑡
∗ = 0. 
However, this would underestimate the standard error of the estimated coefficients as we 
would be using imputed values for 𝑝𝑗𝑡  as if they were observed values 
We alternatively perform multiple imputations for each missing 𝑝𝑗𝑡. This technique allows 
calculating standard errors for the estimated parameters of the dynamic probit model that 
take into account the fact that prices are imputed when 𝑑𝑗𝑡
∗ = 0. The process to create 
imputations is as follows. First, we look at the distribution of purchase prices 𝑝𝑗𝑡  and 
perform a transformation on 𝑝𝑗𝑡  so that the transformed purchase prices follow a normal 
distribution.16 The transformation that we use is: 
                                                           ?̃?𝑗𝑡 = ln([𝑝𝑗𝑡]
𝑛0 − 𝑛1)                                                       (1.11) 
?̃?𝑗𝑡  are transformed prices, 𝑛0 and 𝑛1 are parameters that ensure that the skewness of the 
distribution is close to 0 and its kurtosis around 3, which are two properties of normal 
distributions. Then, we run a fixed effect linear regression on transformed prices: 
?̃?𝑗𝑡 = ℎ𝑗 + ℎ𝑐𝐶𝑗𝑡 + ℎ𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑡 + ℎ𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡 
ℎ𝑗 is a product specific fixed effect, ℎ𝑡 a time dummy and ℎ𝑐 a parameter whereas 𝑥𝑗𝑡 is an 
error term. Importantly, 𝑊𝑗𝑡 corresponds to the vector of instruments that have been used 
to control for the sales-price endogeneity and ℎ𝑊 is a vector of parameters. Using these 
instruments in the imputation process allows us to control for the endogeneity on imputed 
                                                          
16
 The multiple imputation method that we describe is known to be biased if applied to non-normally 
distributed variables. 
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purchase prices. We denote ?̂?𝑗𝑡  the predictions that we obtain from this fixed effect linear 
regression. 
Based on the results of the linear regression, we create ten imputed prices for each missing 
value of 𝑝𝑗𝑡. If we denote m the imputation number, each imputed transformed price of 
product j at time t is given by: 
?̃?𝑗𝑡
𝑚 = ?̂?𝑗𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑚 
where 𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑚 is a randomly assigned and normally distributed error term corresponding to 
imputation m for product j at time t. Next, we use equation (1.11) the other way round to 
calculate the value of the imputed prices 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑚 from their transformations ?̃?𝑗𝑡
𝑚. This step allows 
obtaining imputed values 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑚  which distribution is very similar to observed prices. 
Once the values of 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑚 have been obtained, we estimate the dynamic fixed effect probit 
model above as many times as there are imputations and then compute consistent 
coefficient values and standard errors that take into account the uncertainty surrounding 
the value of 𝑝𝑗𝑡  when 𝑑𝑗𝑡
∗ = 0. 
Note that the technique described above allows us to obtain consistent imputations that 
take into account the endogeneity of purchase prices. To control for the endogeneity of 
observed purchase prices, we run a linear regression similar from the above and extract 
predicted values that we use later on in the dynamic fixed effect probit model instead of 
using observed prices. 
4. Data 
We use market data from the refrigerator market in the UK on the product level from 2002 
to 2007 collected by the market research company GfK Retail and Technology (received by 
the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). The data includes detailed annual 
information on refrigerators and combined refrigerators-freezers sold in the UK. We identify 
products by brand name and series numbers. If not available, we rely on available 
information on product features (width, height, total capacity, energy consumption, energy 
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efficiency rating, freestanding/built-in feature, availability of no-frost system and availability 
of freezer).17 
Each observation is a product j in year t with measures including number of units sold, 
average consumer price, a set of product features such as size, whether it is a simple 
refrigerator or a refrigerator-freezer, indication whether it has a separate freezing 
compartment that can store food at -18°C, and annual electricity consumption (details 
provided in Table 1.1).  We do not have detailed information on product-specific lifetime in 
the GfK data. We thus use the information provided by the Association of Manufacturers of 
Domestic Appliances that estimates the lifetime to 12.8 years for refrigerators and to 17.5 
years for combined refrigerators-freezers (AMDEA 2008). 
Although the data is not used in our estimation, we also know the product’s classification 
according to the EU energy label. Energy labelling is mandatory since 1995 for all 
refrigerators sold in the European Union. In our data, each product is assigned to a class 
from A++ (the most energy-efficient) to G (the least energy efficient). This rating does not 
capture the absolute energy consumption of the appliance, but its relative consumption in 
comparison with products providing the same cooling services. 
Moreover, we drop observations with low sales. More specifically, we drop each model of 
which annual sales never exceeds 500 units over the study period18. This ensures that the 
models in the sample were actually commercialized at a large scale (not only on a few local 
markets) during at least one year over the period. We also drop every observation (product 
x year) with less than 10 units sold to avoid having models with sales near zero, creating a 
bias for estimating the discrete choice model. 
                                                          
17
 Brand name and series numbers were not available for retailers’ own brands. For these products, 
identification is based on product features alone. This means that, with this method, two models 
from different retailers’ brand but with exactly the same product features cannot be properly 
distinguished. Therefore, observations for retailers’ brand appliances are dropped each time the 
same product features corresponds to various models of appliances for the same year. For products 
where brand name and series numbers are available, identification on product features is always 
necessary considering that manufacturers can change some of the product features of a model 
without changing the series number (there can be various versions of a same model of appliance). 
18
 We reduce this threshold to 100 for the estimation of the dynamic fixed effect probit model 
though. Since we are interested in the appearance and disappearance of products in this specific 
case, using too high a threshold would then conduct us to overlook the appearance of some products 
on the market. 
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Summary statistics on product characteristics are displayed in Table 1.1. Table 1.2 provides 
an overview of the distribution of prices and market shares across energy efficiency classes. 
The initial data set includes 2,651 observations of which 1,823 are used to construct the first 
differences for the econometric estimation. The total number of differences used in the 
econometric estimation is thus 1,118. Descriptive statistics are provided for the 1,823 
observations used to construct the differences of the estimation sample of the market share 
and price equations. 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics on product characteristics 
Variable Unit Mean Std deviation 
Annual sales, used for the log of market shares ln(𝑠𝑗,𝑡) # of units 3283.0 5973.8 
Purchase price, 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 real £ 343.6 230.9 
Appliance lifetime, 𝐿𝑗  years 15.48  
Energy consumption, Гj kWh/year 319.3 138.4 
Height cm 138.9 43.4 
Width cm 58.8 9.3 
Capacity litres 240.2 109.3 
Energy efficiency rating
a
  2.51 0.87 
Share of combined refrigerators-freezers  0.57  
Share of built-in appliances  0.18  
Share of appliances with no-frost system  0.23  
Notes. Source: GfK, provided by Defra. Survey years: 2002-2007. 1,823 observations. 
a
 To obtain a 
numeric value for the energy efficiency rating (from “G” to “A++”), ratings were recoded with “A+” 
set equal to 1, “A”=2 and so on up to “G”=8. 
Table 1.1: Sales-weighted price and market share of appliances, breakdowns by energy efficiency 
class 
Category 
Sales-weighted 
average price 
Market share 
Energy efficiency rating 
 
 
A+ 285.2 0.02% 
A 270.8 1.94% 
B 306.5 61.98% 
C 219.9 22.10% 
D 225.0 13.59% 
E 107.6 0.27% 
G 130.7 0.11% 
Notes. Source: GfK, made available by Defra. Survey years: 2002-2007. 1,823 observations. No 
observation with energy efficiency rating of “F”. 
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We use the real average bond deposit rate of UK households of 2.83% as recorded by the UK 
Bank of England (2013) for 2002-2007 to discount the future electricity cost.19 This cost is 
calculated using data on retail electricity price from the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (2013). The real monthly electricity price data are expressed in pence with CPI=1 in 
2005 (displayed in Figure 1.1).   
 
Figure 1.1: Average monthly electricity prices in the UK, 1996-2014 
Note: The study period is between the two vertical lines 
As explained in the model section, we use an ARIMA model to proxy rational expectations 
about energy prices. The best fit to our data is obtained using an ARIMA process with one 
lag for the autoregressive term and one lag for the moving average term. We run six models 
to produce different price expectations for each year available in the GfK data, from 2002 to 
2007. Each ARIMA model is run with the electricity price data available from the previous 
years (e.g. the price expectations for consumers in 2003 are based on prices up until Dec. 
2002). We then compute price expectations up to 2030 to be able to compute expected 
electricity costs entailed by appliances until their end-of-life. The detailed results of the 
ARIMA models are in Appendix (A9).  
The initial data set includes 4,166 observations of which 2,706 are used to construct the first 
differences for the econometric estimation. The total number of differences used in the 
econometric estimation is thus 1,623. Descriptive statistics in Tables 1.1-2 are provided for 
                                                          
19
 The nominal rate was 4.61% and the Bank of England code for the statistics is IUMWTFA. We 
subtracted the average inflation rate of 1.78% between 2002 and 2007. 
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the 2,706 observations used to construct the differences of the estimation sample of the 
market share and price equations. 
5. Results  
Sales 
Estimating the attention parameter is not straightforward as there is an interaction between 
𝛼 and γ. The standard empirical approach is to separately estimate the coefficients for the 
price and the energy costs in a linear setting, and deduce from it the values of 𝛼 and γ. We 
prefer to use a GMM estimator to estimate directly all the model parameters and as this 
directly gives their confidence intervals. Table 1.3 reports estimation results of Equation 
(1.6). We include the results obtained with the alternative linear approach as a test of 
robustness in Appendix A3.  
The nested structure of the model properly accounts for market segmentation, with 
𝜎 ≈ 0.80 (significant at 5% level). Additionally, the coefficient for the valuation of money 
has the expected sign and is different from 0.  
The main result in Table 1.3 is the fact that 𝛾 ≈ 0.65. The 95% confidence interval is 0.33-
0.96. Hence the estimate of the attention parameter is statistically different from both 0 and 
1, which means that consumers discount future energy costs too much but still take them 
into account when purchasing cold appliances. While consumers systematically 
underestimate energy costs they still take a large share (65%) of future discounted operating 
costs into consideration when purchasing a cold appliance. Another way of discussing this 
result is to compute the “implicit” discount rate which would rationalize consumer behavior. 
That is, the value of r necessary to obtain a value of 𝛾 equal to one. We show in Appendix A4 
the implicit discount rate is 8.7%. Therefore, consumers behave as if they use a discount 
rate of 8.7% to compute the net present value of electricity cost. 
This implicit discount rate is relatively low when we compare with the previous literature on 
refrigerators, which have found implicit discount rates above 30%. One explanation is that 
previous estimations of the implicit discount rate used older data. Since then, investment 
inefficiencies might have reduced because a policy now targets purchase decisions in the 
European Union: energy labelling is mandatory for refrigerators since 1995. Our result could 
indicate that this approach was quite successful. This is in line with the views expressed by 
many observers who consider that the EU Energy Label has been very successful in reducing 
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the information gap about energy efficiency (see for example Atkins and ECN, 2006). 
Another possible explanation is methodological. We use panel data techniques which better 
control for unobserved product differences. In this respect, when using a hedonic pricing 
model on a cross section of models, the approach adopted by Hausman (1979) for instance, 
we find a discount rate of 72% (See in Appendix A5). As argued in Section 2, recent studies 
which rely on panel data find rates of similar magnitude. 
The average effect obtained with this base specification is robust to changes in the 
parameters used to calibrate the GMM model: the sensitiveness analysis with different 
values of product lifetimes, electricity prices and choice for the nests presented in Appendix 
(A1, A6-8) show little differences in the magnitude of the implicit discount rate.  
Table 1.2: First difference IV-GMM estimation results of the sales equation 
Dependent variable Logarithm of market share of product j 
Importance of total electricity costs (γ) 0.6476*** 
(4) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0075*** 
(3.55) 
Within-group correlation of error term (σ) 
for the demand equation 
0.7967*** 
(8.04) 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 1,118 
Test of over-identifying restriction (p-value) 0.94 
Notes. Three instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing year-on-year changes in the 
price of upright freezers and washing machines, and the squared value of these fixed effects for upright freezers . 
The nests on which σ is calculated distinguish refrigerators from combined refrigerators-freezers and appliance 
by capacity (over and below the sample median). t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Price 
Estimation results are shown in Table 1.4. We also use the generalised method of moments 
to estimate this equation. As expected, producers adapt retail prices to the electricity costs: 
an increase by one pound in future electricity costs reduces the sales price of an appliance 
by 64 pence. Two third of the increase in future operating costs are therefore compensated 
for by a decrease in the purchase price of appliances.  
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Table 1.3: First difference GMM estimation results of the price equation 
Dependent variables (1) 
Discounted electricity costs, η1 -0.6405*** 
(-4.28) 
Fixed-effect derived from the price of upright freezers 
(by size by year) 
7.77* 
(1.77) 
Squared 0.0376** 
(2.11) 
Fixed-effect derived from the price of washing 
machines (by size by year) 
171.19*** 
(3.76) 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 1,118 
Notes. The price equation includes the instruments used in the market share equation as control variables for 
time-varying changes in production costs. t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
Product offer 
Results for the dynamic fixed effect probit model are reported in Table 1.5. Unsurprisingly, 
there is high probability that a product is commercialised if it was on the market the year 
before: the coefficient is both high and strongly statistically significant. Conversely, a 
product available in 2002 is more likely to be obsolete in the future years and therefore to 
disappear during the period covered with our data. 
More importantly, any increase in the electricity costs reduces the probability that the 
product is commercialised. We can therefore expect that highly energy consuming products 
– energy-inefficient products or big refrigerators - are more likely to exit the market when 
electricity prices increase. 
Likewise, products with too high a sales price tend not to be commercialised. This result is 
statistically significant at 1%. Conversely, any reduction in the purchase price of an appliance 
increases its probability to be maintained on the market. This element is important for us 
because we have found previously in the price equation that suppliers reduce the price of 
energy inefficient appliances when electricity prices increase. Such reductions in the 
purchase price may therefore allow them to maintain inefficient products on the market 
when electricity prices go up. 
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Table 1.4: Fixed effect dynamic probit estimation of product offer based on Wooldridge (2005) 
Dependent variables Eq. (9): Log market share of product j 
Eq. (10): Price of product j 
The product was commercialised the year before (𝑘𝑑) 0.9225*** 
(37.14) 
Imputed appliance price (𝑘𝑝) -0.0016*** 
(-13.09) 
Expected and discounted running costs (𝑘𝑐) -0.0032*** 
(-5.05) 
The product was commercialised in 2002 (𝑘1) -0.6057*** 
(-17.53) 
Nonredundant explanatory variables covering all time 
periods and including time-constant product features 
(𝑘𝑧) 
Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 12,340 
Number of imputations for appliance prices 10 
Notes. t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered on products, and take 
into account uncertainty regarding the imputed values of appliance prices. Results marked with *, ** and *** are 
statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
As explained previously, the dynamic fixed effect probit model of Table 1.5 has been run on 
imputed prices since purchase prices can only be observed when products are actually 
commercialized. The imputation method, and therefore the accuracy of the results of the 
probit model, relies on a transformation of observed prices which distribution must be 
normal. The transformation that we use is such that 𝑛0 = 0.1 and 𝑛1 =  0.97  in equation 
(1.11). These parameters have been chosen so that ?̃?𝑗,𝑡 is approximately normally 
distributed. Furthermore, we perform the Skewness and Kurtosis test on ?̃?𝑗,𝑡. The p-values 
of this test is 0.30. It therefore does not reject the hypothesis of normality of ?̃?𝑗𝑡. 
 6. A simulation of electricity price increase 
If further reductions in energy consumption are a policy objective for domestic appliances – 
and there are many reasons to believe that it should be so20 – the above results allows to 
quantify the impact of an increase in electricity prices on energy use taking into account 
both consumer and producer responses. In this section, we simulate the effect of a 10% 
increase in the price of electricity. Recall that the above results describe three adjustments, 
which can be viewed as occurring in different time horizons. In the short term, consumers 
                                                          
20
 One reason is that, for 2020, the European Union has a target of 20% savings in its primary energy 
consumption compared to projections. Energy efficiency is one of the means to achieve this 
objective. In 2011, the European Commission estimated that the EU was on its course to achieve only 
half of his objective (European Commission, 2011a). 
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adjust their purchase behavior. In the mid-term, manufacturers and/or retailers modify 
prices and they revise their product offer in the long-term. Likewise, our simulation builds 
up on these three impacts. 
To assess the short run impact of an electricity price shock on market shares, we use the 
estimates of the sales equation to predict product j’s market shares 𝑠𝑗𝑡. Based on the values 
obtained for each product j at time t, we calculate the market averages for the purchase 
price, the electricity costs, the capacity and the energy consumption (in kWh/year) of sold 
appliances both in a baseline scenario (with historical prices) and in a scenario with a 10% 
increase in the price of electricity. To evaluate the medium term impact associated with 
retail price adjustments, we use the purchase price equation to predict the impact of the 
electricity price increase on 𝑝𝑗𝑡. We then recalculate market shares with the new prices. 
Finally, we introduce changes in product offer by using the results of the dynamic probit 
model on product availability. More precisely, we compute the predicted probabilities that 
each product j in our sample is put on the market without and with the 10% electricity price 
increase. We respectively denote these probabilities ?̂?𝑗𝑡 and ?̂?𝑗𝑡
10% and then calculate their 
ratio (?̂?𝑗,𝑡
10%/?̂?𝑗,𝑡), which we use to weight the market shares of each product j in the 
scenario with a 10% electricity price increase.21 
We need to make three additional assumptions. First, we assume that the increase in the 
price of electricity does not have any impact on the total amount of sold appliances.22 This is 
not unrealistic since purchases of refrigerators are mostly replacements and households are 
unlikely to do without a refrigerator because of an increase in the price of electricity. 
However, increases in the price of electricity could temporarily trigger additional purchases 
by consumers who possess relatively energy-inefficient products and therefore want to 
replace them: this transitional effect is not taken into account in the simulation. Second, our 
specification uses the expected electricity prices, not the real price. In order to calculate the 
impact of the price increase, we assume that expected electricity prices would rise 
proportionally with real electricity prices (hence, by 10%). Third, we neglect the impact of a 
                                                          
21
 In the simulation, we only use the observations for which we have predictions for market shares 
and prices. Furthermore, ?̂?𝑗,𝑡
10% is inclusive of the impact of the electricity price shock on both running 
costs and purchase price adjustments. It is however not computed in a dynamic fashion: we do not 
take into account the fact that ?̂?𝑗,𝑡
10% has an influence on ?̂?𝑗,𝑡+1
10% , ?̂?𝑗,𝑡+2
10% , etc. 
22
 Our model cannot predict the evolution of the market share of the outside good under a 10% 
increase in the price of electricity and, therefore, it is not possible to determine how the total amount 
of sold appliances would evolve. 
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change in the size of nests on the market shares of individual products since this effect is 
likely to be very small. 
Simulation results are displayed in Table 1.6. The variable of interest from a policy point of 
view is the level of energy use. The long-run elasticity of energy consumption to electricity 
price is rather low: minus 0.09 after accounting for both demand and supply adjustments. 
Consumer myopia partly explains this pattern. Recall that the attention parameter is about 
0.65, meaning that a 10% increase in electricity cost corresponds to a 6.5% increase if 
consumers were fully rational. This explains why, in the short run, the energy consumption 
of sold appliances decreases by 3.2% (See column i). 
But the differences between short-, medium-, and long-term elasticities also show the 
importance of producer behaviour. In particular, price revisions by producers almost cancel 
the impact on energy use: the elasticity before and after price adjustment is respectively -
0.32 and -0.004. On the contrary, product innovation reduces energy consumption as the 
products available in the market use less energy in average after changes in product offer. 
It is worth discussing more deeply the negative impact of price adjustments on energy use. 
It is driven by the fact that the producer response is asymmetric: energy-intensive products 
experience larger cuts than energy efficient products. In this way, retailers and producers 
compensate more the increase in discounted electricity costs for poorly efficient appliances. 
This is visible in Table 1.7 that displays the long run simulation results (column iii) with a 
breakdown by energy efficiency class. Demand shifts from energy-consuming to energy-
efficient appliances to a limited extent because suppliers compensate for the higher 
increase of the electricity costs of less efficient products by decreasing their purchase prices 
more. This supply-driven “rebound effect” is made possible by the fact that the market is 
imperfectly competitive due to product differentiation. In a competitive market where the 
price equals the marginal cost of production, producers would have less latitude in their 
pricing strategies.  
 38 
 
Table 1.5: Simulated impacts on average purchase price, electricity cost, and annual energy 
consumption of a 10% increase of the electricity price 
Sales-weighted averages Baseline Electricity price 10% higher 
 
Initial values 
 
Short term 
impact on 
market shares 
(i) 
Impact with 
purchase 
price 
adjustments 
(ii) 
Impact with 
purchase 
price 
adjustments 
and change in 
product offer 
(iii) 
Average purchase price (A) 
 
279.4 
-8.3 
(-3%) 
-24.2 
(-8.6%) 
-25.1 
(-9%) 
Average lifetime electricity cost (B) 
 
375.9 
21.7 
(5.8%) 
37.4 
(10%) 
33.2 
(8.8%) 
Average total net present costs (A+B) 
 
655.3 
13.4 
(2%) 
13.3 
(2%) 
8.1 
(1.2%) 
Average energy consumption 
(kWh/year) 
326.2 
-10.4 
(-3.2%) 
-0.1 
(0.04%) 
-3.1 
(-0.9%) 
Notes. Relative changes in brackets in second to fourth column. 
Table 1.7: Simulated impacts of a 10% increase of electricity price by energy efficiency class  
Energy efficiency rating Relative change in prices Relative change in sales 
A+ -2.3% 5.78% 
A -5.3% 3.08% 
B -6.3% 0.48% 
C -8.0% -0.70% 
D -10.4% -1.28% 
E -12.1% 0.79% 
G -18.8% -4.52% 
Note: The relative change in sales is based on the total market share of each energy efficiency class, 
the relative change in prices on the average price within each energy efficiency class. For example, 
sales of “A+” appliances increase by 5.78% with a 10% electricity price increase, and their average 
price decrease by about 2.3% 
The analysis thus points out that the impact of energy prices on energy use is plagued by 
two inefficiencies: demand-side investment inefficiencies and imperfect competition in the 
refrigerator market which gives room to producers to cushion the impact of power price 
increase with an asymmetric price response. It is then worth calculating what would be the 
elasticities had these inefficiencies not be present. Results are displayed in Table 1.8 which 
compares our results with a hypothetical scenario where consumers are perfectly rational 
(𝛾 = 1) and the refrigerator market is competitive, which means no purchase price 
adjustment in the (realistic) case where marginal production costs are constant. The long-
term elasticity would more than double (from -0.32 to -0.71). The table also shows that the 
inefficiency related to imperfect competition is larger than the impact of consumer myopia: 
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the long term elasticity -0.15 with imperfect competition and perfect rationality and -0.46 
when consumers become myopic under perfect competition. 
Table 1.8: Simulated impacts on average purchase price, electricity cost, and annual energy 
consumption of a 10% increase of the electricity price 
 Electricity price 10% higher 
Relative change in average energy 
consumption (kWh/year) as 
compared to the baseline 
Short term 
impact on 
market shares 
With 
purchase 
price 
adjustments 
With 
purchase 
price 
adjustments 
and change in 
product offer 
Consumers are myopic and 
competition is imperfect 
-3.2% -0.04% -0.9% 
Consumers are perfectly rational but  
competition is imperfect 
-4.9% -0.05% -1.5% 
There is perfect competition but 
consumers are myopic 
-3.2% -3.2% -4.6% 
Consumers are perfectly rational and 
there is perfect competition 
-4.9% -4.9% -7.1% 
 
These simulation results convey three important policy messages. First, imperfect 
competition can be a bigger problem than myopic behavior for the social planner 
attempting to increase the energy efficiency of domestic appliances. Even if consumers 
would value the future cost of energy consumption correctly when they purchase 
appliances, taxing energy would still have an attenuated impact in markets for domestic 
appliances because suppliers are able to cushion the impact of electricity price shocks on the 
sales and obsolescence of the most energy consuming appliances. 
Second, the long term impacts of electricity price shocks on product offer can be relatively 
important. In our case, omitting these would lead to underestimate the elasticity of energy 
consumption to electricity prices by about 40%. Anyway, this also implies that the two 
inefficiencies do not only have short run impacts on the sales of energy efficient durable 
goods, but also have long-lasting effects on product offer and suppliers’ incentives to 
innovate. These long-lasting effects are important in magnitude and can be severely 
affected even at moderate levels of consumer myopia or imperfect competition. 
Another lesson is that the two inefficiencies are partly “substitutes”, in the sense than an 
increase of the size of one reduces the importance of the other. So, if consumers are less 
myopic, the producer incentives to reduce the price of inefficient models are higher, and 
conversely. A policy implication is that energy labelling, which only addresses the first 
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inefficiency, may exacerbate the second problem. In contrast, other policy options – energy 
performance standards, feebates, subsidies for efficient models, eventually combined with 
taxes on inefficient models – do address both problems. 
7. Conclusion 
The existing literature suggests that consumers’ implicit discount rates for cold appliances 
are suspiciously high, implying that consumers would be myopic and would not take future 
energy costs into consideration when purchasing refrigerators. By using a discrete choice 
model applied to UK market-level panel data to estimate consumers’ valuation of energy 
savings, we find that consumers undervalue future energy costs by 35%, which is equivalent 
to applying an implicit discount rate of 8.7% to the stream of future electricity costs when 
calculating the net present value. Such a finding substantially moderates our perception of 
the importance of consumer myopic behavior as a barrier to energy efficiency investments. 
This result is robust to many factors, in particular the average lifetime of appliances, 
expected energy prices and sampling choices. Contrary to previous investigations of 
appliances, our model controls for unobserved product characteristics with product-specific 
fixed effects and we directly estimate the weight given to energy costs by approximating 
rational energy price expectations with an ARIMA model. Evidence that the energy 
efficiency gap could be much lower than previously thought has been found with similar 
methodologies applied to the US automobile market (Sallee, West and Fan, 2011; Allcott 
and Wozny, 2012). 
From a policy perspective this result suggests that the EU energy label policy, which provides 
consumers with information on the energy performance of appliances, has been able to 
mitigate investment inefficiencies. The fact that consumers finally dot underestimate too 
much future electricity costs could also plead for energy taxation if further energy savings is 
sought. However, our simulations stress the importance of another market failure which 
erodes the effectiveness of the energy price-based approach: as competition in the 
refrigerators market is imperfect, manufacturers and retailers are able to partly absorb 
electricity price shocks, by cutting the purchase price of the least energy-efficient appliances 
more.  
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Chapter 2: Impacts and Monitoring of the EU 
Policy on the Energy Labelling of Domestic 
Appliances 
François Cohen, Benoit Tinetti and Shailendra Mudgal 
The authors thank the Service Climat of the French Agency of Environment and Energy 
Management (ADEME) that initiated this research. 
Abstract 
This chapter has been written in 2011 in the framework of a study conducted by BIO 
Intelligence Service for the French Agency of Environment and Energy Management 
(ADEME) on the ex post evaluation of the implementation of the EU Energy Label in France, 
entitled “Bilan de l’évolution du parc électroménager français et évaluation bottom-up des 
économies d’énergie depuis la labellisation énergétique des appareils”. This chapter was 
originally a section in a larger report, which establishes the level of energy consumption of 
French domestic appliances and assesses the energy savings imputable to the energy label. 
Updates have been made since then, mostly to include some of the results of the FP7 
research project ATLETE II, in which BIO Intelligence Service indirectly participated as a 
service provider for the ADEME. 
This chapter presents the EU policy of an energy label along with its principal effects and 
identifies two conditions that are necessary for the policy to be effective in reducing the 
energy consumption of domestic appliances: the visibility of the label and the accuracy of 
the information that is supplied to consumers. Whereas the notoriety of the energy label 
has largely widened during its 18 years of implementation, the controls on the correctness 
of the information that is displayed still remain insufficient. This chapter therefore 
encourages French and EU public authorities to guarantee more frequent checks to ensure 
that the energy savings that are promised correspond to the real energy savings of the 
energy-efficient products that are on the market. 
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Résumé du chapitre 2 en français 
Ce chapitre a été rédigé en 2011 dans le cadre d’une étude menée par BIO Intelligence 
Service pour le compte de l’ADEME sur l’évaluation ex-post du dispositif d’étiquette énergie 
en France, intitulé Bilan de l’évolution du parc électroménager français et évaluation 
bottom-up des économies d’énergie depuis la labellisation énergétique des appareils. Il s’agit 
d’une section au sein d’un rapport plus important, qui établit par ailleurs le niveau de 
consommation du parc électroménager français et tente d’évaluer les économies d’énergie 
imputables au dispositif d’étiquette énergie. Des mises à jour ont été apportées depuis à ce 
chapitre principalement pour y inclure certains des résultats du projet de recherche ATLETE 
II, auquel a indirectement participé BIO Intelligence Service en tant que prestataire pour 
l’ADEME. 
Ce chapitre présente le dispositif d’étiquette énergie, ses principaux effets avant d’identifier 
deux conditions nécessaires pour que le dispositif soit efficace pour réduire la 
consommation énergétique des appareils électroménagers : sa visibilité auprès des 
consommateurs et l’exactitude des informations fournies. Tandis que la notoriété de 
l’étiquette énergie s’est largement accrue au cours de ses 18 années de mise en œuvre, les 
contrôles sur l’exactitude des informations fournies demeurent encore insuffisants. Ce 
chapitre encourage donc les pouvoirs publics français et européens à garantir des contrôles 
plus fréquents pour que les économies d’énergie affichées correspondent aux économies 
réelles des appareils commercialisés. 
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1. General presentation of the EU Energy Label 
Since 1995, the reactivity of households to energy issues has been stimulated by an EU-wide 
information-based measure: the energy labelling of domestic appliances. EU Directive 
92/75/CEE defines the implementing modalities of an energy label for domestic appliances. 
Following this Framework Directive, specific regulations have been adopted for each 
category of products, such as Directives 94/2/CE, and then 2003/66/CE for refrigerators, 
freezers and their combinations; Directives 95/12/CE and then 96/89/CE for washing-
machines; or Directives 97/17/CE, and then 1999/9/CE for dishwashers. 
The labelling system steadily gained popularity among European consumers. This has been 
observed in France thanks to various surveys conducted by TNS/Sofres. In 1997, two years 
after the enforcement of the EU Energy label, only 20% of the French consumers declared 
that they knew the EU Energy Label. It has however progressively gained ground and it is 
today known by the majority of consumers: 67% of French consumers declared that they 
knew the label in 2003, and 84% in 2009. 
The diffusion of energy efficient products at lower prices has spurred the EU to introduce 
two new energy efficiency ratings for cold appliances in 2003: “A+” and “A++”. These two 
new categories have been added above category “A” to provide the market with products 
that are even more energy efficient and to encourage manufacturers to develop even more 
efficient products. 
Furthermore, a revision of the EU energy label in 2010 has clarified the content and the 
scope of the new system of energy efficiency categories, with the creation of the “A+++” 
rating. The new version of the EU Energy Label has been defined in Directive 2010/30/UE. 
Figure 2.1 displays the two versions of the EU Energy Label for a combined refrigerator-
freezer: the old one and the new one currently enforced. 
In comparison with the old version, the new EU energy label has been modified in the 
following ways: 
 It includes up to three more energy efficiency categories (i.e. categories “A+”, “A++” 
and “A+++”) with respect to the old A to G classification; 
 It is identical in all the Member States; 
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 It is linguistically almost neutral, as the great majority of the texts have been replaced 
with pictograms; 
 It is printed on a unique document; and 
 It displays the noise level of products in a much more visible manner. 
 
Figure 2.1 : Old and new energy labels (example for a combined refrigerator-freezer) (Mudgal et al., 
2011) 
2. Expected effects of an energy label 
Domestic appliances that are similar in terms of technical and usage characteristics can 
differ substantially in terms of energy efficiency. If there were no energy label on electric 
appliances, most consumers would very likely purchase (without knowing it) the most 
energy inefficient goods. This is because the most energy efficient appliances are also the 
ones that are most expensive to produce. The price signal at the time of purchase would 
therefore encourage consumers to buy the least expensive goods without accounting for 
their operating costs. In the end, purchasing decisions would be biased in favour of 
inefficient products.  
Not only would this create an information failure so that energy inefficient goods are 
purchased in the short run, but it would also have a long-run effect on the types of products 
available on the market. As soon as consumers would systematically purchase energy 
inefficient goods, manufacturers would no longer have any incentives to commercialize 
energy efficient appliances. The lack of interest for energy efficient appliances would 
therefore not encourage manufacturers to innovate in the long run.  
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The main purpose of an energy label is therefore to tackle a market failure of imperfect 
information, by making a hidden dimension of the quality of an energy-using product visible, 
i.e. providing information about energy efficiency and the cost of usage of goods. As soon as 
an energy label allows distinguishing the energy inefficient goods from the energy efficient 
ones, consumers are able to choose the appliances which are best for them according to 
their own preferences: some may continue to purchase energy using products by choice or 
due to immediate financial constraints, but others may well decide to purchase energy 
efficient products. By providing consumers with a very relevant piece of information, they 
can make rational choices which, at a larger scale, contribute to rationalize domestic energy 
use. 
The impact of the energy label on the sales of energy efficient products is the most direct 
impact that can be associated to this policy. However, it is likely that the energy label has 
medium to long run impacts on consumer preferences (by increasing their awareness of 
energy and environmental issues) and on the offer of energy efficient products. The most 
likely impacts of the energy label are described below. 
Impact on sales and prices 
The energy label reduces information search costs that may lead to energy inefficient goods 
being favoured by consumers. It allows correcting the market tendency to favour energy 
inefficient goods. Therefore, the most direct impact of the energy label on the appliance 
market should be an increase of the average energy efficiency of sold appliances.  
However, an impact on prices is also very likely. It is probable that the increase in the 
demand for energy efficiency alters the structure of market prices: because the energy label 
makes energy efficient appliances more attractive, it is likely that this policy increases the 
price of energy efficient appliances relatively to the price of energy inefficient appliances. 
Therefore, a shift in demand in favour of energy efficient appliances may well lead to an 
increase in both the sales level and the price of energy efficient appliances with respect to 
their energy inefficient counterparts. 
Impact on consumer behaviour 
In the medium run, the energy label also makes consumers more aware of the problem of 
energy misuse. Generally speaking, it may contribute to a change in consumer mentality 
with respect to their use of energy: by giving a new visibility to the matter of energy 
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efficiency, the energy label may change, in the medium run, consumers’ preferences for 
energy efficient products (on the domestic appliance market and on any other market for 
energy-using products) and also change their behaviour as users of these products. These 
shifts of consumer preferences and habits could well be additional benefits of the energy 
label, which may educate while it informs.  
Unfortunately, determining the impact of the energy label on consumer awareness and on 
their behaviour as users of domestic appliances is difficult. Above all, this would require a 
better understanding of the determinants of the intensity of use of domestic appliances. In 
this respect, the educative feature of the energy label let us hope some positive effect of the 
energy label on rationalizing consumers’ utilization of domestic appliances. However, the 
decrease in the marginal cost of use associated with higher energy efficiency could generate 
rebound effects, i.e. more intensive and less caring uses of domestic appliances. The 
question is then to know if the introduction of more efficient appliances can lead to a 
significant decrease of domestic energy consumption, or if any increase in energy efficiency 
is offset by a parallel increase of the intensity of use of appliances. Greening et al. (2000) 
have reviewed 75 studies which aim to estimate the rebound effect of energy-using 
products. Depending on the type of product, the rebound effect could vary between 5% and 
40% of the initially forecasted energy savings. This means that 5% to 40% of the savings 
expected from the purchase of more energy efficient appliances may be compensated by 
increases in the frequency of use of the appliances. 
Very few studies have tried to analyse the rebound effect of washing-machines and 
dishwashers, which are the white goods which frequency of use can vary the most (contrary 
to cold appliances). Woersdorfer (2010) explains that the automation of clothes-washing 
and the massive diffusion of washing machines in households since the 50s explain the 
sharp increase in the quantities of clothes washed per household (525kg in 2000 vs. 277kg in 
1960 in Germany). This author notes that, by the 1990s, the need for washing became 
satiated. Therefore, we could expect today that the diffusion of more energy efficient 
washing machines thanks to the energy label would not lead to a massive increase in the 
frequency of utilization in the future. In this respect, Davis (2008) implemented a field 
experiment in which old washing machines were replaced freely by new, energy efficient 
ones in the sample of households that were part of the experiment. Whereas the energy 
savings associated with replacing the old appliances were about 40%, the increase in the 
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frequency of use was only around 5.6%. The rebound effect would therefore be relatively 
modest for this category of product according to the results of Davis (2008).  
Impact on manufacturers’ incentives to innovate 
In parallel to a shift in the demand for electric products, the energy label may structurally 
alter supply on the domestic appliances market. By encouraging consumers to prefer energy 
efficient products, the energy label gives manufacturers some incentives to outperform 
other manufacturers by offering innovative, energy-efficient appliances. The energy label, as 
it puts products into competition according to their energy efficiency, fosters research and 
the development of new products. This effect may well offset the tendency of the energy 
label to make more energy efficient products also more expensive, because innovation may, 
in the medium term, reduce the production cost of energy efficient products. 
3. The determinants of success 
The positive impacts that can be attributed to an energy label however depend on various 
factors. In particular, the attribution of an energy label to any product on the market 
requires the involvement of suppliers and dealers, which must put on each appliance an 
energy label in conformity with regulation. The success of the policy essentially depends on 
the commitment of these two actors. 
The role of suppliers 
Suppliers23 must establish the technical documentation that is necessary to produce the 
energy label, and must provide freely the energy label that dealers will put on their 
products. Suppliers are responsible for the accuracy of the information that they provide, 
and must make the technical documentation available to the inspectors that assess the 
accuracy of the information on the label. 
The quality of the information provided on the energy label therefore depends on the 
quality of the work of suppliers to be in compliance with regulation. To avoid frauds, EU 
Member States must guarantee that suppliers fulfil their obligations. In practice, gaps 
between real energy consumptions and the ones mentioned on the energy labels exist. 
                                                          
23
 The word “supplier” is defined in Directive 2010/30/UE as “the manufacturer or its authorised 
representative in the Union or the importer who places or puts into service the product on the Union 
market”. 
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During the first years of the implementation of the EU energy label, Winward, Schiellerup 
and Boardman (1998) have estimated that less than 50% of the products commercialized in 
the EU would have had an energy label that matched the real energy efficiency level of 
products. The other half was over-rated. One reason is that the methods used to measure 
energy consumption may vary. An additional uncertainty remains: manufacturers have the 
right to a technical margin of error, which makes over-rated appliances compliant in the 
limits of this level of tolerance. Consumers are of course not able to check for over-rating 
due to the technical margin of error at the moment of purchase. Only independent 
organisms or competitors can expertise products, which is costly. 
In some cases, as the Swedish Energy Agency (2006) mentions for Sweden, the appliances 
that are inspected are no longer produced by the manufacturer, and in some cases, the 
latter does not keep the relevant technical information during the legal duration of five 
years after the date of manufacturing of the last appliance. The verification of the accuracy 
of the information on the energy label can also become very difficult when a supplier gives 
the same name to a new version (that has different technical characteristics) of a product 
which is no longer manufactured. 
More recently, the research project ATLETE24 has tested the accuracy of the energy label 
displayed on 80 refrigerators. The check included all the criteria presented on the label and 
not only the energy category of the appliance. According to the results of ATLETE, 79% of 
the products were correctly labelled in terms of energy efficiency rating. A wave of similar 
tests is currently ongoing for washing machines in the framework of ATLETE II (2012-2014), 
the follow-up of ATLETE. Besides, a questionnaire geared to Member States in the 
framework of ATLETE II, and elaborated by BIO Intelligence Service, brings a few pieces of 
information regarding the accuracy of the energy label to display the actual energy 
consumption of appliances. In particular, Denmark has performed 500 tests on energy-using 
products in 2011 and found an accuracy rate of 80%. Still a non-negligible minority of 
products would be over-rated. 
This explains why some suppliers are worried about the distrustful practices of competitors 
that display labels that are likely to be very optimistic regarding the energy consumption of 
their appliances (Winward, Schiellerup and Boardman, 1998; Swedish Energy Agency, 2006). 
                                                          
24
 ATLETE project: Appliance Testing for Energy Label Evaluation. http://www.atlete.eu/. Website last 
consulted in January 2014. 
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Because producing appliances that are energy inefficient is less expensive, for a same type 
of appliances, the unfair competition of over-rated products may affect the market shares of 
the products that are correctly rated. Thus, even a small proportion of over-rated appliances 
can be a threat for the energy label: it is enough if consumers believe that the difference in 
prices within a same energy category is due to a difference in competitiveness, and not to a 
difference in energy efficiency or product quality. For the moment, and as explained on the 
ATLETE I and II reports on Member State activities, France is among the half of the Member 
States that has not enforced any control policy regarding the accuracy of the energy label as 
compared with the real energy performance of products. 
Beyond the need to reinforce controls on the energy efficiency of products, it is essential 
that the energy label encourages the purchase of products which environmental footprint, 
as much as their energy consumption, is lower with respect to other products. It is therefore 
essential that product-level energy efficiency policies are understood as one part of the 
more general need for ecological and socially responsible manufacturing. In this context, 
surveillance activities are not the only ones that may be foreseen. Strengthening 
manufacturers’ commitments in terms of good environmental practices could also result 
very fruitful. 
The role of dealers 
Whereas the energy labels must be provided freely by suppliers to dealers, dealers are 
responsible for displaying the energy labels in retail shops, on each appliance and on a very 
visible place. In practice, the energy label is not always put in a visible part of the appliance, 
the legal format of the label is not respected, or the label is sometimes simply missing. The 
Swedish Energy Agency (2006) finds three main reasons that explain that sometimes the 
energy label is not properly displayed:  
 The lack of time and neglect of some. Furthermore, frequent new arrivals of products 
explain that the energy label is not always put on the products on time. 
 Products in aluminium and steel have sometimes been stained by the glue used to 
stick the energy label. For these products, some dealers are no longer putting the 
labels in a visible place outside the products, but on the inside. The responsibility of 
suppliers is then involved, because they must provide glue that is adapted to the 
products that they sell. 
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 Some labels are printed in black and white, to make savings or when dealers are 
waiting for coloured labels from their suppliers. This is not compliant with current 
regulation and makes the energy label not as visible as a coloured label. 
In France, the Direction de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des 
Fraudes (DGCCRF) is in charge of controlling whether the energy label is present or not on 
the appliances for which it is compulsory. In the EU, a campaign in 149 retail shops occurred 
in 1997 and showed that most of the domestic appliances were not correctly labelled soon 
after the implementation of the old policy on energy labelling: only 44% of the 7,104 
products that were inspected (51% of the inspected products in France) had their energy 
label conform with regulation (Winward, Schiellerup and Boardman, 1998). In 2010, the 
majority of the appliances appeared to be correctly labelled. According to project ATLETE 
(2009-2011), the percentage of products correctly labelled was between 71% and 80% in 
French retail shops. In most cases, non-compliance was due to the use of a black and white 
label instead of a coloured one. This may look anodyne, but the coloured display makes the 
energy label much more visible in a retail shop than a black and white display. Therefore, 
the black and white display reduces the impact of the energy label on the decisions to 
purchase energy efficient appliances. 
Besides, the questionnaire realized by BIO Intelligence Service for the ADEME and addressed 
to Member States in the framework of ATLETE II allowed identifying, for some Member 
States, the number of inspected shops and the percentage of correctly labelled products. 
The results of the questionnaire are presented on Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. There is some 
high heterogeneity in the amounts of tests performed by Member States. Furthermore, the 
degree of compliance with regulation ranges from 40% for Cyprus to more than 90% in 
other EU countries.  
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Figure 2.2 : Amount of shops inspected every year in a selection of Member States (Pahal et al., 
2013)
25
 
 
Figure 2.3 : Percentage of products complying with EU regulation on the display of the energy label 
on domestic appliances in a selection of Member States (Pahal et al., 2013)
26
 
Synthesis of expected impacts 
Figure 2.4 sums up the main impacts expected from the implementation of an energy label. 
The positive impacts are displayed in green whereas the negative ones are in red. 
                                                          
25
 *: CZ checked 4 shops in 2010, 18 in 2011, and 300 in 2012. SK checked 226 in 2011, no data for 
2012. SL checked approximately 100 shops per year in 2009 and 2010 
26
 In DK, compliance eventually reaches 100%. Sometimes three visits are necessary but compliance is 
reached. After the third visit the case, in the advent of non-compliance, the case goes to court. In CY, 
the level of compliance has been 40% after the first inspection. However, similarly to DK, further 
inspections are carried to the non-compliant shop in order to increase the level of compliance.  
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This research highlights that an energy label can be threatened by risks which can lead to 
market distortions in the worst cases. If the energy label is not visible in shops, consumers 
will never know about it. At the same time, the display of a favourable energy label 
constitutes a commercial advantage for manufacturers. It is essential that the accuracy of 
the displayed information is controlled else dishonest suppliers could appropriate the 
benefits of such an advantage without keeping their promise of higher energy efficiency. 
This type of frauds could have heavy consequences for the labelling policy, in the short run 
as energy inefficient goods could be unduly sold, but also in the long run on the notoriety of 
the energy label among consumers, suppliers and dealers.  
 
Figure 2.4 : Diagram of the positive and negative impacts of an energy label, depending on its 
enforcement (based on Mudgal et al., 2011) 
4. Maximizing the effectiveness of the energy label 
The energy label is a policy which seems to have had a positive impact, and sometimes even 
a very positive impact, on consumers’ purchasing decisions towards energy efficient 
appliances. However, its key implementation factors need to be strengthened. With this 
objective, four levers of action could be promising: 
 Increasing awareness among consumers at the same time: it is very likely that the 
energy label makes consumers a bit more aware of the need to save energy while it 
informs them. However, its main objective is to provide information to consumers, 
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who are free to purchase or not to purchase energy efficient products. Therefore, one 
of the main drivers of the impact of the energy label on purchasing decisions is that 
consumers are perceptive about energy and environmental matters. The potential of 
the energy label as an information policy for consumer is only fully exploited if 
consumers are, at the same time as the energy label is enforced, attentive to energy 
and environmental issues. 
 A perfect match between displayed and real energy savings: when the energy label 
does not correspond to the real energy performance of a product, so that displayed 
and real energy consumptions do not match, consumers may pay for a low quality 
product at a high price. A wrong indication on the energy efficiency of a product is 
therefore worse than any indication at all. Furthermore, a false display leads to 
energy consumptions that could have been avoided, because consumers were ready 
to invest in energy efficient appliances. 
 Good visibility in retail shops: this is obvious, but good visibility is the sine qua non 
condition for the energy label to influence decision-making. If the energy label is not 
properly displayed (e.g. display in black and white or inappropriate place for the 
display), many consumers will not pay attention to it. 
 Competitive and proactive markets: by highlighting the interest of energy efficient 
products, the energy label can increase the selling price of these appliances. This 
increase in prices caused by the energy label can slightly reduce the effect of the 
latter on energy savings. With current information, it is difficult to know to what 
extent the energy label might have or might not have had an impact on the selling 
price of energy efficient products. However, this effect on prices is likely to be small 
under high competition. At the same time, the energy label plays a role in the long run 
on innovation. This effect requires that manufacturers have an incentive to make 
better products than their competitors: in this matter as well, healthy competition 
between manufacturers is required for the effect on innovation to be significant. 
Maximum effectiveness requires that all these four drivers are properly accounted for. 
Consequently, they constitute operational objectives of proper enforcement of the EU 
energy label. We therefore encourage policy makers to monitor the energy label throughout 
these four dimensions year after year. 
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Additionally, a fifth element should be considered when assessing the capacity of the energy 
label to generate environmental benefits. In fact, the energy label is effective as soon as it 
favours the purchase of energy efficient products. However, the assessment of the 
environmental benefits associated with the policy may not be limited to the average energy 
performance of products, but could take into account more general elements, such as the 
evolution of the energy consumption of the entire stock of running appliances (which 
depends on energy efficiency, but also on average product size and frequency of use) and 
the environmental impacts of products throughout their lifecycle. It may be necessary to 
look at the question of the energy efficiency of appliances within the framework of the more 
general questions of eco-design, manufacturing and sustainable consumption. In this 
matter, encouraging industry to adopt principles of eco-design and corporate social 
responsibility is important. In the case of domestic appliances, this could directly reflect on 
the environmental impact of manufactured goods throughout their lifecycle, including the 
design of compact goods appropriate for all types of households, so as to avoid that the 
energy consumption of products increases due to the increase of the average size of 
products. 
Figure 2.5 structures the objectives associated with the implementation of the energy label. 
It integrates this last dimension among the operational objectives connected to the good 
implementation of the policy.  
For each operational objective except the one related to corporate social responsibility, 
monitoring indicators are suggested in Appendix B. For each indicator, a factsheet describes 
the content of the indicator, how to measure it, use it and also its interest for the 
monitoring of the energy label. Ideally, at least one monitoring indicator for each objective 
should be scrutinized. 
These indicators have been chosen so that they could be easily collected by public 
authorities, in particular using consumer surveys. This is why these indicators are above all 
based on declarations from consumers, and not on observed data. We are aware of the 
limits of using declarations, in particular of the risk of hypothetical bias that could affect the 
outcomes. However, with the sole objective of monitoring the energy label, values in levels 
are as relevant as their year-on-year evolution. In this context, and as soon as there is no 
reason to think that the magnitude of declarative biases would change from one year to the 
other, monitoring indicators collected with surveys can perfectly match the needs of public 
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authorities, i.e. to have information on whether the implementation of the energy label is 
more effective today than in the previous years to reduce the energy bill of households. 
 
Figure 2.5 : Diagram of objectives associated to the energy labelling of domestic appliances
27
 (based 
on Mudgal et al., 2011) 
The list of indicators is displayed below, whereas their more detailed analysis has been put 
in Appendix B: 
 On Increasing awareness among consumers: 1) the percentage of consumers that 
declare that energy efficiency matters in their purchasing decisions; and 2) the 
amounts of money consumers would be willing to pay to increase the energy 
efficiency of the products that they purchase. 
 On matching displayed and real energy savings: 3) the percentage of products that 
have been checked and for which the rating on the energy label corresponded to the 
real energy consumption of the appliance. 
 On in-shop visibility: 4) the percentage of controlled products in shops and on the 
Internet complying with the regulation on the display of the energy label. 
 On competition between brands producing domestic appliances: 5) the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index on market concentration; and 6) the mean and the maximum energy 
efficiency rating of the most energy efficient appliance sold by each supplier. 
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 The objectives mentioned in this paper correspond to the enforcement of the EU label and do not 
include all the issues before implementation regarding the design of the energy label (e.g. how to 
make it easy to understand, attractive to consumers, etc.). 
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5. Conclusion 
Since its enforcement, the EU energy label has acquired an increasing popularity among 
consumers. It has furthermore been reshaped to become easier to implement for suppliers 
and dealers in all the EU Member States, in particular thanks to the replacement of texts by 
pictograms, and to take into account technical progress in energy efficiency, with the 
creation of the energy efficiency categories “A+”, “A++” and “A+++”. 
This research shows that the effectiveness of the energy label relies on two fundamental 
elements: a good visibility and the accuracy of promised savings with the energy 
consumption of appliances. Whereas compliance with the regulation is relatively high 
among dealers and suppliers, both in terms of a correct display and of a proper match 
between promised and real energy consumptions, margins of improvement remain, in 
particular through a strengthening of market surveillance activities. 
Moreover, the accuracy of displayed consumptions appears to be priority as compared with 
the issue of in-shop visibility, because even a minority of non-compliant products on the 
matter of accuracy of displayed consumptions can seriously damage the policy. Not only can 
consumers be cheated on, but this risk is high for those who would like to purchase the least 
expensive products within an energy efficiency category. In fact, these least expensive 
products within an energy efficiency category might well correspond to the ones for which 
the risk of fraud is higher, considering that fraudulent products are less costly to produce. 
Besides, all the legitimacy of the label relies on a good match between promised savings and 
real energy consumptions. In the long run, insufficient action to ensure a perfect match 
between displayed and real consumption levels could bring the energy label into disrepute. 
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PART II. The Impacts of Climate Change 
on Energy Investment Behaviour 
Chapter 3: Decision-Making in the Electricity 
Sector under Climate Uncertainty: a Literature 
Review 
François Cohen, Claire Barnett, Nial Lawlor and Lorcan Lyons 
The authors thank Directorate C, “Mainstreaming adaptation and low carbon technology”, 
of the Directorate-General for Climate Action of the European Commission (DG CLIMA) which 
has planned this research. 
Abstract 
This chapter has been written in 2013 in the framework of a study conducted by AMEC, BIO 
Intelligence Service and Milieu for the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) on 
framing investment decisions in the energy sector to adapt to climate change. The results of 
this project were gathered in a report entitled Decision Making under Uncertainty in the 
Context of Future Climate Change: Applications in the Energy Sector. This chapter was 
originally the first part of this report, which additionally includes two case-studies of 
investment decisions potentially affected by climate change. The first case study is derived 
from the experience of a UK company, the National Grid Electricity Transmission, whereas 
the second relates to the installation of a smart grid system at Castellón, Spain, by Iberdrola. 
This chapter includes a brief description of the EU electricity sector. It then describes 
impacts of climate change relevant to the sector and the levels of uncertainty in projected 
changes, general information about the drivers of investments in the electricity sector and, 
finally, decision-making methods under uncertainty applicable to the electricity sector. 
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Résumé du chapitre 3 en français 
Ce chapitre a été rédigé en 2013 dans le cadre d’une étude conduite par AMEC, BIO 
Intelligence Service et Milieu pour la Direction Générale Action pour le Climat (DG CLIMA) 
sur la prise en compte du changement climatique dans les décisions d’investissement du 
secteur de l’énergie. Les résultats de ce projet ont été rassemblés dans un rapport intitulé 
Decision Making under Uncertainty in the Context of Future Climate Change: Applications in 
the Energy Sector. Initialement, ce chapitre était la première partie de ce rapport, qui 
comprend par ailleurs deux études de cas de décisions d’investissements potentiellement 
affectés par le changement climatique. La première étude de cas est dérivée de l’expérience 
d’une entreprise britannique, la National Grid Electricity Transmission, tandis que la seconde 
porte sur l’installation d’un système de réseau intelligent par Iberdrola à Castellón, en 
Espagne. 
Ce chapitre comprend une description brève du secteur électrique européen. It décrit 
ensuite les impacts du changement climatique qui sont pertinents pour le secteur et les 
niveaux d’incertitude des changements escomptés. Il comporte ensuite des informations 
générales sur les déterminants des décisions d’investissement dans le secteur de l’énergie 
puis décrit finalement les méthodes de prise de décision dans l’incertain adaptées à ce 
secteur d’activité. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU strategy on adaptation to climate change was adopted on 16 April 2013 and set out 
aims to promote action by Member States, enable better informed decision making and 
promote adaptation in key vulnerable sectors. The majority of the Member State’s current 
adaptation plans and strategies recognise the energy sector as a priority sector for action. 
There is however relatively little information available on the decision making tools used 
within the sector and whether climate change is being taken into account within them.  
The original study conducted for DG CLIMA examines the decision making methods which 
are in current or potential use while focusing on the electricity sector. It proposes a decision 
making framework which sets out the steps for including climate change uncertainty in 
existing decision making processes. The first section of this report is the literature review 
below.  
If the EU’s targets for decarbonisation of the energy sector are to be met, there is a need for 
significant levels of investment. Investors in the energy sector are used to considering a 
range of uncertainties such as demand levels, plant availability and long term and short term 
costs as well as understanding the associated risks. However, where investment decisions 
are taken without due regard to climate change, there is a possibility that the future energy 
security of the EU may be at risk as temperature, rainfall and sea levels change and 
consequently affect the overall resilience of the sector. The risk of making inappropriate 
investments is correspondingly large as a result. 
Electricity companies have long experience of managing uncertainty as matching electricity 
generated to demand is at the core of an effective and reliable industry where storage is 
prohibitively expensive. This includes understanding the ways in which weather influences 
demand and the vulnerability of assets to different types of weather. The sector therefore 
might be expected to have a good level of awareness of the issue of climate change. 
Decision making tools used for investment analysis have already been applied to address 
issues in the sector arising from climate change. Examples include the discounted cash flow 
models and cost benefit analysis. There are also examples of broader climate risk 
assessments and adaptation plans developed within the sector at Member State level. There 
are further, more complex approaches to decision making under uncertainty which have 
been applied in academic studies of the sector. However, the industry is highly regulated 
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and the fundamental requirement for firms within it is to develop a business case to support 
an investment decision which will meet the requirements of the regulatory body within the 
relevant Member State. 
The literature review below provides a broad understanding of the drivers of any investment 
decision in the electricity sector, and analyses to what extent climate change should be 
considered in future investments decisions. It is structured as follows: 
 General characteristics of the electricity sector in the EU (covering electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution) as this provides the background context; 
 Climate change and the electricity sector, describing impacts of climate change 
relevant to the sector and the levels of uncertainty in projected changes; 
 General information about the drivers of investments in the electricity sector; and  
 Decision-making methods under uncertainty applicable to the electricity sector, 
whether they are currently in use or could be applied. 
2. The electricity sector in the EU 
Approximately a fifth of all the energy consumed in the EU is consumed as electricity. Even 
though the EU is relatively self-sufficient in terms of electric generation capacity, there is a 
dependency on non-EU countries for the import of fuels. Not all electricity generated by a 
Member State remains within it. There is a significant cross-border transport of electricity 
and increasing levels of coordination between neighbouring networks. 
In 1996, the EU agreed to liberalise the electricity sector and this has resulted in an industry 
structure that reflects the aims of the implementing policy to: 
 “distinguish clearly between competitive parts of the industry (e.g. supply to 
customers) and non-competitive parts (e.g. operation of the networks); 
 oblige the operators of the non-competitive parts of the industry (e.g. the networks 
and other infrastructure) to allow third parties to have access to the infrastructure; 
 free up the supply side of the market (e.g. remove barriers preventing alternative 
suppliers from importing or producing energy); 
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 remove gradually any restrictions on customers from changing their supplier; 
 introduce independent regulators to monitor the sector.”28 
The sector is now regulated and has a degree of competition, for instance with customers 
able to move between suppliers. The role of the regulator is to monitor and control the 
sector, protecting and advancing the interests of consumers while maintaining security of 
supply. As a regulated sector, significant components of investment require a supporting 
business plan approved by the regulator in the relevant Member State. 
Electricity cannot be stored cost-effectively on a large scale and utility companies therefore 
must aim to work collectively so that the amount of electricity generated and distributed 
instantaneously on the network balances the demand from customers. As stated on the EC 
website “Suppliers who use the networks are obliged to input the same amount of 
electricity as their customers take out and are charged by the network operator for any 
imbalances. The network operator also maintains some generating reserves with which to 
ensure that the network can remain in balance”.29 This leads to a need for complex 
relationships coordinating the elements of the electricity supply chain across a wide set of 
different systems from generation to customer. 
Electricity generation in the EU 
The majority of electricity generated by the EU-27 uses the fossil fuel sources of coal, oil and 
gas. The other main sources are nuclear energy (27.1%), hydropower (11.7%) and wind 
energy (6.4%) (data for 2011 taken from Eurostat). Total net generation of electricity within 
the EU-27 in 2011 was 3.11 million GWh (Eurostat), with the Member States with greatest 
generation of electricity being Germany (18.4%), France (17.3%) and the UK (11.3%). This is 
the current status of electricity generation across the sector (figures presented in 2011) but 
the EU is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 
2050 and this means that energy supply needs to be decarbonised (European Commission, 
2010 and 2011). The European Commission (2011) sets out scenarios for transforming the 
current energy mix to the lower carbon sector required if GHG emissions reduction targets 
are to be met. According to IEA (2012), if decarbonisation targets for the energy sector in 
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 European Commission, Competition, Energy: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html  
29
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/electricity/electricity_en.html  
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the EU are to be reached by 2035, 1,728 billion dollars (€ 1,290 billion) of investment in the 
generation of electricity will be required. Figure 3.1 shows how this investment is expected 
to be targeted, showing the significant investment required in renewable energy sources. 
 
Figure 3.1: Necessary investments in electricity generation to reach decarbonisation targets by 2035 
(IEA, 2012) 
Except for the share of electricity that is produced by autoproducers30 for their own needs, 
most of the electricity produced is purchased by intermediaries before it is resold to end 
consumers. As explained by Rademaekers et al. (2008), wholesale customers can purchase 
electricity for the purpose of resale through market exchanges, over the counter (OTC) 
operations or bilateral agreements. Wholesales markets include anonymous sales of 
electricity contracts and derivatives which help to establish a market price. There are also 
wholesale markets for the short- term sale of electricity (one-day ahead) for trading within 
the day. These are equivalent to financial spot markets. Futures contracts are also traded in 
anonymous wholesale markets. Futures contracts are an agreement to exchange electricity 
in the future (e.g. one month, one year or more) at a price agreed in the present. OTC 
operations and bilateral agreements are not anonymous in the first instance (though parties 
                                                          
30
 There are two kinds of electricity producers within the EU, those who generate electricity for sale 
to third parties and those who partly or wholly generate energy for their own use (termed 
autoproducers).  In 2011, 8.2% of total net electricity generation in the EU-27 was from 
autoproducers. This differentiation between type of producers is relevant in terms of investment 
decision making as different incentives apply however, for this study, the focus is upon the wider 
sector so autoproducers are not considered explicitly. 
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may use intermediaries to achieve a measure of anonymity) and there is no central 
exchange as there is with spot markets. 
As a result, the EU wholesale electricity power trading31 is structured over various 
interconnected regional markets and is intimately related to cross-border transmission 
infrastructure. Wholesale market electricity prices generally move in line with the prices 
(over expected prices) of crude oil and natural gas (European Commission, 2012). At the 
same time, OTC operations are a predominant feature of electric power trading. 
Rademaekers et al. (2008) emphasise that, in 2007, the EU trade of electricity (spot and 
futures) would have amounted to 6.7 million GWh in 2007, which was about three times EU 
consumption for that year. On the other hand, total exchanges amounted to about 820,000 
GWh in spot markets and 1.1 million in futures markets. 
Electricity transmission 
Electricity transmission is managed independently from both electricity generation and 
wholesale trade. In the EU, the separation of these activities is a legal obligation, as 
expressed in EU’s third legislative package to liberalise energy markets, adopted in 2007. In 
particular, Directive 2009/72/EC requires the unbundling of transmission systems and 
transmission system operators (Article 9): the same persons are not entitled to act as a 
transmission system operator and, at the same time, exercise control over an undertaking 
performing any of the functions of generation or supply of electricity (including sale or 
resale of electricity). Therefore, electricity generation and transmission must be performed 
by different companies. Likewise, the Directive requires the unbundling of distribution 
system operators (distributing electricity to end consumers), to guarantee independence of 
action from transmission system operators, supply of electricity, and generation (article 26). 
According to the IEA (2012), EU electricity transmission systems will require 155 billion 
dollars (€115 billion) of investments up to 2035. The ongoing liberalisation of the energy 
market is expected to increase cross-border exchanges of electricity and also encourage the 
provision of electricity at competitive and more harmonised prices in the EU. This is 
supported by European Regulation 714/2009, which sets conditions for cross-border 
exchanges of electricity, through the creation of the European network of transmission 
system operators. However, even in the context of liberalised electricity markets, 
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 Note – this includes market-based operations, OTC operations and bilateral exchanges. 
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investments in electricity transmission may face practical problems and economic 
disincentives that can constitute barriers to investment, as reported by Frontier Economics 
and Consentec (2008). In particular, cross-border projects, which are essential to the 
functioning of EU electricity transmission network, may face the following difficulties: 
 The planning and consents process needs to be undertaken in various jurisdictions, 
delaying projects; 
 The additional flow of electricity across a new infrastructure will affect the wholesale 
prices of electricity in connected regions, whereas the cost of building the new 
infrastructure will most likely be borne by the users of the grid on which the asset is 
situated. This is a problem if paying users are not the ones who benefit most from the 
infrastructure in terms of decreased electricity prices; and 
 There is a risk of low utilisation of the asset once it is operational, if market conditions 
which may depend on conditions in individual countries, do not encourage electricity 
exchanges through it.32 
Within the context of this research this is relevant as each of these potential difficulties 
represent an area of risk or uncertainty that would be relevant to an investment decision. 
Electricity distribution 
Electricity distribution is the activity of distributing electricity to end users through medium 
to low voltage lines. It is the mechanism by which electricity is supplied to its end users 
(from generation, to transmission and then distribution). Distribution Network Operators 
perform asset management operations, network operations and customer relations.  
According to IEA (2012), the necessary investments in electricity distribution to 2035 will 
amount to 688 billion dollars (€514 billion). Investments will be driven primarily by the need 
to replace ageing infrastructure, but also by the development of distributed energies 
networks and smart grids. 
                                                          
32
 Noting that a well known impact of interconnection is that local generators can choose to reduce 
prices to respond to a market threat from new importers and this may reduce the financial incentive 
for physical transfers. 
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3. Climate change and the electricity sector 
The previous section set out some of the wider context for uncertainties relevant to 
investment decisions in the electricity sector across the EU. As discussed below, 
understanding weather impacts is part of the operation of the sector. The pertinent 
question however, is to what extent climate change impacts are understood. This topic is 
also explored in this section, considering the way relevant variables impact the operation of 
the sector and where there are areas of uncertainty associated with the impacts of climate 
change, relevant to electricity generation, transmission and distribution as well as demand.  
The impact of weather on the electricity sector 
Weather has an impact on the electricity sector, clearly seen in terms of fluctuations in 
demand and in the ability of the sector to generate and supply electricity efficiently. 
Variables such as wind speed, precipitation, temperature or solar radiation all have an 
influence on electricity production, transmission, distribution and consumption. 
The performance of electricity generating facilities can be influenced by weather conditions, 
with sensitivity to different weather phenomena depending upon the type of generation. 
For example: 
 Thermoelectric generation can be affected by cooling water availability and its 
temperature. One study estimates that, on average, 25 gallons (95 litres) of water are 
necessary to produce each kWh of electricity generated via the steam cycle (Bull et al. 
2007). To provide cooling, nuclear power plants require reliable supplies of water 
within a specific temperature range; 
 Power production from renewable sources of electricity depends on the absolute 
availability of renewable resources such as water, wind or solar radiation. In some 
parts of Europe snow melt is an important source of water for hydroelectric plants 
and facilities can be affected by a reduction in snowfall or a change in the timing of 
the melt season; and 
 Flooding, whether flash flooding from storms or related to sea level rise as well as 
coastal erosion can put at risk the functioning of power plants as well as the viability 
of sites and may have additional impacts on safety concerns (e.g. for nuclear power 
plants). 
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For the electricity transmission network, hail, gale and lightning are considered to be 
amongst the most influential weather phenomena that can affect the reliability of power 
networks (Brown, 2002) and the frequency of lightning strikes has been shown to correlate 
with the frequency of outages (Zhou et al., 2006). In the United States, EPRI (2006) has 
estimated that 30% of power outages are related to lightning and costing utilities over 100 
billion dollars annually. Similarly, Domijan et al. (2005) discovered that wind is one of the 
most significant factors affecting the total number of daily outages, followed by rainfall and 
moisture/dew. Furthermore, Yu et al. (2008) found that temperature variables have an 
impact on the economic performance of the UK’s distribution network operators, even 
though they found that the magnitude of this impact was small on average in the special 
case of the UK. 
More generally, all transmission and distribution networks are affected by high temperature 
which requires that some equipment must be “de-rated”, reducing the amount of current 
they carry (Defra, 2012). Transmission and distribution networks are themselves also 
vulnerable to risks from flooding, particularly scouring of foundations and flooding of assets 
installed at ground level, such as sub-stations. Studies have shown that restoration time 
after power outages during winter storms is considerably longer than during normal 
weather (Wang and Billington, 2002). This may reflect concomitant impacts such as the 
event triggering the outage also hampering the ability of teams to reach the site of the 
outage and effect repairs as well as factors such as waterlogged ground reducing natural 
draining.  
As regards electricity consumption, Defra (2012) note that temperature is often negatively 
correlated with electricity consumption because in the UK demand is predominantly related 
to low temperatures, primarily due to the heating load. However, high temperatures can 
also put more stress on electricity consumption due to the demand from use of cooling 
appliances (Hor et al., 2005), sales of which are projected to grow overall in Europe. In 
Spain, Pardo, Meneu and Valor (2002) have been able to estimate the influence of heating-
degree days on electricity consumption with daily consumption and weather data. They 
found, similar to Peirson and Henley (1994), that the temperatures of previous days can also 
have an accentuating or an attenuating impact on the electricity consumption of the day 
implying that longer periods at a higher temperature may lead to the establishment of a 
pattern of higher demand.  
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The impact of climate change on the electricity sector 
As climate changes, the expected change in the weather variables discussed above will 
introduce new challenges for electricity supply systems, from generation to electricity 
distribution networks. In the UK, Defra (2012) identified four main climate variables relevant 
for the electricity sector in the UK within the context of climate change: temperature, 
precipitation, wind and sea level. Although the Defra study focused upon the UK, the 
variables identified are relevant to the EU-27: 
 Temperature: Projected change in temperature is one of the aspects of climate 
change where there is greatest confidence. With an increase in average temperatures, 
the number of cooling degree days is likely to increase while the number of heating 
degree days will decrease. This could shift the typical European seasonal pattern of 
electricity consumption from a winter to a summer peak. The European Environment 
Agency report on climate risk and vulnerability (EEA, 2012) presented a reduced 
demand for heating (particularly in northern and north-western Europe) but increased 
demand for cooling (particularly in southern Europe) as one of its key findings. 
Increased temperatures also have implications for generation capacity in that many 
power stations draw water for cooling from water courses. As temperatures increase, 
this becomes a less efficient process, with further limitations on the temperature of 
cooling water discharged (given the ecological damage that could be caused to 
receiving waters). Summer months are also the traditional time for maintenance work 
in the electricity sector but increased cooling demand may shift the window of 
opportunity for systems to be shut down; 
 Precipitation: IPCC (2007) sets out the precipitation patterns projected for the future 
as climate changes, with a general drying in southern Europe and increasing levels of 
precipitation in northern Europe. This implies a potential opportunity for greater 
hydroelectricity generation in northern Europe but possible challenges for those in 
the south (depending upon design). More recent research has also shown that there 
is medium confidence that some regions of the world have experienced more intense 
and longer droughts, in particular in southern Europe (IPCC, 2012). Where there is a 
reduction in the water resource available, water for cooling power stations may not 
be available in sufficient volume for generation at full capacity throughout the year. 
There is also evidence of loss of snow cover and retreat of glaciers, altering the timing 
and volume of water available from snow melt. This has implications for the 
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generation of hydroelectricity in some Member States. Changes in extremes rainfall, 
the high intensity rainfall events that occur over very short periods, also increase risk 
of surface water flooding in addition to the longer periods of rainfall that can increase 
flood risk generally. Assets, particularly in distribution networks given their density in 
urban environments, may then be at increasing risk from flood; 
 Wind: Projected changes in wind climatology are highly uncertain and there is no 
significant trend emerging from observations gathered over recent decades. Thomas, 
Cox and Tindal (2009) have tried to analyse wind speeds to see if a pattern of change 
could be found from one year to the next in Northwestern Europe because of climate 
change. Their statistical analysis found no discernible pattern within the quite high 
variations of wind speeds. The IPCC (2007) also confirms that future projections of 
changes in wind climate are highly uncertain across Europe, although more recent 
work confirms that it is likely that there has been a pole-ward shift in the main 
Northern Hemisphere extra-tropical storm tracks (IPCC, 2012); and  
 Sea level: sea levels are rising and, in a global average sense, will continue to rise in 
the future (as a combined result of thermal expansion of the oceans and melt of ice 
currently on the globe’s land masses). It is likely that there has been an increase in 
extreme coastal high water related to increases in mean sea level (IPCC, 2012). The 
challenge is that regional patterns of future sea level rise are highly uncertain as they 
are heavily influenced by ocean dynamics and land movement (for example, northern 
parts of the UK are steadily lifting as a result of ‘isostatic rebound’ following the last 
ice age). Further, in some oceans there are thought to be areas where sea levels may 
actually fall in the future as a result of weakening or repositioning of ocean currents. 
As a guide, it is sometimes suggested that regional sea level could be plus or minus 
fifty percent of the global average (Hulme et al, 2002). Within the package of 
documents accompanying the EU Adaptation Strategy it is noted that energy 
production located in coastal areas may be threatened by sea level rise, storm surges 
and coastal flooding and that siting of future plant must take into account climate 
scenarios.33 
                                                          
33 Climate change adaptation, coastal and marine issue, Accompanying the document 
“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
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These are only the main variables identified but there are others which are relevant. The 
Energy Networks Association (ENA, 2011) identified potential impacts on the distribution 
networks in the UK to be associated with wind and/or ice storms, lightning, heat wave and 
drought. As with the Defra (2012) study, these are impacts which, although identified in a 
UK study, are relevant across the EU. 
The level of confidence in projections of changes in specific climate variables and how 
patterns of change will vary regionally are mixed. Even where long term trends are well 
understood and there is confidence in projections of future change, interannual variability 
means that some years could be much hotter, colder, wetter or drier than average, 
introducing a degree of uncertainty. How the changes in climate variables could interact 
with the electricity system is also a very complex issue adding to the challenge of 
determination of future demand as well as prices and costs. For example, higher 
temperatures may increase demand due to air conditioning or reduce it due to lower 
heating requirements. 
According to Defra (2012), climate change will mean interconnected risks for electricity 
security and for investment costs in the UK energy sector, including: 
 Power supply disruption and asset deterioration (e.g. due to increased fire hazard 
from changes in carbon-based fuel moisture content, increased overheating of energy 
industry buildings); 
 Variation of renewable energy resource availability and output (solar radiation, water, 
etc.); 
 Potential reduction of efficiency in power station outputs (e.g. lower cooling efficiency 
of warmer water) and power transmission (e.g. cables affected by temperature 
changes); and 
 Changes in energy demand patterns, possibly reducing total energy demand due to a 
lesser need for heating, but also increasing the risk of the impact of demand peaks 
exceeding grid capacity. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions: An EU Strategy on adaptation to 
climate change”, SWD(2013) 133 final 
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The same report also sets out risk of flooding for electricity substations and other energy 
infrastructure located in vulnerable areas noting: “The number of power stations at risk of 
flooding in England and Wales is projected to rise from 19 today to 26 (21 to 27) in the 2020s 
to 38 (31 to 41) in the 2080s.The risk of flooding to major substations is projected to rise 
from 46 today, to 53 (48 to 60) by the 2020s and 68 (57 to 79) by the 2080s”34. It is unlikely 
that this risk applies only to the UK although it would not be advised to take this as 
indicative of risk for other Member States as rainfall changes and flood risks will not be 
homogeneous across Europe (as noted previously). 
A study by Vine (2008) also discussed how climate change will affect power generation, in 
particular from hydroelectric plants because reduced water flows will be available at peak 
demand periods in summer and also because water scarcity will create additional stress on 
regional water management. Although this particular study was undertaken in California, 
the results can be taken as analogous to Southern Europe and are more widely applicable in 
Europe as expected changes to the cycles of snow and rainfall will have similar impacts. 
Early snow melts and heavy stream flows could force engineers to release water from 
reservoirs and divert water from hydropower facilities in order to avoid flooding and 
damage to the installations. The timing of snow melt peaks in the cycle of annual water 
resources is a key input to hydropower generation calculation in alpine areas. There are 
indications that since the 1970s, annual energy production of some existing hydropower 
stations in Europe has decreased, in particular in Portugal, Spain and other Southern 
European countries (UCTE, 1999). Although this reduction has been attributed to changes in 
average discharge, it is not known if this is a consequence of climate change (Lehner et al., 
2001), even if it appears consistent with climate projections. Conversely, it has also been 
suggested that the potential for hydroelectricity generation in Nordic countries will increase 
as a result of projected change in climate (Golombek et al., 2012). 
Climate change and uncertainty for the electricity sector 
In the context of the electricity sector, climate change uncertainty has most impact on 
assets with long lifetimes, such as energy generation and transmission infrastructure which 
                                                          
34
 The ranges in the figures reported by Defra (2012) result from the different climate change 
scenarios used within the study, i.e. 21 cm under the low emissions scenario, 26 cm under medium 
emissions and 27 cm under high emissions by the 2020s, etc.  The projections used are the UKCP09 
Climate Projections for the UK. 
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may have operational lives of 50 years or more (noting that the same observation applies to 
many other sectors including for example transport and the built environment). The further 
into the future that is considered, the greater the uncertainty in climate projections because 
the future evolution of GHG emissions is not known, hence the use of scenarios. Further, 
climate projections begin to diverge after the middle of the century depending on the GHG 
scenarios used, (i.e. the difference between the low and high emission scenario becomes 
more significant). This introduces another element of risk. Where assets have a shorter 
lifetime, routine replacement programmes provide opportunities to increase resilience 
periodically in the future. With longer lifetime assets, there is a risk of “locking into” a design 
solution which may not provide long term resilience.  
Adaptation reports from utility companies in the UK (as a commitment under the UK Climate 
Change Act (2008)) set out the aspects of climate change which can be linked to 
vulnerability, or risk, and present a view of the levels of uncertainty associated with each. 
These reports, although part of the same overall package as the Defra report on climate 
risks to the sector (Defra, 2012) were developed independently by utility companies without 
sight of the Defra report. It is interesting to note that the Defra report highlighted four main 
climate variables but that the industry owned studies identified others. The additional 
factors considered in the adaptation reports include:  
 Increases in the frequency of lightning; 
 Increases in wind speeds and occurrence of gales; 
 More occurrences of snow, sleet, blizzards, ice and freezing fog; 
 Increase in both coastal and river erosion; and  
 Increased risk of subsidence where soils are susceptible. 
Changes in wind and lightning were highlighted as two of the more significant areas of 
uncertainty with a lack of information (for these variables) in the scenarios of climate 
change. This was summarised in the adaptation report from National Grid – Electricity 
(2010) which details a number of gaps in industry knowledge about the risks associated with 
climate change, derived for the main areas of uncertainty in climate projections for the UK. 
Similar observations have been made by other utility companies in their own reports but 
National Grid identified that: 
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 There is no information available on future changes in the frequency or intensity of 
wind and gales. This includes a lack of information on the likelihood of a period of low 
wind speed (dead calm) coinciding with a period of high ambient temperatures, 
conditions that increase the challenges of supplying energy to customers as demand 
increases at the same time as risk to the network; 
 There is no information on future changes in the frequency or intensity of lightning. 
Transmission and distribution systems are particularly vulnerable to lightning but 
climate models are not able to provide projections of likely changes to lightning (due 
to resolution) so this remains one area of significant uncertainty; and  
 There is limited information on the frequency and intensity of snowfall and 
accumulations and no information on the likely frequency of ice and freezing fog, 
conditions which can make overhead lines vulnerable to damage. 
These observations, although specifically for the UK, are relevant for the whole of Europe. 
There is a lack of consistency in the projected changes to the future wind climate and a lack 
of confidence in the future frequency and intensity of storms. Changes in storm frequency in 
Europe show no clear overall trend, with a general increasing trend being observed from the 
1960s to 1990s, followed by a decrease to the present (EEA, 2012). Research has however 
suggested a shift in the storm track may be likely, with a weakening of the Mediterranean 
storm track and a strengthening of the storm track north of the British Isles (Bengtsson et al, 
2006) although there is currently no consensus on this point within the research community.  
Figure 3.2 visualises the differences between risk and uncertainty across the electricity 
sector associated with climate change. For example, based on the definition of Knight (1921) 
as set out in Box 3.1, projected changes in temperature pose a risk to all parts of the 
electricity sector as each element (generation, transmission and distribution) are vulnerable 
to temperature increases. 
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However, because of confidence in projected changes of temperature, there is relatively 
little uncertainty. Conversely, all parts of the sector are vulnerable to storms, gales and 
strong wind but there is very little information in future projections making this a key area 
of uncertainty. For precipitation which could result in flooding, larger electricity generating 
plants are often assessed for flood risk and the likelihood of a flood impacting the site is thus 
understood. Flooding is therefore a risk but there is limited uncertainty. However, 
uncertainty associated with flooding increases for transmission and distribution networks 
because they are less likely to have been flood risk assessed (in part because of the number 
of assets within the networks). Further, flash flooding due to surface run off is more 
common in urban environments and this is where the majority of distribution network 
assets are located. There is significant uncertainty associated with this type of flooding 
however as it is due to very localised and intense rainfall. 
 
Figure 3.2: Schematic of risk versus uncertainty associated with climate change across the 
electricity sector 
Box 3.1: Defining uncertainty and risk 
Uncertainty can be defined as the information gap which impedes the simple calculation of 
expected prices, costs and amounts of electricity transmitted or generated. Following the 
work of Knight (1921), economists usually distinguish between risk and uncertainty. Under 
risk, the set of probabilities that may lead to different outcomes is known. For example, 
based on past evidence and assuming no change in average wind speed, it is possible to 
estimate the expected frequency of days with high wind speeds and days with low wind 
speeds for a specific location. Using the probability that wind speed is high or low, it is 
possible to calculate expected electricity generation by a wind turbine and derive expected 
profitability and other related variables. Use of the probability allows risk to be managed for 
the location and a calculation of a most likely cash flow is possible. On the other hand, 
climate change may impact wind speeds but in ways which are much more uncertain leading 
to changes in wind speed, direction or extremes. For this range of potential change, a 
probabilistic approach to risk may no longer be valid. 
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Climate change can add uncertainty and risk to investment costs in electricity infrastructure 
but it may also be that investment which includes an adaptation measure to manage the 
potential impacts of climate change will have only marginal additional cost or that a 
behavioural/management change (with no additional costs) will be sufficient to address the 
risk. For example, where a nuclear facility is to be constructed in a coastal location, the 
platform upon which the site is constructed needs to be at a height above sea level 
considered to be free of risk of inundation and coastal flooding. Any additional height 
required to address uncertainty in regional patterns of sea level rise will increase overall 
investment cost at the time of construction but this may be small compared to the cost of 
making the site resilient later. More generally, investment decisions which do not take into 
account climate change, and the uncertainty associated with it, risk requiring additional 
investment in the future. In a worst case scenario, an investment where climate change and 
the associated uncertainties are not considered could become inoperable before its full 
potential life cycle is complete. One example would be development of an asset which 
requires significant water inputs in a region where drought is likely to occur more frequently 
in the future. Key is to avoid locking into an asset design which provides no option for future 
adaptation. In this context, Defra (2012) recommends that considerations of climate change 
should be taken into account in relation to known weather sensitivities, so that maintenance 
programmes, for example, will not compromise electricity supply during extreme weather 
events. 
Understanding of climate impacts on the electricity sector across the EU is increasing. A 
recent report by the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2013) states that “According to 
the information submitted by the EEA member countries, a total of 16 countries have already 
adopted national adaptation strategies, and 12 others are currently in the process of 
developing them”. Of those who have already adopted a national adaptation strategy, the 
majority (Finland, UK, Portugal, Spain, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Germany and 
Lithuania) highlight the energy sector as a priority area within the strategy. That is not to say 
that the others do not identify energy as a vulnerable sector however. Hungary has 
indicated that critical infrastructure will be one of the priority themes in the revised national 
adaptation strategy. Sweden assessed risks to energy systems in its vulnerability 
assessment. Other strategies take a non-sectoral approach, considering adaptation as a 
cross sectoral issue. Further, some Member States have studies and assessments of 
vulnerability of the energy sector where an adaptation strategy has not yet been adopted. 
The EEA report identifies energy sector actions in the plans of 14 countries (this includes 
 75 
 
those plans in development). An example of a Member State adaptation action plan for the 
sector is given in Box 3.2 below. 
Box 3.2: French Adaptation Plan – Energy and industry action sheet
35
 
Action n°1: Manage the emergence of peaks in summer energy consumption via an electrical 
capacity obligation mechanism 
Cold spells usually trigger consumption peaks. A planned capacity obligation established in this context 
would also be adapted to peaks in hot spells (linked to cooling requirements). It would safeguard 
continuity of supply available for use. 
Action n°2: Promote the use of more efficient cooling equipment (air conditioning) or equipment 
using renewable or recoverable energy 
Pursuing mechanisms for Energy Saving Certificates (ESC) and the adoption of a 3rd period will 
encourage people to replace the most energy-intensive cooling equipment and promote renewable 
energy sources such as geothermal energy. The Heating Fund will back collective cooling projects 
using renewable or recoverable energy, which will mean fewer pressures on the network during hot 
weather. 
Action n°3: Make all hydrogeological and climate data available 
This request, which emerged from the consultation exercise, will be met by the implementation of a 
national water data plan. This will improve the quality of data available online on the Eau France 
knowledge-sharing portal. Climate data and regional projections will be available from 2012. 
Action n°4: Integrate climate change into the monitoring indicators of the Framework Water 
Directive 
Long-term monitoring of the status of bodies of water within the FWD is an important tool for observing 
the effects of climate change. This permanent observation process should be able to isolate disruptions 
attributable to global warming from those caused by industrial activities using water for cooling (notably 
electricity generation plants). The permanent network, which will be introduced in 2012, will integrate 
this aspect of climate change into the indicator monitoring process. 
Action n°5: Identify French industrial sectors which are vulnerable to climate change and 
potential opportunities (2030-2050) 
Several economic sectors (agriculture, forestry, energy generation, tourism, transport, etc.) are 
positively or negatively affected by changes in the climate, depending on the case. The industrial sector 
is very important for the national economy and the balance of trade, but to date there is little evidence 
available about its vulnerability to future climate change. This action aims to evaluate the sensitivity of 
this sector to climate change and the implications in terms of economic intelligence at a national level 
for a 2030 and a 2050 horizon. 
4. Drivers for investment in the electricity sector 
Within this section, a range of the drivers for investment and how this influences decision 
making are considered. The types of potential investors, challenges, opportunities, EU (and 
Member State) policy and the constraints of investment in a regulated industry all influence 
decision making.  
As an example, for the Connecting Europe facility, it is estimated that approximately €200 
billion of investment is needed for electricity and gas networks (in combination) of European 
                                                          
35 French National Climate Change Impact Adaptation Plan 2011 – 2015, 
http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ONERC_PNACC_Eng_part_1.pdf  
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importance alone. €100 billion of this investment should be delivered by the market 
unaided, whereas the other €100 billion will require public action to leverage the necessary 
investments.36 In public-private partnerships, particularly for development of new 
generation capacity, the driver for public bodies is most likely to be energy security while 
the private sector partners will most likely decide to invest (or not) based on a profitability 
assessment which considers financial flows from the project planning phase through to the 
end-of-life of the asset, in particular the income that can be generated versus the capital 
costs and operating costs (including fuel and maintenance). For many investments in the 
sector, the investment must be approved by the regulator in the Member State, with 
application based on a business case which includes appropriate consideration of such costs 
and benefits (often assessed over a set period of time which may not take account of 
climate change horizons).  
As discussed previously, the IEA have estimated that over €1 billion of investment will be 
required across the energy sector in the EU over the next two decades if EU targets for 
decarbonisation of the sector are to be met by 2035. This is a significant driver for 
investment but there are a range of barriers associated with investment in electricity 
generation. Any form of barrier can represent a risk or uncertainty in the investment 
decision as it may affect return on investment, development timescales and costs, successful 
installation of the proposed infrastructure, etc. For example, there is a need for significant 
investment in renewable energy technologies identified but challenges relating to public 
opinion, connecting to the existing grid, gaining appropriate consents and permits, etc., can 
be seen as potential barriers. The fact that investment continues to be made in renewable 
energy suggests that the sector already overcomes such barriers (and therefore 
uncertainties) in decision making processes for investment. 
There are other risk and uncertainties associated with meeting the decarbonisation targets 
of the sector. Distributed technologies, such as integrated deployment of small and medium 
scale renewable electricity generation, can face barriers to their uptake as a result of 
network effects. Put simply, connection needs to be made from the new asset to the 
existing grid and there is a cost incurred in doing so, both in terms of the cabling but also in 
gaining appropriate permissions along the route. Although this is a transmission and 
                                                          
36
 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/investment/europe_2020/investment_n
eeds_en.htm  
 77 
 
distribution constraint, it has the potential to restrict investment in generation 
infrastructure as there is uncertainty in whether connection to the grid will be possible (a 
factor also linked to accessing financial incentives for investment in specific technologies). 
Bruckner, Morrison and Wittmann (2005) studied the importance of network effects and 
network externalities to better understand energy planning with distributed technologies. 
Paradoxically, such technologies may be profitable only if interconnected infrastructure is 
already in place before any investment is made, for example adding to existing networks 
rather than establishing a new one or installing district heating only where a suitable source 
of low carbon energy/heat already exists and there is a demand for the heat it provides. This 
is particularly relevant in that smart grids are designed to facilitate integration of distributed 
technologies and so any development of a smart metering programme, when combined 
with a smart grid, can facilitate investment in distributed technologies. 
To promote electricity generation from renewable sources, Member States have put in place 
feed-in payment (or tariff) systems, quota obligations with tradable green certificates, 
investment grants and tax incentives (Ragwitz et al., 2012). At Member State level, one of 
the most commonly used policy options for the support of renewable sources of energy are 
feed-in systems with 20 out of 27 MS using them to support the development of renewable 
sources of energy (see Figure 3.3). Two kinds of feed-in systems can be implemented, either 
Feed-in tariffs which guarantee a fixed price per kWh of electricity or Feed-in premiums 
which guarantee a fixed premium per kWh of electricity, paid additional to the market price 
of electricity. 
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Figure 3.3: Map of EU countries according to their support mechanism of renewable sources of 
energy (Ragwitz et al., 2012) 
5. Decision-making methods under uncertainty applicable to the 
electricity sector 
As well as uncertainties related to physical factors, such as changes in wind climatology, 
climate-related factors are part of a wider picture of risk and uncertainty: 
 Capital costs can be subject to the uncertainty of construction cost escalation. This 
phenomenon has been observed, for example, during the construction of nuclear 
power plants and has been documented in the US for example (Hultman, Koomey and 
Kammen, 2007). This particularly applies to generation as the scale of investment is 
typically larger than for transmission or distribution assets but the effect does apply 
across the sector (as it does in others such as transport, etc); 
 Operating costs are subject to uncertainty in unpredictable maintenance costs or risk 
of price increase of inputs, such as fuel prices for a coal-based power plant. This is 
relevant across all parts of the sector. One example associated with transmission and 
distribution networks is the likely requirement to increase the frequency of 
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vegetation clearance, including cutting back trees in order to make sure overhead 
lines clearances are maintained; 
 Price have many kinds of risks and uncertainties37 from the daily fluctuations of 
electricity prices in the wholesale market to, more structurally, factors such as the 
uncertain evolution of supply and demand in the long run. Furthermore, future 
climate change mitigation policies and the way they are reflected in electricity prices 
is an unknown parameter to investors that results in additional price uncertainty 
(Ming et al., 2008). This could impact all in the electricity supply chain, from 
generation to distribution, given price is so closely linked to income derived from 
electricity supplied to customers; and 
 Quantity requirement are subject to the overall variation in expected demand 
dependent on structural factors such as use of electric vehicles but may also be 
affected by strategies adopted by other suppliers and their expectations, for example 
the degree to which they invest in solar energy. This impacts all parts of the supply 
chain as it is a capacity issue, either providing adequate capacity in the distribution 
network to accommodate distributed technologies or through the total of energy 
generated to meet demand (and the infrastructure required to supply it). 
A common classification of the existing models for investment decisions in the electricity 
sector is based on the planning horizon of the decisions to be made. Short term planning 
deals with very short time horizons of supply adjustment, typically over one week or less. 
Medium term planning deals with decisions over a 1-3 year period, whereas long term 
planning typically has a horizon of more than 15 years (Wallace and Fleten, 2003).  
For long term electricity planning, the use of data management and modelling techniques is 
common using both technical and economic factors. Wallace and Fleten (2003) present a 
general framework for profitability assessment of long term investments, such as the 
building of thermal units or the construction of hydro reservoirs and turbines. They explain 
that the starting point of this kind of assessment is the projection of future expected load 
and, in practice, the consequences of a wrong assessment of this expected load can be 
significant. For example, an underestimation of electricity demand by a retailer may lead to 
                                                          
37
 In the case of feed-in tariffs, price uncertainty is not faced by investors in renewable electricity 
generation as the price of electricity is fixed by contract. 
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higher than expected operational costs because the additional demand has to be met by 
purchasing additional amounts of electricity at a high price on the wholesale market. As load 
forecasts for the electricity network affect electricity transactions on the futures market, 
they can have a significant impact through wholesale futures prices on all the actors in the 
electricity sector from producers to end consumers. Financial incentives, such as Feed-in-
Tariffs, can however provide some certainty as a price is fixed for the duration of a contract 
(as discussed earlier).  
Tools employed to forecast load include regression and time series analysis, but also 
methods belonging to the fields of artificial and computational intelligence (Hahn, Meyer-
Nieberg and Pickl, 2009). Regression and time-series analysis are classical methods of 
statistical analysis based on explicitly formulated mathematical models which estimate the 
relationship between load and various input factors such as weather, demography, 
economic growth, etc. Once such a relationship has been estimated, it is possible to forecast 
electric load based on reasonable assumptions about how input factors may evolve in the 
future. Methods from artificial and computational intelligence are drawn from a research 
field that is relatively new but has shown some promise for electric load forecasting. Within 
these methods, neural networks are the most frequently used method for load forecasting. 
The basic working principle is interconnection of nodes that treat and aggregate information 
to formulate appropriate responses. 
A simple approach to taking risk or uncertainty into account is through the development of 
various scenarios with the same forecasting technique. In the case of regression analysis, 
this can be done by making different assumptions about future trends of input parameters 
(e.g. economic growth, input fuel prices, etc.) so as to calculate the output value of the 
parameter of interest (electric load in this example) for the forecasts. Such probabilistic 
analyses are widely used in the electricity sector, for example by utilities in their planning 
and operation studies (Gorenstin et al., 1993). However, probabilistic techniques may or 
may not consider many kinds of uncertainties and in practice many parameters are still 
represented as deterministic. Gorenstin et al. (1993) notes that the following parameters 
that are often represented as deterministic, rather than probabilistic, ones: 
 Load growth rates; 
 Fuel costs; 
 Construction time; 
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 Interest rates and financial variables; 
 Economic growth; and 
 Environmental constraints. 
Instead of weighting different scenarios with probabilities based on deterministic 
representations of uncertain parameters, uncertainty can also be taken into account during 
the development of non-deterministic scenarios (using stochastic programming methods), 
noting that taking into account uncertainty during the development of scenarios will almost 
always lead to different solutions than developing deterministic scenarios and making a 
weighted average over these scenarios. This is because, for each scenario that, by 
construction, does not take into account risk or uncertainty, the optimal solution that is 
identified will assume perfect knowledge of future events. Such solutions will therefore 
never lead to consideration of flexible options in case extreme events might happen 
because these eventualities are not taken into account (by construction) in the modelling 
exercises. On the other hand, when scenario development integrates risk or uncertainty, 
then the optimal investment decision as identified by the techno-economic tools takes into 
account the need to be responsive in case of an incident. 
Stochastic programming in energy includes a wide range of methods that take into account 
the unpredictability of future events (including quantities, prices which are volatile, etc.). 
Some sophisticated models take into account the possibility of selling electricity on the 
futures market and medium term price expectations. Other models try to assess the 
evolution of the electricity market as a whole. These models have been useful to generate 
long term electricity price scenarios (Wallace and Fleten, 2003). 
Furthermore, and because decision-making under uncertainty must take into account many 
different factors (not only economic, but also technical, social and environmental), the use 
of multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) has developed for investment decisions in the 
energy sector. 
In their demonstration of a MCDM method for a theoretical case study of distribution utility 
investment planning, Espie et al. (2000) took into account the following criteria: 
expenditure; profitability; quality of supply; customer service; and environmental benefits. 
On the other hand, for electricity planning in Spain, Linares and Romero (2000) took into 
account total cost, CO2 emissions, SO2 emissions, NOx emissions and radioactive waste 
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produced. Linares and Romero (2000) also constrained their model to take into account 
demand requirements; resource availability; limits to technologies; domestic fuel quotas; 
energy security; and the constraint on power generation with installed capacities. In the 
end, MCDM methods have the advantage of taking into account many elements that may 
not be fully taken into account in more financial profitability assessments. However, the 
accuracy of such methods actually depends on the weighting strategy: with different 
weights, MCDM may provide different rankings of the options under study. 
With these methods, uncertainty can be taken into account by making a sensitivity analysis 
of the best option for different uncertain parameters. Other potential approaches are based 
on different statistical techniques to maximize welfare, although the literature review did 
not identify evidence of their use in the electricity sector. One example of this is the 
“maximin regret criterion” presented and employed by Espie et al. (2000).  
Following Aaheim and Bretteville (2001), it is possible to identify five alternative decision-
making criteria, including the one used by Espie et al. (2000), which can be applied under 
uncertainty. These criteria can be applied to various kinds of decisions and in the presence 
of two or more alternatives: 
 The “maximin” criterion: the maximin criterion ranks all the potential alternatives 
according to an evaluation of their worst outcomes. Consequently, an alternative is 
considered superior to another when its worst outcome is less catastrophic that the 
worst outcome of the other alternative. This decision rule allows worst-case scenarios 
to be avoided; 
The criterion of “generalised maximin and maximax”: this decision rule first 
estimates the best and worst outcomes of each option, and then makes weighted 
sums of the best and worst outcomes. Like “maximin”, this decision criterion gives 
high importance to preventing worst-case scenarios. However, it also takes into 
account that each option may provide benefits that should be taken into account. All 
in all, the relative weight given to worst outcomes and best outcomes captures the 
investor’s risk aversion. In the maximin framework, risk aversion is absolute and no 
weight is given to the best outcomes; 
 The criterion of “limited degree of confidence”: under limited degree of confidence, 
the decision-maker tries to calculate profitability by using the “maximisation of 
expected utility” criterion (based on a broad probabilistic assessment). However, he 
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knows that he should have limited confidence in the outcome. Therefore, he also 
applies at the same time the “maximin” criterion, and makes a weighted sum of the 
outcomes obtained with both criteria; 
 The “maximin regret” criterion: with this criterion, the decision-maker answers the 
question: “With which option, if I make a mistake, will I regret less?” The decision-
maker therefore calculates the “regret” that he/she could have if he/she was not to 
take the right decision. Such a “regret” is calculated as the difference between the 
outcome of the chosen option and the best outcome that could achieved with a 
different decision being taken. This “regret” of making a specific decision is to be 
calculated for each potential state of future events, taking always as a reference the 
best decision that could be taken. Once the “regret” of choosing a specific option has 
been calculated for all potential events, it is possible to calculate what the maximum 
value of the regrets is for this specific option. By doing this same calculation 
recurrently for all possible decisions that could be made, it is possible to identify 
which decision has minimum negative impact if it ends up being a wrong decision; and 
 The criterion of “safety first”: this decision-making criterion consists in choosing the 
option that minimises the probability that the outcome could be inferior to a given 
threshold. This threshold consists of a “safety net” that the decision-maker wants to 
ensure. 
Such techniques have been applied to scenarios in the energy sector by the research 
community, demonstrating their potential. Examples include: 
 Alanne et al. (2007) which applies multi-criteria decision-making to the choice of a 
residential energy supply system: they compare micro-generation heating systems 
with traditional heating systems, and consider various decision rules, including 
maximax, maximin and minimax regret; or 
 Gnansounou et al. (2004) which develops an agent-based model designed to support 
decentralised planning activities in the electricity supply industry, where the decisions 
from investors can be triggered by alternative decision criteria such as maximin, to 
take into account the uncertain context of decision-making. 
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Tools for decision making relating to climate change. 
All of the techniques described above, which are capable of dealing with uncertainty, can be 
embedded into an iterative process of making and revising decisions. One example of an 
interactive process is the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) decision making under 
uncertainty framework tool which provides a flexible approach to decision making under 
climate uncertainty. It is comprised of eight stages (see Figure 3.4 below) based upon the 
principles of good decision making. It is cyclical, with emphasis on an adaptive approach 
where decisions are revisited when new information on climate change and its impacts are 
published. As well as reducing uncertainty and increasing accuracy, the feedback and 
iteration in the stages aids the refinement of the problem, objectives and decision making 
criteria, which are important in achieving solid decisions. There are also tiered stages (3, 4 
and 5), which allow the decision maker to identify, screen, prioritise and evaluate climate 
and non-climate risks and options before a decision is made on further detailed assessments 
or appraisals are required (Willows and Connell, 2003).  
 
Figure 3.4: A framework to support good decision-making in the face of climate change risk 
(Willows and Connell, 2003) 
Under uncertainty, it is common to make additional precautions in the eventuality that ‘bad’ 
events might occur, even after choosing the best investment decision available. The U.S. 
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Climate Change Science Program (2009) notes that the application of the “precautionary 
principle” is a strategy often proposed for use under high levels of uncertainty. The 
precautionary principle “enables rapid response in the face of a possible danger to human, 
animal or plant health, or to protect the environment. In particular, where scientific data do 
not permit a complete evaluation of the risk, recourse to this principle may, for example, be 
used to stop distribution or order withdrawal from the market of products likely to be 
hazardous”38. However, the precautionary principle may not lead to optimal decision-
making in relation to the impacts of climate change. The U.S. Climate Change Science 
Program (2009) identifies two kinds of strategies considered likely to outperform it: 
 The resilient strategy: the principle is to identify the range of future circumstances 
that one might face, and then look for approaches that will work well across this 
range. An example of resilient strategy is presented by Hallegatte (2009) and relates 
to water management in Copenhagen. To manage risk arising from projected 
increases in precipitation, water managers in Copenhagen took a safety margin: “to 
calibrate drainage infrastructure, water managers in Copenhagen now use run-off 
figures that are 70% larger than their current level. Some of this increase is meant to 
deal with population growth and the rest is to cope with climate change, which may 
lead to an increase in heavy precipitation over Denmark.” Similarly, Western Power 
Distribution in the UK examined future flood risk using climate change scenarios when 
replacing major substations on flood plains. After considering a range of options, they 
found that the marginal cost of considering the flood risk management solution at the 
same time as normal asset replacement activity proved to be substantially cheaper 
than other functional equivalent options (Western Power Distribution, 2011) ; and 
 The adaptive strategy: the idea is to make decisions that are flexible enough to be 
modified if necessary as more information is gathered and uncertainty reduces. 
Hallegatte (2009) gives the example of insurance and early warning systems that can 
be adjusted each year with new information. A classic example of the use of flood 
defence barriers which can be increased in height over time if and when required.  
These strategies, used in synergy with climate projections and decision making tools, can 
help make better decisions under uncertainty. For example:  
                                                          
38
 Communication from the Commission of 2 February 2000 on the precautionary principle, 
COM(2000) 1 final, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf  
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 Investment options can be designed in such a way that they adopt resilient and/or 
adaptive features; 
 For these investment options, decision-making can look at the many aspects of 
complex investments through the use multiple criteria decision-making or 
sophisticated forecasting tools; and 
 The criteria used to finally make a decision can be selected taking account of high 
uncertainty, potentially high losses or opportunities. 
6. Conclusion 
Investments in electricity generation, transmission and distribution depend upon many 
factors even before the consideration of climate change. Therefore, climate change will be 
an additional parameter to be taken into account when assessing the profitability of 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructures. Taking into account this 
additional parameter will be much more imperative for investments with longer lifetimes, as 
they put investors more at risk of “being locked in”. For the investments with shorter 
lifetimes, the possibility should be seized of frequently adapting infrastructures to up-to-
date knowledge about climate change.  
Besides, our knowledge of the future impacts of climate change on the electricity sector is 
uneven and has to do with our knowledge of climate change, with is more precise when it 
comes to temperature and precipitations than when it comes to wind and lightening. 
However, there is a wide range of techniques available and employed in the electricity 
sector, whether in generation, transmission and distribution, to manage uncertainty in 
decision making. These techniques can be applied to consider climate change and 
adaptation. This suggests that it is not necessarily the technique of decision making that 
needs to change if climate change is to be considered in investment decisions, given the 
level of experience in the sector of both understanding the impact of weather of its 
systems/networks and in managing uncertainty. As shown, there are other tools which have 
been applied in theory and could be incorporated into decision making processes however 
there are also examples of effective use of existing approaches and information. The 
challenge is thus making sure that there is appropriate awareness of methods and tools and 
that the sector has access to the right information to enable it to move towards greater 
climate resilience.  
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Chapter 4: Adaptation to Climate Change and US 
Residential Energy Use – Does Adaptation Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions? 
François Cohen, Matthieu Glachant and Magnus Söderberg 
Abstract 
Previous literature has found that positive temperature shocks increase US residential 
electricity consumption because air-conditioning is used to adapt to excessive heat. This 
suggests that climate change adaptation could increase electricity demand. This research 
goes beyond previous analyses by evaluating which drivers would explain the relationship 
between climate change and energy use. We look at the alterations and improvements to 
housing associated with climate shocks – including but not limited to air-conditioning – and 
correlate these changes with both gas and electricity consumptions. Then resorting to a 
long-term simulation, we find that climate change is likely to increase residential electricity 
consumption. However, this surge in electricity consumption could be more than 
compensated by a parallel decrease in gas consumption. All in all, residential energy 
consumption (adding gas and electricity consumptions) could decrease due to adaptation to 
climate change, but not necessarily greenhouse gas emissions. Electricity generation in the 
US is carbon-intensive so that the predicted shift from gas to electricity could sustain 
greenhouse gas emissions in spite of a total reduction in energy demand resulting from 
climate change. This puts pressure on decarbonising electricity generation. 
 
 
Keywords: Climate change adaptation, home improvements, residential energy 
consumption. 
 
JEL Codes: D12, Q47, Q54, R22. 
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Résumé du chapitre 4 en français 
Des études précédentes ont établi que les hausses de température augmentent la 
consommation électrique du secteur résidentiel américain, très vraisemblablement parce 
que l’air conditionné est utilisé par les ménages pour s’adapter à la chaleur excessive. Cela 
suggère que l’adaptation au changement climatique pourrait accroître la demande 
électrique aux Etats-Unis. Cette recherche va au-delà des analyses précédentes en 
identifiant plus précisément les mécanismes qui expliquent la relation vraisemblable entre 
changement climatique et consommation d’énergie. De ce fait, nous nous penchons sur les 
altérations et les améliorations des habitations qui sont associées aux chocs climatiques – 
qui incluent l’air-conditionné mais n’y sont pas limitées – et les mettons en relation avec 
l’évolution des consommations d’électricité et de gaz. En recourant à une simulation de 
long-terme, nous trouvons que la consommation électrique du secteur résidentiel est plus 
élevée dans un scénario avec changement climatique que dans un scénario où les 
températures demeureraient constantes. Cependant, cet accroissement des consommations 
électriques pourrait être plus que compensé par une réduction parallèle des consommations 
de gaz. Au total, la consommation énergétique du secteur résidentiel américain pourrait 
baisser du fait de l’adaptation au changement climatique, mais cela n’entrainerait pas 
nécessairement une même réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre associées à la 
consommation d’énergie. La production d’électricité est intensive en carbone aux Etats-Unis 
de sorte que le basculement d’une consommation au gaz vers une consommation électrique 
pourrait soutenir les émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Nos résultats mettent donc l’accent 
sur le besoin de réduire l’empreinte carbone de l’électricité. 
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1. Introduction  
Climate has already changed and most experts believe the global average temperature will 
continue to increase: the fifth report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 2013) estimates that global mean surface temperature could be up to 4.8°C higher in 
2081-2100 relative to 1896-2005 if greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) continue unabated. 
Climate change will affect human activities through many channels, including agricultural 
production, labour productivity, industrial output, health, energy or political stability.39 In a 
world cross-section, Dell, Jones and Olken (2009, 2012) estimate that national income falls 
by 8.5% per degree Celsius. In poor countries, these authors find that a 1 degree Celsius rise 
in temperature reduces per-capita income by 1.4%.  
However, acclimation can reduce the impact of high temperatures on human activities. In 
this direction, Dell, Jones and Olken (2009) compare the long-run consequence of 
temperatures on economic output with the short-run negative impact of temperature 
shocks. It appears that short run impacts are much sharper than long run impacts, 
suggesting that the negative impact of temperatures on output is compensated for by 
adaptation measures in the long run. More precisely, these authors find that nearly half of 
the negative impacts of high temperatures on income are cushioned by adaptation 
measures in the long run.  
For future global warming, this suggests that adaptation may reduce the impacts of ongoing 
climate change on human activities to a large extent. A concrete example is given by Barreca 
et al. (2013), who find that the progressive adoption of air conditioning throughout the 20th 
century explains 90% of the entire decline in the temperature-mortality relationship in the 
US.  
Interestingly in this case, adaptation is also unlikely to be neutral in terms of GHG emissions: 
air-conditioning may not only be very effective as an adaptation to excessive heat, it is also 
particularly energy consuming. In these lines, Sailor and Pavlova (2003) predict that market 
saturation of air-conditioning could increase drastically with climate change and be more 
important as a driver for future energy load than the sole impact of temperature shocks. 
Focusing on 38 US cities, they forecast that a 20% increase in cooling degree days would 
                                                          
39
 Dell, Jones and Olken (2013) make a thorough review on the economy-climate relationship. 
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increase residential electricity consumption by 1-9% depending on the city, mainly driven by 
a 20-60% increase in electricity consumption from air-conditioning.  
More generally, adaptation will require additional investments of different types: dikes to 
prevent from sea level rise, changes in crop-management practices in agriculture, 
installation of insulation of housing to protect from heat, etc. These different types of 
investments will have different impacts on emissions. For instance, insulation reduces 
energy use, and thus carbon emissions, but changes in agricultural practices have an 
ambiguous impact. However, the total impact of adaptation on GHG emissions is unlikely to 
be marginal, considering the magnitude of forecasted investment levels. For public 
authorities only, the World Bank (2010) has estimated that the global cost of necessary 
adaptations to climate change could be between $ 70 billion and $ 100 billion between 2010 
and 2050. 
In spite of this, adaptation and mitigation are two topics that are usually independent in 
political practice: mitigation policies focus on the decarbonisation of industry, agriculture 
and services, whereas adaptation measures consist in planning and carrying out necessary 
investments (e.g. dykes). A better understanding of the impact of adaptation on GHG 
emissions is necessary to encourage the implementation of adaptation strategies that do 
not put more pressure on climate mitigation. 
As adaptation strategies differ across sectors, sector-specific analyses, and often region- or 
country-specific analyses are necessary. In this paper, we focus on the US residential sector 
and analyse the impact of temperature shocks on housing investment behaviour and on 
residential energy consumption and carbon emissions. To so do, we use micro-data from 14 
biannual and national waves of the American Housing Survey (AHS, 1985-2011), which 
includes detailed information on the improvements performed in a large panel of US homes. 
The data from the AHS has been matched with climate data from the National 
Oceanographic Atmospheric Association Data Center gathered for 159 localities in the US. 
We use three climate variables: the count of heating degree days, of cooling degree days 
and the number of days with precipitations higher than 0.5 inches to control for 
precipitations and humidity. Energy price data at State level are collected from the US 
Energy Information Administration. The time period covered by our data is extensive, which 
allows us to capture the impact of changes in climate on the decisions of specific households 
over time.  
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We use the results of our econometric models of home improvement and energy 
consumption to simulate the impact of a 1 Fahrenheit degree increase of US average inland 
temperature on residential gas and electricity consumption. Our econometric and 
simulation show that households will use air conditioning more intensively, which will drive 
electricity consumption upwards (+3.5% for a 1 Fahrenheit degree increase). However, the 
increase in electricity consumption could be compensated for by a reduction in gas demand 
(-5.1% for a 1 Fahrenheit degree increase) due to a reduced use of gas heaters in winter. All 
in all, we find that energy demand decreases by 1.9% in the long run with a 1 Fahrenheit 
degree increase. 
The impact of the cut in energy consumption on emissions depends on the energy mix of 
power generation. Currently, electricity produces more GHG emissions than gas in the US. 
Therefore, the shift from gas demand towards electricity, as predicted by our model, would 
lead to a slight increase (+0.8% with a 1 Fahrenheit degree increase in our simulation) of 
GHG emissions imputable to residential energy demand if today’s facilities were used to 
produce electricity in the distant future. Our results therefore gives a new reason for US 
policy-makers to insist on the decarbonisation of electricity generation, considering that 
household level adaptation is likely to favour electricity, both for space heating and air-
conditioning. 
These results are in line with those obtained by Deschênes and Greenstone (2011), 
Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (2011) and Amato et al. (2005). Deschênes and 
Greenstone (2011) estimate that, by the end of this century, residential energy consumption 
could rise by 11% in the US as a result of climate change. Similarly, Auffhammer and 
Aroonruengsawat (2011) examine household-level electricity consumption data in California 
from 2003-2006. Using a very large sample of monthly and geolocalized data, they run a 
model of short-run response of energy demand to shocks in temperature. In a second stage, 
they use their model results to run simulations of residential electricity demand under the 
A2 (high emissions) and B1 (low emissions) climate scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC, 2000).40 Assuming no change in Californian population and 
electricity prices, these authors find that, under the A2 scenario, Californian residential 
                                                          
40
 The B1 scenario is a “sustainability” scenario with relatively low GHG emissions. IPCC (2001) 
predicts that the B1 scenario should lead to a 1.9°C temperature increase between 2000 and 2100. 
On the other hand, under the A2 scenario, GHG emissions are substantially larger and IPCC (2001) 
predicts a 3.6°C temperature change over the 21
st
 century. 
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electricity consumption will rise by 48% in 2080-2099 compared to 1980-2000 levels. In the 
B1 scenario, the rise in residential electricity consumption is 18%. If climate change is not 
properly mitigated, the results of Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (2011) show that 
electricity consumption could increase substantially in California. Likewise, Amato et al. 
(2005) analyse the impact of temperature shocks on residential electricity consumption, in 
Massachusetts. They find that residential electricity consumption increases in a series of 
climate change scenarios as compared with a no-climate change scenario. According to 
Amato et al. (2005), the increases in electricity consumption during summer months should 
outweigh the decreases in the winter months. However, they forecast that heating oil and 
gas consumption should decrease in Massachusetts as a result of climate change. 
We go deeper into the analysis of the relationship between climate change and residential 
energy demand in several respects. To our knowledge, this paper is the only one to resort to 
household level panel data to estimate nationwide residential energy consumption over the 
past 20 years. Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (2011) use household level data but focus 
on electricity consumption between 2003 and 2006 in California. Their time span is relatively 
short and their results specific to California. Furthermore, these authors use monthly shifts 
in temperatures to assess climate change impacts. This is a limitation as the use of variables 
covering longer time periods is preferable to study climate change, as explained by 
Deschênes and Greenstone (2011).  
Second, we deal with both electricity and gas consumption. Extending the analysis to gas is 
crucial because it is widely used for space and water heating in the US. Furthermore, one 
would expect that higher temperatures would reduce gas use in some regions, as in the case 
of Massachusetts (Amato et al., 2005). Mansur, Mendelsohn and Morrison (2008) analyse 
US energy demand in a setting in which fuel choice decisions are endogenous. Using a 
multinomial choice framework, they show that households prefer electricity to other fuels 
when temperatures are high, in particular because electric heating appliances have lower 
installation costs and fit more in regions where space heating is not intensive. 
A third contribution is that we explicitly consider the mechanisms that make the link 
between climate change and residential energy consumption. More precisely, we proceed in 
two steps.  First we estimate how temperature shocks modify investments in dwellings. We 
then assess the impact of the investments made on energy consumption and GHG 
emissions. This allows us to derive additional findings, in particular that households may 
invest less in insulation when temperatures get higher, which may put more pressure on 
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energy demand and lead to additional GHG emissions under climate change. Deschênes and 
Greenstone (2011), Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (2011) and Amato et al. (2005) do 
not open the “black box”. They directly study the relationship between the climate variables 
and energy consumption. 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we develop a 
home investment model to represent households’ home improvement decisions, both the 
likelihood that investments occur and the intensity of the investments, conditioned on 
investments taking place. The results of the home investment model feed into a statistical 
analysis of the sensitivity of energy demand to climate change in the short and the long 
runs. Section 3 presents the data and section 4 the estimation results. Finally in section 5, 
we run a simulation to assess the implications of our econometric results. 
2. Model 
Home improvements 
Outside economics, looking at the nature of the building stock and its fitness to climate is 
not particularly original: there are many historical examples of human settlements that 
adapted to their climate. In fact, a large share of past adaptations to climate can be found in 
vernacular architecture, i.e. the architecture that grew out of “the needs of the inhabitants 
of a place and the constraints of site and climate” (Oktay, 2002). For instance, dwellings are 
usually oriented to the south and placed below a hill to protect from winds in cold countries.  
Within economics, the determinants of home improvements have been studied in a series of 
empirical papers at least since the 1970s. Apart from a few regional-level examples (e.g. 
Mendelsohn, 1977; Mayer, 1981; Melchert and Naroff, 1987; or Helms, 2003), the empirical 
analysis of US home renovation has principally relied on the data from the American 
Housing Survey (AHS), examined at different time periods and for different geographical 
areas (Shear, 1983; Reschovsky, 1992; Bogdon, 1996; Montgomery, 1996; Baker and Kaul, 
2002; Gyourko and Saiz, 2004; Plaut and Plaut, 2010). However, previous empirical research 
on home improvements has focused on the socioeconomic characteristics of households 
and homes that undergo renovation. To the best of our knowledge, no research on US home 
improvements has ever looked at the impact of climate change on household decisions. 
Previously, scholars using the AHS data on home improvements have principally relied on 
probit and tobit models. In fact, home improvements can be interpreted as a left-censored 
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variable because investments are only observed with a positive value. The probit and tobit 
models are run on a cross-section of residential units and the data from the previous years is 
used to construct independent variables. Actually, Helms (2003) provides a very simple 
theoretical model to link household utility and household capital investment, which finally 
takes the form of a latent variable that can be estimated with a tobit model.  
Even though these types of econometric models appear attractive at first sight, they proved 
to be insufficient to understand renovation efforts. For example, the predictive power of the 
models of Helms (2003) is very low. Additionally, cross-sectional probit and tobit models 
may be biased if the independent variables are correlated with the unobservables. 
Furthermore, tobit models tend to overlook the “lumpy” nature of the investments in home 
improvements: long periods with no or low investments are usually preceded by more 
active investment periods.  
Various reasons can make home improvements lumpy. In particular, it is unlikely that 
households will perform similar investments twice over a short time period, because the 
utility of making an investment depends on the state of decay of the part of the home that is 
renovated or improved. Additionally, households may prefer to make all the necessary 
improvements at one point in time, and not to delay them over a longer time period 
because of the hidden fixed costs associated with home improvements. For example, home 
improvements may limit the possibility to live in a house while it is being renovated.  
This is why the econometric model below tries to consider the lumpy nature of investments 
in home improvements by referring to a framework developed by the investment literature. 
Furthermore we use the longest panel available with the AHS and cover the entire US, from 
1985 to 2011 and exploit the panel nature of the data by using fixed effects. The long time 
span also allows us to look both at the short run and the long run impacts of climate change 
on home improvements.  
An empirical application of the (S,s) framework 
In the investment literature, it is well known that capital investments by industries are 
lumpy (e.g. Doms and Dunne, 1998). Dixit and Pyndick (1994) provide the theoretical 
foundations: in a context in which the optimal level of firm output is stochastic and the 
decision to invest is costly, firms are better off investing once and for all in new production 
capacities when the gap between the current and the optimal level of output is sufficiently 
high to motivate new investments. Likewise, when the level of optimal output reaches a 
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bottom threshold, much lower than the current level of output, disinvestment is the optimal 
decision. Within an upper bound and a lower bound, the difference between the current 
and the optimal level of output is too small to motivate an investment or a disinvestment. In 
this case, the cost of adjustment is higher than the expected utility derived from it.  
A family of investment models with adjustment costs is constituted by the (S, s) models, the 
two “s” corresponding to the upper and the lower bounds of inaction. This “range for 
inaction” makes any analysis of investment decisions at the micro-level relatively complex: 
the investment decisions are dependent on past investments and appear in a lumpy fashion, 
which makes any single investment difficult to predict.  
This complexity is well represented by the (S, s) setting of Caballero and Engel (1999). Their 
model, developed for firm decisions, assumes that the profitability of investing evolves 
stochastically and entails random adjustment costs proportional to the amounts that have 
already been invested.  
Making the analogy with home improvements is straightforward: shocks on the utility for 
specific housing services and house depreciation can lead to disequilibria between the level 
of housing services provided by a house and the level desired by homeowners. On the other 
hand, home improvements usually affect the possibility of using one’s house during the 
renovation works. Consequently, changes to the current level of stock are likely to entail 
adjustment costs proportional to the total amounts already invested in housing, but these 
adjustment costs (if investments are undertaken) may change from one year to the other for 
reasons unobserved by the econometrician. 
Based on Caballero and Engel (1999), we denote the utility 𝑈 of household i at time t as: 
𝑈(𝐾𝑖,𝑡, 𝜃𝑖,𝑡) = 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝛽𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 represents the total amount of invested capital in housing by household i at time 
t, 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 is a stochastic parameter that follows a random walk, 𝑟 and 𝛿 are the discount and the 
depreciation rates and 𝛽 is a parameter that is less to one. In the absence of any adjustment 
cost, the frictionless stock of capital invested in housing, 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ , would be achieved by the 
household after maximizing firm utility with respect to K so that: 
𝜃𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑟 + 𝛿
𝛽
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ 1−𝛽 
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However, like Caballero and Engel (1999), we consider that households undergo an 
adjustment cost proportional to the housing services that are foregone when home 
improvements are made: 
𝐶(𝐾𝑖,𝑡, 𝜃𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜔𝑖,𝑡(𝜋(𝐾𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜃𝑖,𝑡) + (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜔𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝛽
𝜃𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to the adjustment cost factor. This parameter is stochastic, changes 
at each time period and follows the distribution function G(.). With adjustment costs, the 
utility function of the household can be rewritten as a function of the frictionless stock of 
embedded capital in housing: 
𝜋(𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ , 𝑧𝑖,𝑡) =
𝑟 + 𝛿
𝛽
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ (𝑒𝛽𝑧𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝑧𝑖,𝑡) 
With: 
𝑧𝑖,𝑡 ≡ ln(
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ ) 
The decision of adjusting or not adjusting becomes dynamic and is computable according to 
the value function of adjusting capital at time t for a given level of pre-adjustment 
disequilibrium 𝑧𝑖,𝑡, frictionless capital stock 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗  and adjustment cost 𝜔𝑖,𝑡. If we denote 
𝑉(𝑧𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ , 𝜔𝑖,𝑡) the household’s bellman value function, with 𝑉(𝑧𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ ) its realization with 
no adjustment and 𝑉(𝑐𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ ) its value if the firm adjusts, we can write: 
𝑉(𝑧𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ , 𝜔𝑖,𝑡) = max {𝑉(𝑧𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ ), 𝑉(𝑐𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ ) − 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑟 + 𝛿
𝛽
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑒𝛽𝑧𝑖,𝑡} 
Here, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is the optimally determined return point after investment: it corresponds to the 
desired level of capital if the investment/disinvestment decision is made. Similarly, we can 
define 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ≡ 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 as household’s imbalance with respect to its target point. Caballero 
and Engel (1999) show that the solution to this setting can be derived from the policy 
𝛺(𝑧𝑖,𝑡), defined as the largest adjustment cost factor 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 for which an agent would still 
adjust41, so that the adjustment hazard 𝛬 according to imbalance 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is given by the policy 
𝛺(. ) and the cumulative distribution function G(.) of the adjustment factor 𝜔𝑖,𝑡: 
                                                          
41
 The value of 𝛺(𝑧)is such that the following equation holds: 𝑉(𝑐, 𝐾∗) − 𝛺(𝑧)
𝑟+𝛿
𝛽
𝐾∗𝑒𝛽𝑧 = 𝑉(𝑧, 𝐾∗) 
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                                                      𝛬(𝑥𝑖,𝑡) = 𝐺 (𝛺(𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑡))                                                     (4.1) 
Furthermore, and by definition, the amount 𝐼 invested by households once they have 
decided to invest corresponds to the difference in capital necessary to reach the target point 
c from current imbalance point x: 
               𝐼(𝑥𝑖,𝑡) = (𝑒
𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝑧𝑖,𝑡)𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ = (𝑒−𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 1)𝑒𝑧𝑖,𝑡𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗ = (𝑒−𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 1)𝐾(𝑥𝑖,𝑡)             (4.2) 
Econometric specification 
We make a sequential interpretation of the model of Caballero and Engel (1999). In our 
reduced-form setting, consumers first decide whether they invest or not and then opt for an 
amount proportional to their capital imbalance. Importantly though, equation (4.1) and (4.2) 
suggest that the probability of investing and the amounts that are invested depend on the 
same latent variable 𝑥𝑖,𝑡. In our setting, we use a set of independent variables and fixed 
effects to proxy 𝑥𝑖,𝑡. 
We estimate 𝛬𝑖,𝑡 in a first stage. We denote 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 the decision of making an investment, such 
that 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 1 if an investment is performed by household i at time t, or zero otherwise. As 
we observe 𝐷𝑖,𝑡, we can implement a fixed-effect logit model. Thus, we assume that there is 
a latent variable 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∗  such that: 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝑍𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝐵 +∑𝑃𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝜏𝑓
𝑓
+ 𝜎(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖;𝑡 
and: 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∗ > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Above, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of independent variables including climate variables, B a vector of 
parameters, 𝑢𝑖 an individual-specific fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖;𝑡 an error term following an extreme 
value distribution. Moreover, 𝑃𝑓,𝑡 is the price of fuel f and 𝜏𝑓 a parameter associated with 
fuel f (e.g. gas or electricity). Furthermore, we expect that the decision D depends on the 
total amounts of investments that have already been capitalized in the house, i.e. 
(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 where 𝛿 is the depreciation rate. Finally, 𝜎 is a parameter such that 𝜎 < 0: the 
more improvements that have been performed previously, the less a household will be 
prone to perform additional home improvements.  
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The estimation of such a model allows recovering the probability that individual i decides to 
make an investment. We can apply the formula of the logit model to recover the 
probabilities of investing, assuming that the fixed effect is equal to zero42:  
                               𝛬𝑖,𝑡 =
exp(𝑍𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝐵 +∑ 𝑃𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝜏𝑓𝑓 + 𝜎(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1)
1 + exp(𝑍𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝐵 +∑ 𝑃𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝜏𝑓𝑓 + 𝜎(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1)
                              (4.3) 
In a second stage, we estimate 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 with a fixed effect linear regression model such that: 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝐴 +∑𝑃𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝑆𝑓
𝑓
+ 𝜌(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 > 0 
In the equation above, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a set of independent variables, A is a vector of parameters, 𝑆𝑓 
a parameter associated with fuel f, 𝜌 a parameter capturing the influence of past 
investments on new ones, 𝜇𝑖  is a fixed effect and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 an error component.  
Note that we estimate 𝛬𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 independently. The limitation of doing so is that there 
could be a selection bias on 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 if time-varying unobservables affect the choice of investing 
or not (i.e. 𝛬𝑖,𝑡). However, we reduce this risk by controlling for the main drivers affecting 
decisions to invest. The first one is the current state of the house, which is captured by 𝐾𝑖,𝑡, 
and the second one is household specific tendency to make home improvements, which is 
to a very large extent controlled for thanks to the use of fixed effects at household level: 
both the time constant features of housing units and households are controlled for in our 
setting. Additionally, our base specification controls for income shocks and changes in the 
number of family members within a household. 
Accounting for different types of home improvements 
The estimation process above can be applied even when we consider that housing services 
do not constitute a homogeneous good. If we consider that there are H types of housing 
services and therefore H types of potential home improvements, we can write as many 
systems of equations (𝛬𝑖,ℎ,𝑡; 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡) as there are types of housing services. In this case though, 
the investments performed in type h become dependent on the investments performed in 
any other type 𝑗. This is why we consider that all the 𝐾𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 affect 𝐷𝑖,ℎ,𝑡
∗ : 
                                                          
42
 It is not possible to recover the fixed effects of a fixed effect logit model once it has been 
estimated. 
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𝐷𝑖,ℎ,𝑡
∗ = 𝑍𝑖,ℎ,𝑡
′ 𝐵ℎ +∑𝑃𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝜏𝑓,ℎ
𝑓
+∑𝜎𝑗,ℎ(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑗=1
+ 𝑢𝑖,ℎ + 𝜀𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 
The amounts to be invested in h depend on the amounts that have been capitalized in all 
the other types j and in h previous to the investment that is considered. Because the 𝐾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 
are good predictors of 𝛬𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 and 𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, they allow controlling for the likeliness that 
investments in other categories occur simultaneously to 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡. Furthermore, they are also 
good indicators about consumers’ expectations regarding future home improvements, i.e. 
the fact that a household can forecast that, within a few years, he/she will have to perform 
works in his home.43  
Likewise, we consider that the amounts invested in one category at time t depends on the 
amounts that have been capitalized in other categories of housing services: 
𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖,ℎ,𝑡
′ 𝐴ℎ +∑𝑃𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝑆𝑓,ℎ
𝑓
+∑𝜌𝑗,ℎ(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑗=1
+ 𝜇𝑖,ℎ + 𝜖𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 
Accounting for previous adaptations of housing services 
Since we are interested in energy-related adaptations, present heating degree days and 
cooling degree days are the most appropriate variables to account for the impact of 
contemporaneous shifts in temperatures on home improvements. However, past 
temperatures may also have an impact on the home improvements that are performed at a 
given year, because they may be correlated with previous adaptation decisions (either to a 
hotter or a colder weather).  
We have tested for the impact of past temperatures on home improvements using the 
average amount of heating and cooling degree days for the past ten years as an 
independent variables (i.e. in the vectors 𝑍𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 explaining 𝐷𝑖,ℎ,𝑡
∗  and 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡). 
Furthermore, we have tested for the inclusion of interaction variables between the amount 
of capital dedicated to specific housing services and the past 10-year average amount of 
both heating and cooling degree days in alternative specifications. These variables would 
control for previous adaptation of the housing stock to the past climate, which may in return 
                                                          
43
 Note that including the values of 𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 as independent variables to explain 𝐷𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 is not only difficult 
because these variables would be endogenous, but also because they are censored: we do not always 
observe at least one investment in all H categories. 
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explain investment levels at time t. We are reporting a few examples of these tests in 
Appendix C1. 
In our base specifications for 𝐷𝑖,ℎ,𝑡
∗  and 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡, the interaction variables that proved to be 
statistically significant have been included as additional independent variables.44 These 
variables are different from one equation to the other (i.e. for one type of housing services 
to the other), which is normal as one interaction may be relevant for one type of housing 
services (e.g. air-conditioning) and not for the other (e.g. insulation).  
Model of residential energy consumption 
The model of home improvements presented previously allows capturing household 
decisions to invest in their homes. This model therefore allows us to assess in which 
proportions temperature variations could trigger new home improvements. However, the 
model of home improvements does not say anything about the impact of the adoption of 
specific adaptations on GHG emissions. To look at this aspect, we model the impact of home 
improvements on residential energy consumption. We then compute GHG emissions based 
on our estimates for residential energy consumption.45 
As already explained, there are two main sources f of energy consumed by US households: 
electricity (e) and gas (g). We estimate separately the demand for both energy sources using 
a similar framework. More precisely, we use a linear econometric equation where the 
dependent variable is the annual energy consumption of fuel f by household i at time t, 
denoted 𝑞𝑖,𝑓,𝑡. Like Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (2011), we consider that the 
dependent variable varies with temperature, energy prices and a series of household- and 
unit-specific features: 
𝑞𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝜙𝑀,𝑓 + 𝜓𝑖,𝑓 + 𝜏𝑡,𝑓 + 𝜍𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of independent variables, which includes heating degree days, cooling 
degree days, days with precipitations, the prices of electricity and gas (𝑃𝑓,𝑡 with 𝑓 ∈ {𝑒, 𝑔}), 
and income. 𝜓𝑖,𝑓 is a household-specific fixed effect capturing household-level specificities, 
                                                          
44
 Because we have two variables reflecting past temperatures (heating and cooling degree days), we 
have pairs of interaction variables between a specific kind of housing services and the past climate. 
We have tested for the statistical significance of these pairs and have included them in the base 
specification as soon as one of the variables within a pair proved to be statistically significant.  
45
 We therefore disregard the GHG emissions generated by renovation works per se and only consider 
the emissions derived from a change in residential energy consumption. 
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𝜏𝑡,𝑓 a time dummy and 𝜍𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 is an error term. 𝜙𝑀,𝑓 is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated.  
Moreover, the originality of our approach is that we introduce the expected amount of 
capital in the housing units into the model as an explanatory variable of energy use. This 
expected amount of capital, noted ?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, corresponds to the previously accumulated capital 
plus the expected amount of investment made at time t: 
                                 𝑞𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 = ∑𝜙ℎ,𝑓?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡
𝐻
ℎ=1
+𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝜙𝑀,𝑓 + 𝜓𝑖,𝑓 + 𝜏𝑡,𝑓 + 𝜍𝑖,𝑓,𝑡                          (4.4) 
With: 
?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,ℎ,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 
𝜙ℎ,𝑓 is the vector of parameters that provides information on the impact of home 
improvements on residential energy consumption, and 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 and ?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 are the predicted 
values of 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 and 𝛬𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 as estimated with our home improvement model. These predicted 
values exclude fixed effects, which are assumed to be zero. This is because they cannot be 
recovered for ?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 and this allows enlarging the sample of predictions for 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡. This could 
create a bias in the estimation of 𝜙ℎ,𝑒, which we considerably limit as we are estimating 
𝜙ℎ,𝑓 not only on 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡, but on ?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 which includes 𝐾𝑖,ℎ,𝑡−1 and therefore the past 
realizations of 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡.  
Energy price endogeneity 
Because residential energy prices and consumption levels are simultaneously determined at 
equilibrium, energy prices are endogenous variables in equation (4.4). We apply a two-stage 
least square (2SLS) setting to control for electricity and gas price endogeneity. 
We construct four instruments based on the average price of gas and electricity in the 
industrial sector, both within the State in which household i lives and in neighbouring States. 
These instruments are available at State level and for each year.  
Average industrial prices are likely to be correlated to residential prices but should have no 
impact on residential electricity demand. Likewise, the price of energy in neighbouring 
States will be correlated with the price of energy in the State in which household i lives. 
However, changes in the price of energy in neighbouring States should have no impact on 
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the demand for energy of household i. However, simultaneous demand shocks affecting 
both the industrial and residential sectors (for example a shock on industrial activity 
affecting household income and therefore residential demand for energy) could lead these 
instruments to be invalid. To control for this eventuality, we use the 2-year lagged values of 
industrial prices instead of their contemporaneous values, both within the State and in 
neighbouring States. Additionally, we apply standard identification tests to control for the 
statistical validity of our instruments. 
Another issue is that the predicted values for the expected amounts of home improvements 
performed by each household i at time t are also endogenous in equation (4.4) because they 
are expressed as a function of energy prices. In fact, ?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 and 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 depend on the price of 
electricity and gas, and therefore so does ?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡. 
To avoid requiring as many additional endogenous variables as types of housing services, we 
control for the endogeneity of energy prices with respect to energy consumption since the 
start, when running the home improvement model.  
Therefore, the equations of the home improvement model are not run with the real values 
for electricity and gas prices, but with predicted values to guarantee, at a later stage, that 
the ?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 are exogenous with respect to electricity and gas consumption. More precisely, 
before each estimation of 𝛬𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 or 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡, we run two linear fixed effect models to make 
predictions for electricity and gas prices. The linear models include the same explanatory 
variables as for the estimation of 𝛬𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 or 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡, plus the energy price instruments described 
above. Then, we estimate the 𝛬𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 and 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 with the predicted values for electricity and gas 
prices, which allows us to recover estimates of 𝛬𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 and 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 that are exogenous with 
respect to residential electricity and gas consumption. Once we have estimated all the ?̂?𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 
and 𝐼𝑖,ℎ,𝑡, we can compute values for ?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 that are exogenous in the energy consumption 
model. 
This technique allows us to consider that only energy prices are endogenous in the energy 
consumption model, as we previously make sure that all the ?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 are exogenous. This 
methodology presents the advantage of reducing the amount of necessary instruments in 
the 2SLS regression. However, running a weak identification test after the estimation of the 
2SLS model may underestimate the potential IV bias, as the test does not take into account 
the fact that we have controlled for the endogeneity of the ?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 beforehand. 
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We provide in Appendix C2 an example of the type of regressions that is used to predict 
residential electricity and gas prices. The example corresponds to regressions that have 
been run before the estimation of one 𝛬𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 relative to a specific type h of housing services. 
Heterogeneity of the impact of home improvements on energy consumptions 
In equation (4.4), two vectors of parameters would provide relevant information about the 
relationship between climate and energy: 𝜙𝑀,𝑓, the vector of parameters that, once 
estimated, describes household response to climate shocks with the available capital stock; 
and 𝜙𝑗,𝑓 which provides information on the impact of home improvements on residential 
energy consumption.  
However, the capital invested in the various categories of home improvements is unlikely to 
have a constant marginal impact on energy consumption. In fact, home improvements may 
entail different energy consumption levels at different temperatures. For example, the 
impact of a better insulation on energy consumption is likely to depend on how extreme 
outside temperatures are. Therefore, we complement our base specifications for the models 
of electricity and gas consumption with interaction parameters between the categories of 
housing services and heating and cooling degree days. 
Likewise, we consider that current energy consumption levels may reflect some adaptation 
to the past climate and use the past 10-year average amount of heating degree days and 
cooling degree days to account for this effect. Like for the home improvement model, we 
have also tested various specifications where we have interacted information on the past 
climate with the total amount of capital corresponding to each type of housing services. Our 
base specification includes all the interaction parameters that proved to be statistically 
significant. 
3. Data 
This paper relies on three data sources to estimate the model of home improvement and 
the model of residential energy consumption. Firstly, the American Housing Survey is used 
to gather data on housing units, home improvements, energy consumptions and 
households. Moreover, meteorological data has been extracted from the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Data Center. Finally, energy price data for the 
study period has been obtained from the State Energy Data System (SEDS) monitored by the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
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American Housing Survey (AHS) 
Launched since 1973 under the name of Annual Housing Survey, the American Housing 
Survey includes two samples of US retail estate: a metropolitan and a national one. The 
national sample is a nationally representative survey of the housing stock of the United 
States. However, it underwent a redesign in 1985 and the units of 1985 and after are 
different from the units surveyed during the previous years.46 
For this study, we have extracted data on households and housing conditions from the 
national waves of the AHS since its redesign in 1985. We have therefore gathered 
longitudinal data from 14 waves of the national AHS, from 1985 to 2011. We are not using 
all the observations of the AHS from 1985 to 2011 though, firstly because the localization of 
the housing units is confidential for about half of the sample47 and also because the 
information on home improvements has been collected for owner-occupied units only. The 
sample of geolocalised, owner-occupied units between 1985 and 2011 is composed of 
262,872 observations.  
In the AHS, the geographical information is displayed at the level of the Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs). A MSA is an area which contains a core urban area of at least 
50,000 inhabitants and can consist of one or more counties. The AHS waves between 1985 
and 2011 include housing units from 144 MSAs, spread all over the United States.48 
The AHS includes information on different types of home improvements.49 For this research, 
we distinguish three types of housing services, corresponding to three types of home 
                                                          
46
 The metropolitan sample covers a set of 21 metropolitan areas and each metropolitan area is 
surveyed once every six years. 
47
 Principally, the public use files of the AHS do not provide information on the location of the units 
that are situated in areas with less than 100,000 inhabitants to ensure that the public use files are 
entirely anonymous. In the end, about half of the owner-occupied units of the AHS are not 
geolocalised in the public use files. 
48
 In 2013, there was a total of 387 MSAs in the US according to the Census Bureau: 
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/files/metro_micro_Feb2013.pdf 
49
 Before 1997, owners were asked about the amount they had invested in 9 different types of home 
improvements: roofing; insulation; siding; storm doors and windows; installation of major equipment; 
changes to the bathroom; changes to the kitchen; home extensions; and any other major 
improvement costing $ 500 or more. In 1997, the typology was refined but we had to stick to the 
previous typology to be able to use the entire study sample from 1985. Among the nine types of 
home improvements that were available to us, we decided to follow in detail the two that were the 
more obviously related to climate adaptation. For the others, we just decided to aggregate them and 
analyse them as one type of home improvements by its own. On the other hand, please note that we 
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improvements. The first category covers the installation of major (energy-consuming) 
equipment, including principally space heating appliances and air conditioners (either room 
or central air conditioners). The second category covers all the types of improvements that 
we expect to be directly or indirectly related to energy integrity, including direct works to 
insulate the home (i.e. addition/replacement of foam, weather stripping and caulking), the 
addition or replacement of storm doors and windows (double or triple glass), roofing jobs 
and improvements on siding. We expect that works related to energy integrity reduce 
energy bills, whereas the installation or replacement of major equipment could either 
increase energy bills with the installation of new equipment or reduce energy bills if old, 
energy inefficient appliances are replaced with energy efficient ones. On the other hand, the 
third category consists in all the other indoor amenities50 which we have considered as not 
directly related to energy use: changes to the bathroom; changes to the kitchen; home 
extensions; and any other major indoor improvement. 
For all these types of home improvements, we observe the investments performed by 
households (𝐼ℎ,𝑖,𝑡). We however do not know the value of the stock of capital already 
embodied in a home before the first investment is performed. We extrapolate this initial 
amount – and from this the total amounts 𝐾ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 of a type of housing services capitalized by 
each household at a specific – from the purchase price or the construction cost of the 
housing units as registered in the American Housing Survey after a transaction or after 
construction for new buildings. 
Let’s note 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 the amount of capital embodied in a home at time t, net of any observed 
home improvement 𝐼ℎ,𝑖,𝑡. For the years in which the housing units are either sold or built, 
𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is known to us. For the years following the sale/construction of the house, we input the 
value of 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 by applying a depreciation rate on housing capital: 
𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ≈ (1 − 𝛿)
𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑖,𝑡−𝜏𝑖 
𝜏𝑖 represents the observed date of construction or sale. We take 2% for the value of the 
depreciation rate of past investments (i.e. 𝛿 = 2%). This value corresponds to the 
depreciation rate of real estate as estimated by Harding et al. (2007) on AHS data. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
cannot control for the home improvements realized outside the home, because the information is not 
recoded before 1997 and we need to use the entire panel to consider climate change adaptation. 
50
 As explained in the previous footnote, we have no information on outdoor improvements for the 
entire survey period. 
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Additionally, for the years that precede a sale and for which we have no previous 
information on the initial capitalized investments net of home improvements, we infer it 
from the sales price of the home at a later date: 
𝑘𝑖,𝜏𝑖−𝑠 ≈
𝑘𝑖,𝜏𝑖
(1 − 𝛿)𝑠
 
s represents the lag between the observed purchase and the time of interest for the 
calculation of 𝑘. This technique allows us to proxy the amount of capital in a home before 
home investments are made provided that we observe at least one sale or the construction 
cost of the unit.  
We expect our approximation of 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 to be representative of the value of all the services 
delivered by the housing unit net of any observed. We however want to distinguish the 
initial stock of capital associated with major equipment and the initial stock of capital 
associated with energy integrity from the rest. To do so, we use the information provided by 
the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB, 2010) on construction costs. According to 
the NAHB, 20.3% of the construction cost of a single-family unit is due to the lot price. 
Furthermore, the NAHB also provides a breakdown of the construction cost of a home 
according to the part of the unit that is considered. In particular, heating, ventilation and air-
conditioning systems represent 4.0% of the construction cost, and appliances 1.6% in 
average. We therefore proxy the initial stock of capital in major equipment, net of any home 
improvement after 𝜏𝑖, by evaluating the share of 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 that is most likely to have been 
allocated to major equipment at the time of construction based on NAHB (2010). This leads 
us to apply the following formula: 
𝑘1,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 20.3%) ∗ (4% + 1.6%) 
In the equation above, 𝑘1,𝑖,𝑡 is the capitalized investments in type 1 (major equipment) at 
time t for household i, net of any improvement performed to the home after 𝜏𝑖. We can 
likewise assess the capitalized investments net of home improvements for insulation, storm 
doors and windows, and all the other home improvements covered with our data.51  
                                                          
51
 According to NAHB (2010), Insulation is 1.5% of construction costs, windows represent 2.8%, 
exterior doors 0.9%, framing and trusses 15.6%, roof shingles 3.8% and siding 5.8%. To assess the 
initial capital for all the other homes improvements, we consider that it correspond to the remaining 
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Once the capitalized investments net of home improvements after 𝜏𝑖 have been calculated 
for all the three types of homes improvements, we add the value of all the home 
improvements performed in the house since the last purchase (𝜏𝑖) or withdraw the sum of 
all the home improvements done between time t and the observed future purchase (in 𝜏𝑖) 
to proxy the value of capitalized investments in a specific type h of housing services at time 
t: 
𝐾ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 =
{
 
 
 
 𝑘ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 +∑ 𝐼ℎ,𝑖,𝑠(1 − 𝛿)
𝑡−𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=𝜏𝑖
 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≥ 𝜏𝑖
𝑘ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 −∑𝐼ℎ,𝑖,𝑠(1 − 𝛿)
𝜏𝑖−𝑠 𝑖𝑓 
𝜏𝑖
𝑠=𝑡
𝑡 < 𝜏𝑖
 
To get comparable values of 𝐾ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 through time, 𝑘ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐼ℎ,𝑖,𝑠 are deflated. The deflator 
employed depends on each type h of home improvement. For improvements in energy 
integrity and in all other indoor amenities, we use the “housing” component of the US 
consumers’ price index (CPI) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For major equipment, the 
“durable goods” component of the CPI is used. This allows us to control for the impact of 
innovation on gradually reducing the cost of major appliances over the period under study. 
Moreover, the AHS provides household level information, in particular household total 
income which we use as a control variable in all the equations. We also have information 
whether the neighbourhood has access to pipe gas and on the time since the household 
moved in. The latter allows us to identify the moment when a household left and was 
replaced by a new one in a given housing unit. We can therefore construct household-
specific fixed effects. 
Additionally, we also extract information on the energy bills paid by households from the 
AHS. This allows us to calculate the quantities of energy consumed by each household, 
which constitutes the dependent variable of the second step of our econometric exercise.52  
                                                                                                                                                                      
share, excluding outdoor features and fees, i.e. lanscaping and sodding (3.2%), wood decks or patios 
(0.9%), asphalt driveways (1.4%), building fees (1.9%) and impact fees (1.4%). 
52
 To do so, we divide the energy bills for electricity and gas by the average price of these fuels in the 
State in which the housing unit is located. The price data is taken from the Energy Information 
Administration and is presented just after the climate data. Recently, Ito (2014) has shown than 
consumers are more responsive to average prices than to marginal prices. Our choice of using 
average prices seems therefore reasonable. 
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Finally, for the households who perform home improvements, we know if they have 
benefitted a low interest loan or grant from a government program to help pay for making 
any of the alterations to their home. We use this element as a control variable for the 
amounts that are invested in home improvements. We therefore partly control for the 
impact of different policy settings on home improvements. 
NOAA Climate Data 
The climate data has been extracted from the Climate Data Online (CDO) service of the 
National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), which is monitored by the National Oceanographic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
We have extracted three measures to proxy climatic conditions: heating degree days, 
cooling degree days53, and the annual number of days with precipitations over 0.5 inches. 
We use heating and cooling degree days instead of average temperature because they 
provide a much more accurate measure of heating and cooling needs. We are using the total 
number of days with precipitations above 0.5 inches to control for the impact of 
precipitations on home improvements. This is because precipitations can be correlated with 
temperatures and not accounting for changes in precipitation levels could bias our results. 
Furthermore, precipitations are a good proxy for humidity, which is known to increase the 
perceived sensation of heat and cold. 
Our data corresponds to land-based (in situ) historical observations recorded by 
meteorological stations in the US from 1985 to 2011. We use the information from about 
2,200 meteorological stations situated in 159 locations that match the metropolitan 
statistical areas covered with the AHS data. The records are available for different time 
spans depending on the opening and closure of the meteorological stations. We have 
extracted the monthly data and then calculated the yearly averages and sums with the 
meteorological stations that were active during the entire year. For each metropolitan 
statistical area, we averaged the values recorded in all the nearby active stations54 to get 
variables that could be matched with the AHS data. 
                                                          
53
 The threshold used by NOAA to distinguish heating degree days from cooling degree days in our 
data is 65 Fahrenheit degrees. 
54
 The nearby stations are identified thanks to the geographical search engine of NOAA’s National 
Climatic Data Center. 
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Energy Price data from the SEDS 
The energy price data is taken from the State Energy Data System administered by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration. The data includes information on residential and 
industrial energy prices for each US State from 1985 to 2011.55  
We combine the energy price data with the AHS data by matching the metropolitan 
statistical areas of the AHS with the State-level information of the SEDS. Each time at MSA is 
situated on more than one State, average price values are obtained by calculating the 
average energy price corresponding to the different States on which a metropolitan 
statistical area is overlapping. 
Furthermore, we construct instruments for energy prices by using the energy price data 
from the SEDS. We can easily recover the price of neighbouring States and we also have 
information on energy prices in the industrial sector.  
Summary of statistics 
Table 4.1 provides the list of the descriptive statistics from all the three data sources that 
are used for the model estimation. These statistics are reported for the 31,436 observations 
that were directly used in the model estimations. 
This amount may appear as relatively small as compared with the sample of 262,872 
observations of geolocalised, owner-occupied units. The reduction in sample size is 
principally due to the fact that we only have about 55,000 units for which we have either 
information on the purchase price or the construction cost, matching with our energy and 
temperature data. Additionally, some observations have missing information on the 
variables used in the econometric estimations and we have excluded outliers.56 
                                                          
55
 The prices are provided for coal, natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, electricity, fuel oil, kerosene 
and wood in dollars per million btu but we are only using the information on gas and electricity 
prices, as these two fuels are the ones that are principally used by households. 
56
 The 2.5% of units with very high or very low values for heating degree days, cooling degree days, 
electricity and gas prices has been excluded. This is because there could be differences in the 
response of the households that live in very hot/very cold regions or in regions in which energy is 
either very cheap or very expensive (as these households could already be very well equipped or on 
the contrary underequipped in terms of energy conservation). Furthermore, among the observations 
that perform an investment in one investment category, we have dropped the 2.5% of observations 
that invested the highest amounts, considering that the investments performed by these households 
are likely to be structural and to have occurred anyway. Likewise, our data registers many small 
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Finally, please note that the observations which have been used to make descriptive 
statistics are not used in all the equations estimated in our setting. This is because some 
equations focus on the observations for which one investment is recorded. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
amounts of investment in any of the three categories, corresponding to small maintenance efforts. To 
distinguish these small maintenance works from home improvements, we have considered that the 
2.5% cheapest alterations recorded in our data should be disregarded. They enter in the calculation 
of the total embodied capital in the home but are not used in the fixed effect logit models and the 
linear models. We have also excluded the 2.5% observations with smallest and the 2.5% observations 
with largest amounts of capital invested in either major equipment, energy integrity or other indoor 
amenities as well as the 2.5% observations with very high or very low but non-null levels of either gas 
or electricity consumption. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the data used 
Variable Unit Mean Std deviation 
Capitalized investments in main equipment, 𝐾1,𝑖,𝑡 $ 13,759 9633 
Share of households making an investment in main 
equipment 
% 8.1% - 
Expenditure in main equipment for those who perform 
an investment 
$ 2,652 2,154 
Capitalized investments in energy integrity, 𝐾2,𝑖,𝑡 $ 49,641 33,109 
Share of households making an investment in 
insulation 
% 20.8% - 
Expenditure in energy integrity for those who perform 
an investment 
$ 3,658 4,022 
Capitalized investments in all the other home 
improvements, 𝐾3,𝑖,𝑡 
$ 94,845 62,027 
Share of households making an investment in a least 
one of all the other home improvements 
% 34.1% - 
Expenditure in other home improvements for those 
who perform an investment 
$ 4,916 6,832 
Logarithm of total household income $ 11.04 0.91 
Percentage of units with at least one air conditioner % 87.7% - 
Share of households that have benefitted from a 
government grant or loan to perform home 
improvements 
% 1.0% - 
Share of housing units connected to pipe gas % 77.9% - 
Climate variables and energy prices  
 
 
Heating Degree Days # 4,048 2,093 
Cooling Degree Days # 1,548 990 
Days with precipitation over 0.5 inches # of days 24.95 10.58 
Past 10-year average amount of heating degree days # 4,078 2,080 
Past 10-year average amount of cooling degree days # 1,517 956 
Residential electricity consumption 
MM.btu/yea
r 
36.14 20.28 
Residential gas consumption 
MM.btu/yea
r 
63.45 58.14 
Residential price of electricity $/MM.btu 40.05 9.01 
Residential price of gas $/MM.btu 8.23 2.47 
Variables used to construct instruments    
2-year lagged industrial price of electricity $/MM.btu 25.92 7.92 
2-year lagged industrial price of gas $/MM.btu 8.23 2.47 
Notes. Source: AHS, CDO and SEDS. Survey years: 1985-2011. Number of observations: 31,436. 
Comments: all the variables in dollars are expressed in 2011 real dollars. The correction of nominal 
values has been made using the U.S. Consumer Price Index of the Bureau of Statistics of the U.S. 
Department of Labour. The entire CPI is used to correct energy prices and household income, 
whereas only the “housing” component is used for capitalised investments in energy integrity and in 
other indoor amenities and only the “durables” component is used for capitalised investments in 
major equipment. 
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4. Model results 
The section below presents the model results. First, they are provided for the home 
improvement model and then for residential energy consumption. For home improvements, 
the results are separately displayed for the probability of making an investment and then for 
the amounts that are invested, for the three types of home improvements considered. 
Results of the model of home improvements 
Results for the decisions to invest in specific types of home improvements 
The regression results on the probability to make a specific type of home improvement are 
displayed in Table 4.2. However, because interaction parameters have been included in the 
regressions, it is unclear at first glance whether a higher temperature increases or decreases 
the probability that a specific type of investment occurs. To provide such a piece of 
information, we additionally compute and report the marginal effect of a change in one 
heating degree day, and of a change in one cooling degree day at the mean values of the 
parameters interacting with our climate variables. We also compute the marginal effect of a 
permanent increase in temperatures by one Fahrenheit degree for every day in the year. 
This effect is based on the average number of days below and above 65 Fahrenheit degrees 
in 2011 in the US.57 
Our results show that the probability of making a new home improvement depends on the 
total amounts that have already been capitalized in the category that is considered: the 
more investments have already been capitalized in one category, the fewer households are 
likely to invest again in this category. This is consistent with the fact that household will not 
invest twice in similar home improvements. Furthermore, investments in major equipment 
and in energy integrity appear as complements. The higher previous investments in one of 
these categories are, the higher is the probability that an investment is made in the other 
category. 
                                                          
57
 The average number of days with mean temperature above (below) 65 Fahrenheit degrees has 
been obtained from the daily records of all the land-based stations active in 2011. These records were 
extracted from the NOAA Data Centre. In average in the US, around 69.5% days (30.5% days) had an 
average temperature below (above) 65 Fahrenheit degrees in 2011. On the other hand, we use 65 
Fahrenheit degrees as a threshold because it is the one that NOAA has used to compute the heating 
degree days and cooling degree days of our data. 
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For major equipment, we find no statistically significant impact of immediate temperatures 
to trigger new investments. However, we find that the probability to invest is both 
proportional to the average number of heating and cooling degree days during the past 10 
years and to the size of the house, captured by the total amounts capitalized in other indoor 
amenities. All in all, the probability of investing in major equipment increases with the total 
number of heating degree days, such that a permanent, one Fahrenheit degree increase in 
temperature would reduce, in average, the probability that a household invests in major 
equipment. Note that this effect, which is statistically significant, includes both investments 
in air conditioning and in heating at the same time, which plausibly means that the higher 
frequency in the installation of air conditioners would not compensate for the lower 
frequency in the installation of heating appliances. 
Table 4.2: Fixed effect logit model on the decision to perform investments according to the type of 
investments 
Independent variables 
Major 
Equipment 
Energy 
integrity$ 
All other 
indoor 
amenities 
Lagged stock of major equipment, 
𝐾1,𝑖,𝑡−1 
-2.00E-4** 
(-1.98) 
4.72E-4*** 
(5.78) 
2.65E-4*** 
(4.04) 
Lagged stock in energy integrity$, 𝐾2,𝑖,𝑡−1 7.11E-5*** 
(7.45) 
-3.49E-4*** 
(-8.22) 
-5.78E-5* 
(-1.8) 
Lagged stock in other indoor amenities, 
𝐾3,𝑖,𝑡−1 
-4.89E-5** 
(-2.19) 
3.59E-6 
(1.36) 
-4.70E-5*** 
(-15.58) 
Heating degree days, 𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 1.84E-4 
(1.19) 
3.25E-4*** 
(3.14) 
9.56E-5 
(1.04) 
Cooling degree days, 𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 3.55E-5 
(0.13) 
2.62E-4 
(1.38) 
8.45E-5 
(0.53) 
Interactions with past ten year average 
amount of heating degree days, 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡    
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 -1.72E-8 
(-1.45) 
-4.37E-8*** 
(-4.33) 
-2.61E-8*** 
(-3.21) 
?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 
 
3.14E-8*** 
(5.56) 
1.04E-8** 
(2.4) 
?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 7.30E-9** 
(2.47)   
Interactions with past ten year average 
amount of cooling degree days, 𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡    
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 -1.67E-7*** 
(-4.32) 
-8.89E-8*** 
(-3.15) 
-6.94E-8*** 
(-2.98) 
?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 
 
2.07E-8 
(1.57) 
1.93E-8* 
(1.85) 
?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 1.51E-8** 
(2.24)   
Number of days with precipitations over -3.60E-3 2.89E-3 2.54E-3 
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Independent variables 
Major 
Equipment 
Energy 
integrity$ 
All other 
indoor 
amenities 
0.5 inches (-0.65) (0.74) (0.74) 
Price of electricity (predicted) 8.17E-2* 
(1.76) 
2.95E-2 
(0.96) 
-1.40E-3 
(-0.05) 
Price of gas (predicted) -1.40E-2 
(-0.05) 
-1.69E-1 
(-0.88) 
2.76E-2 
(0.17) 
Household income 9.99E-2** 
(2.11) 
1.28E-1*** 
(3.7) 
1.17E-1*** 
(4.08) 
Number of people in household 4.56E-2 
(1.07) 
-1.25E-2 
(-0.43) 
6.91E-2*** 
(2.75) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,247 14,119 16,894 
Cumulative effect of heating degree days 
at mean values for ?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡, ?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 and ?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡.  
6.39E-4** 
(2.33) 
1.26E-3*** 
(6.31) 
2.55E-4 
(1.59) 
Cumulative effect of cooling degree days 
at mean values for ?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡, ?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 and ?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡. 
-8.31E-4 
(-1.26) 
5.76E-5 
(0.12) 
9.60E-5 
(0.25) 
Expected impact of a one Fahrenheit 
degree increase 
-6.97E-4*** 
(-3.74) 
-8.57E-4*** 
(-6.11) 
-1.48E-4 
(-1.31) 
Notes. T-statistics in brackets. Results marked with one to three stars are statistically significant at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. $: Energy integrity corresponds to insulation, storm doors and 
windows, roofing and siding. Only the interaction parameters that proved to provide statistically 
significant results (either in interaction with heating degree days or cooling degree days) have been 
kept in the base specifications. 
For investments in energy integrity, we find that a relatively higher amount of heating 
degree days is correlated with more investments being made. The probability of investing in 
this category is also correlated with the past climate. However, the impact of past 
temperatures on the probability to invest depends on the stock of capital already 
accumulated either in energy integrity or in major equipment. All in all, we find that heating 
degree days have a statistically stronger impact than cooling degree days in motivating 
efforts in energy integrity. In this context, an increase in temperatures by one Fahrenheit 
degree reduces the frequency of investments in energy integrity. 
For other indoor amenities, we find no statistical impact of on-the-year heating and cooling 
degree days on the probability to invest. However, the past climate seems to alter the 
probability to invest in other indoor amenities. The impact of the past climate on the 
probability to invest in other indoor amenities seems to depend on the type of heating and 
cooling installations in the house, as captured in our model by the total amounts of capital 
embodied in major equipment and energy integrity. For a representative unit, we find that 
households tend to invest more in this category with cooler temperatures. 
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Finally, income has a statistically significant impact on the probability of performing home 
improvements either in major equipment, energy integrity or in other indoor amenities. 
Based on our regressions, on-the-year electricity prices may have a positive impact on the 
installation of major equipment whereas gas prices have no statistically significant impact on 
the probability to invest in home improvements. 
Results for the amounts that are invested 
As explained in the model section, a fixed effect linear regression model is run on the 
amounts invested in each of the three types of home improvements. The results, presented 
in Table 4.3, complement the findings obtained with the fixed effect logit models.  
In particular, we similarly find that the amounts already capitalized in one category are 
lower when high amounts have already been capitalized in this category. On the other hand, 
high amounts capitalized in other categories are a good indication that household 
investments in one specific category may be higher.  
Table 4.3: Fixed effect linear regression model on the amounts that are invested according to the 
type of investments 
Independent variables 
Major 
Equipment 
Energy 
integrity$ 
All other 
indoor 
amenities 
Lagged stock of major equipment, 
𝐾1,𝑖,𝑡−1 
-7.44E-1** 
(-2.3) 
2.75E-1*** 
(3.35) 
6.63E-2 
(0.72) 
Lagged stock in energy integrity$, 𝐾2,𝑖,𝑡−1 2.22E-2 
(0.85) 
-3.98E-1*** 
(-13.1) 
8.73E-2*** 
(2.79) 
Lagged stock in other indoor amenities, 
𝐾3,𝑖,𝑡−1 
8.76E-3 
(1.09) 
2.66E-2** 
(2.28) 
-1.96E-1*** 
(-8.02) 
Heating degree days, 𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 3.16E-1 
(1.37) 
-3.78E-1 
(-1.05) 
1.83E-2 
(0.05) 
Cooling degree days, 𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 1.03E+0 
(0.94) 
-5.93E-1 
(-0.86) 
6.15E-2 
(0.09) 
Interactions with past ten year average 
amount of heating degree days, 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 
   
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 7.56E-5** 
(2.45) 
  
Interactions with past ten year average 
amount of cooling degree days, 𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 
   
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 1.22E-4 
(1.06) 
  
Number of days with precipitations over 
0.5 inches 
1.20E+1 
(0.71) 
5.50E+0 
(0.36) 
-6.33E+0 
(-0.37) 
Price of electricity (predicted) -1.73E+2 
(-1.04) 
-7.38E+1 
(-0.52) 
-9.57E+1 
(-0.78) 
Price of gas (predicted) -3.55E+2 -3.93E+2 -2.77E+1 
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Independent variables 
Major 
Equipment 
Energy 
integrity$ 
All other 
indoor 
amenities 
(-0.22) (-0.5) (-0.04) 
Household income -2.07E+1 
(-0.16) 
4.94E+1 
(0.36) 
4.98E+2*** 
(3.2) 
Number of people in household -1.35E+2 
(-0.82) 
-5.83E+1 
(-0.48) 
-5.43E+1 
(-0.41) 
Benefitted from government loan or 
grant for making home improvements 
4.55E+2 
(1.08) 
5.30E+2 
(0.88) 
2.73E+3*** 
(3.62) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,540 6,544 10,715 
R2 0.29 0.18 0.10 
Cumulative effect of heating degree days 
at mean values for ?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡, ?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 and ?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡.  
1.33E+0*** 
(3.29) 
-3.78E-1 
(-1.05) 
1.83E-2 
(0.05) 
Cumulative effect of cooling degree days 
at mean values for ?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡, ?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 and ?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡. 
2.67E+0 
(1.05) 
-5.93E-1 
(-0.86) 
6.15E-2 
(0.09) 
Expected impact of a one Fahrenheit 
degree increase 
-1.13E-1 
(-0.16) 
8.17E-2 
(0.27) 
6.06E-3 
(0.02) 
Notes. The sample includes only observations for which an investment is recorded. Standard errors 
are clustered on households. T-statistics in brackets. Results marked with one to three stars are 
statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. $: Energy integrity corresponds to insulation, 
storm doors and windows, roofing and siding. Only the interaction parameters that proved to provide 
statistically significant results (either in interaction with heating degree days or cooling degree days) 
have been kept in the base specifications. 
For major equipment, the amounts invested are generally higher if the past climate has 
been cold and if households have already capitalised high amounts in major equipment. All 
in all, heating degree days have a statistically significant impact on the amounts invested. 
However, the effect of cooling degree days is unclear: the coefficient is stronger than for 
cooling degree days but not-statistically significant. This is why the impact of a permanent 
one-degree Fahrenheit increase is unclear and not statistically significant. 
For investments in energy integrity and other indoor amenities, we find no clear correlation 
between temperatures and the amounts that are invested. For other indoor amenities, one 
of the best predictors of the amounts that are invested is income. We furthermore find a 
statistically significant impact of government grants or loans on the amounts invested in this 
category.  
Results of the model of residential energy consumption 
The predictions of the home improvement model are used as explanatory variables in linear 
two-stage least square models of energy consumption. At mean values, the impact of 
additional capital in major equipment is however not statistically significant; this is because 
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the statistically significant interactions with this variable compensate one another. Table 4.4 
displays the estimates for both electricity and gas consumption. 
We find various statistically significant interactions between temperatures and the capital 
embedded in any of the three categories of housing services. At first glance though, the 
marginal impact of a change in capital or a change in temperature is not easy to read 
because of the many interaction parameters included in the regressions. Like for the home 
improvement model, we compute marginal impacts at mean values for a change in capital 
or a change in temperature.58 
Table 4.4: Fixed effect 2SLS models of residential energy consumption 
Independent variables Electricity Gas 
Stock in major equipment, ?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 
(predicted) 
-7.46E-4* 
(-1.69) 
-3.68E-3*** 
(-3) 
Stock in energy integrity$, ?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 
(predicted) 
-2.00E-4 
(-1.02) 
1.44E-3** 
(2.23) 
Stock in other indoor amenities, ?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡 
(predicted) 
5.31E-5*** 
(3.34) 
1.99E-5 
(0.35) 
Heating degree days, 𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 2.68E-3*** 
(3.06) 
4.07E-3 
(1.41) 
Cooling degree days, 𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 3.43E-3** 
(2.42) 
9.16E-3** 
(2.18) 
Past ten-year average amount of heating 
degree days, 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 
-5.46E-3** 
(-2.06) 
2.90E-2*** 
(3.05) 
Past ten-year average amount of cooling 
degree days, 𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 
-1.30E-3 
(-0.37) 
4.48E-2*** 
(3.64) 
Interactions with contemporary climate   
?̃?1,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 -2.34E-7** 
(-2.23) 
-1.01E-6*** 
(-3.17) 
?̃?1,𝑖,𝑡x  𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 -1.76E-7 
(-0.92) 
-1.35E-6** 
(-2.22) 
?̃?2,𝑖,𝑡x 𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 6.20E-8** 
(2.07) 
2.47E-7** 
(2.47) 
?̃?2,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 7.56E-8 
(1.43) 
2.71E-7 
(1.5) 
Interactions with past climate   
?̃?1,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 2.28E-7* 
(1.91) 
1.56E-6*** 
(4.15) 
?̃?1,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 6.47E-7*** 
(2.68) 
2.36E-6*** 
(2.98) 
                                                          
58
 At this stage, we do not report the effect of a one-degree Fahrenheit increase because we need to 
take into account the impact home improvements on energy consumptions. This is done in the last 
section of this paper. 
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Independent variables Electricity Gas 
?̃?2,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 -2.02E-8 
(-0.5) 
-4.24E-7*** 
(-3.1) 
?̃?2,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 -1.31E-7 
(-1.51) 
-8.08E-7*** 
(-2.71) 
Number of days with precipitations over 
0.5 inches 
-9.98E-3 
(-0.48) 
3.43E-3 
(0.06) 
Price of electricity (instrumented) -3.84E-1** 
(-2.36) 
-1.13E+0* 
(-1.72) 
Price of gas (instrumented) 2.30E+0** 
(2.43) 
-5.06E+0* 
(-1.69) 
Household income (logarithm) 3.98E-1*** 
(2.64) 
1.20E+0** 
(2.33) 
Number of people in household 2.05E+0*** 
(12.46) 
2.57E+0*** 
(4.85) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Validity of instruments   
Underidentification test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 
Weak identification test (Max. IV relative 
bias, and Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic in brackets) 
<5% 
(1529) 
<5% 
(1001) 
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.30 0.61 
Observations 25,409 18,127 
Marginal effects at mean values   
Heating degree days -7.35E-4 
(-0.3) 
3.25E-2*** 
(3.73) 
Cooling degree days 6.71E-3** 
(2.04) 
4.22E-2*** 
(3.5) 
Capitalised investments in major 
equipment 
-3.57E-5 
(-0.34) 
1.15E-4 
(0.35) 
Capitalised investments in energy 
integrity 
-1.17E-4*** 
(-2.86) 
-7.25E-5 
(-0.53) 
Capitalised investments in other indoor 
improvement 
5.31E-5*** 
(3.34) 
1.99E-5 
(0.35) 
Notes. 2SLS regression with fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on households. For gas, we 
are only considering households that report a level of residential consumption different from zero. 
For the two equations, instruments are the 2-year lagged industrial electricity and gas prices, both 
within the State and in neighbouring States. T-statistics in brackets. Results marked with one to three 
stars are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. $: Energy integrity corresponds to 
insulation, storm doors and windows, roofing and siding.  
At mean values, cooling degree days have a statistically significant impact on electricity 
consumption at 5%, implying that rising temperatures may raise electricity bills. For gas 
consumption, the estimated impacts of heating and cooling degree days are both 
statistically significant. As there are more heating degree days than cooling degree days in a 
year, the model would predict that a rise in temperature should lead to a decrease in gas 
consumption. 
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As regards the impact of the different types of housing services on electricity and gas 
consumption, some of the results are statistically significant for electricity whereas they are 
not for gas when aggregated to compute a marginal impact at mean values. In the case of 
electricity, investments in energy integrity lead to a reduction in electricity bills whereas 
investments in other amenities increase electricity bills. At mean values, the impact of 
additional capital in major equipment is however not statistically significant; this is because 
the statistically significant interactions with this variable compensate one another. 
5. Implications of model results for GHG emissions and US 
residential energy consumption 
This section aims to articulate the results of the home improvement model with the results 
of the energy consumption model and provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of 
higher temperatures on energy consumption, with particular attention being paid to the 
impact of household-level adaptation to climate change. 
To do so, we run a simulation based on the estimated coefficients of the home improvement 
model and the energy consumption model. Please note beforehand that the results should 
not be interpreted as a simulation of the impact of long term climate change on 
temperatures, as the simulation below does not take into account many factors that will 
affect energy demand, in particular economic and population growth, or the likely changes 
in the technologies used for space heating and air-conditioning. This is why our simulation 
does not aim to provide an estimate of energy demand within 20 or 50 years, but is above 
all interested in analysing if climate adaptation is a driver of residential energy demand. We 
want to assess if, based on the model results, we should expect that adaptation of the 
housing stock increases or reduces energy demand if climate were to evolve. 
Our simulation is run for a representative household whose initial capital stock in each type 
of housing services is equal to the average of our data sample. Likewise, we assume that this 
representative household consumes an amount of electricity and an amount of gas equal to 
our data average and is subject to heating and cooling needs corresponding to the mean 
heating degree days and cooling degree days of our sample. Similarly, his probability to 
perform an investment in one category and the amount that he would invest are equal to 
the average predicted probability and predicted amount obtained with our sample. 
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To assess the impact of climate change on electricity while allowing for capital adjustments 
in housing services, we construct a baseline scenario in which there is no climate change and 
then compare it with a climate change scenario. For the baseline scenario, we recurrently 
compute, from one year to the other, the evolution of the capital stock of the representative 
household assuming no change in heating or cooling degree days. The change in capital 
stock is then simply driven by the fact that we have predicted an average amount of 
investments to be performed each year (equal to the expected probability of investing times 
the predicted amount that is invested at each time period), which evolution depends on the 
capital already accumulated in major equipment, energy integrity and other indoor home 
improvements. From one year to the other, we can therefore define baseline values for the 
amount of capital embodied in each category of housing services. Additionally, we create 
baseline electricity and gas consumption values. They correspond to the average electricity 
and gas consumption of our sample, which are adjusted to take into account the predicted 
changes in capital likely to occur from one year to the other. 
In parallel, we construct a scenario in which temperatures are set to be one Fahrenheit 
degree higher than in the baseline scenario just after the start of the simulation, at period 1. 
This leads to a decrease in the number of heating degree days and an increase in the 
number of cooling degree days, which we have calibrated according to the average number 
of days above and below 65 Fahrenheit degrees in the US in 2011.59 We disregard the effect 
of such a change in temperatures on precipitation levels. 
In the climate change scenario, the representative household responds to the temperature 
shock by increasing immediately his electricity and gas use, and also adapts through home 
improvements which have persistent effects on energy consumption: the different in 
temperature modifies the amounts of capital that are invested each year in the three 
categories of housing services. The changes in invested capital are calibrated based on the 
probabilities to invest and the predicted amounts that are invested according to the 
econometric model of home improvements. The simulated values for the accumulated 
capital in the three types of housing services are reported in Appendix C3 for the baseline 
scenario and the scenario with higher temperatures. 
                                                          
59
 This is based on NOAA daily records for the US as extracted for the NOAA Data Centre. We consider 
that there are around 69.5% days below 65 Fahrenheit degrees in the US. 
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Impacts in terms of energy consumption 
Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 present the evolution of electricity and gas consumptions as 
simulated for our representative household. We have considered up to 50 periods in the 
simulation to be able to capture long run impacts on energy use.60 In both figures, the grey 
line corresponds to the scenario without climate change whereas the black line corresponds 
to the scenario with higher temperatures. The difference between the two lines 
corresponds to the impact of a one-degree Fahrenheit increase, including both immediate 
shocks from higher temperatures and capital adjustments. The simulation predicts a 
progressive shift from gas (-5.1% in the long run) to electricity (+3.5%). Interestingly, this 
shift from gas to electricity consumption reduces total energy demand by 1.9%, estimated at 
101.8 MM.btu61 for the representative household at the end of the simulation in the 
baseline scenario, versus 99.9 MM.btu in the climate change scenario. 
Since this simulation is based on the coefficients as estimated from the electricity and gas 
consumption models, it is possible to analyse the contribution of each type of housing 
services to gas and electricity consumption under the assumption that our estimates 
correspond the true coefficient values.  
To ease the analysis, we group the various coefficients of the regressions into 6 categories of 
effects. For major equipment and energy integrity, we distinguish short-run effects, 
correlated with present temperatures, from long-run effects, correlated with previous 
temperatures (e.g. due to progressive changes in the composition of installed capital). For 
the impact of other indoor amenities, we do not distinguish short run from long run impacts 
as we have not included interaction parameters between this type of housing services and 
climate variables in the energy consumption models.62 Finally, we also compute the effect of 
temperatures (both present and past) on energy consumption that cannot be directly 
explained by a change in the composition or the amount of embedded capital.  
 
                                                          
60
 Please note that the impact of the past climate on energy consumption is progressively taken into 
account in the first eleven periods since the average number of heating and cooling degree days over 
the past 10 years steadily adjusts to the permanent increase in temperature (which has started at 
period 1). 
61
 One million British thermal unit is equivalent to around 293 kWh. 
62
 These interactions proved not to be statistically significant in alternative test specifications. 
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Figure 4.6: Electricity consumption under the baseline and climate change scenarios (million btu for 
the representative household) 
 
Figure 4.7: Gas consumption under the baseline and climate change scenarios (million btu for the 
representative household) 
Figure 4.8 synthesises the contribution of each type of effect in increasing electricity 
consumption when temperatures get warmer. In the short run, more electricity is consumed 
by major equipment, but also more savings are obtained from insulation, which is consistent 
with the fact that insulation generates more savings under more temperature stress. In the 
long run though, households seem to adapt the types of major equipment they have at 
home to their new needs in terms of space heating and air conditioning, which reduces 
electricity bills in the simulation. On the other hand, because the home improvement model 
predicts that households reduce their efforts in insulating their homes under warmer 
temperature, an additional amount of electricity is being consumed in the long run due to a 
decrease in insulation levels. All in all, we can understand from the graph that this is the 
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more intensive use of already installed installation that could cause an increase in electricity 
demand. 
The contribution of the six categories of effects to residential gas consumption is provided 
by Figure 4.9. Interestingly, temperatures reduce gas consumption, but this effect is smaller 
if the amount of major equipment is relatively important. This is consistent with the fact 
that, in the short run, households may not fully switch off gas heaters. However, in well 
insulated homes, the increase in temperature leads to more savings being made on gas 
consumption. In the long run, we find the expected effect that consumers may adapt their 
heating devices to new climatic conditions and depart from using large gas heaters, maybe 
in favour of electric heaters. In the end, the decrease in gas consumption in the simulation is 
concomitant with the changes operated on major equipment: adaptation of the equipment 
installed therefore seems to be the main driver in the reduction of gas demand. However 
and as for electricity, the reduced efforts in insulation may translate into extra amounts of 
gas being consumed in the winter in the long run, all things being equal. This result suggests 
that there is a need to increase public awareness on the benefits of insulation, even under 
warmer temperatures. 
 
Figure 4.8: Relative contribution of various factors to a change in electricity consumption associated 
with a permanent increase in temperatures by 1 Fahrenheit degree (million btu for the 
representative household) 
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Figure 4.9: Relative contribution of various factors to a change in gas consumption associated with 
a permanent increase in temperatures by 1 Fahrenheit degree (million btu for the representative 
household) 
Impacts in terms of GHG emissions 
We convert the predicted changes in energy use in GHG emissions to analyse the impact of 
the adaptation of energy demand on climate change mitigation. We use the emissions factor 
of the Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator of EPA: one million btu of electricity 
corresponds to 202.16 kg of CO2 equivalent and one million
 btu of natural gas to 53.02 kg 
CO2 equivalent.
63 At using these emissions factors, we convert energy consumption from 
electricity and gas in GHG emissions while making the strong assumption of no change in the 
energy mix of electricity generation in the long term. 
The results of this calculation pinpoint that, if electricity goes on being generated with 
current energy mix, the GHG emissions produced from residential energy consumption 
could increase (+0.8% at the ending period of our simulation) as a result of temperature 
changes, in spite of a total residential energy demand reduction by 1.9%. On the contrary, 
would we assume twice fewer emissions from electricity generation, the impact of 
residential adaptation to climate change could lead to a net reduction of GHG emissions by 
0.6% in the long run. 
                                                          
63
 http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/calculator.html#results. Website consulted in 
March 2014. 
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These values are relatively small in magnitude since they have been obtained from an 
increase in land-based temperatures by 1 Fahrenheit degree. By the end of the century, the 
RCP6.0 scenario of IPCC (2013), corresponding to a medium-high level of GHG emissions 
rejected into the atmosphere, predicts an inland temperature increases by around 3 Celsius 
degrees, i.e. 5.4 Fahrenheit degrees. Calibrated to an increase by 3 Celsius degrees, we find 
that the shift from gas to electricity could result in an increase of GHG emissions by 4.4% if 
electricity would still be produced with carbon-intensive methods by the end of the century, 
or to a decrease in GHG emissions by 3.2% with twice less carbon intensive an electricity. 
Therefore, if electricity generation was decarbonised, then the shift of residential demand 
from gas to electricity may not generate additional GHG emissions but savings: long term 
adaptation to climate change in the residential sector could have a positive impact in terms 
of climate mitigation. 
6. Conclusion 
This research has developed a two-stage econometric model to analyse residential 
electricity and gas consumption. In the first stage, we have analysed the responsiveness of 
residential renovation efforts to climatic change. The results of our first stage have then 
been used in the second stage to predict how residential electricity and gas demand could 
evolve under climate change. 
This research finds that total energy demand could decrease in the US as a result of climate 
change, with an estimated decrease by 1.9% for each additional Fahrenheit degree. 
However, residential energy demand would shift from gas to electricity, which consumption 
has been simulated to rise by 3.5% for each additional Fahrenheit degree. From the 
perspective of climate mitigation and due to the high carbon content of US electricity, the 
reduction in total energy demand would not be enough to offset the additional GHG 
emissions created by a shift in residential demand from gas to electricity. Our research 
therefore pinpoints that, as electricity is likely to be more and more often used as a principal 
source of energy in residential units, particular attention should be paid by policy-makers to 
reduce the carbon footprint of electricity. 
Some of the results of this research have already been found by previous scholars, in 
particular Deschênes and Greenstone (2011) and Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (2011) 
regarding the relationship between temperature shocks and electricity consumption. Our 
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contribution is to provide a statistical analysis of the reasons behind the likely increase in 
electricity consumption under climate change. Above all, we find that this increase should 
be compensated by a decrease in gas consumption, and that the principal driver of all these 
changes would be both a modification in the composition of the equipment installed in 
dwellings and in the intensity in use of already installed appliances. 
In particular, our model predicts that the increase in electricity consumption will be due to a 
more frequent use of already installed appliances. Conversely to Sailor and Pavlova (2003), 
we do not find that the diffusion of air-conditioning (i.e. the installation of new air-
conditioners), will be the main driver of future electricity demand. However, our model 
predicts that households are likely to reduce insulation efforts, with a substantial impact on 
both electricity and gas consumptions. 
Precautions should be however taken at analysing our model results, as we have assumed 
no economic growth or demographic evolution. Furthermore, we have assumed no change 
in the technologies available to households for space heating and air-conditioning, in terms 
of energy efficiency, but also in terms of fuel choice for space heating or air-conditioning: for 
example our results are conditional on gas not being used more often for air-conditioning. 
Additionally, note that the US housing stock is relatively specific to the extent that gas 
consumption is high and air-conditioning is already present in many US homes: 86% of 
households in our sample declared having at least one air-conditioner at home, whereas 
77% live in neighbourhoods connected to pipe gas. Thus, there is clearly a need in 
conducting similar studies on the relationship between climate change and energy demand 
in other countries, in particular developing countries that face high constraints in terms of 
energy security. 
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General conclusions 
In the first part of this PhD dissertation, we have highlighted that consumers do take into 
account energy costs to a large extent before purchasing domestic appliances, surely thanks 
to the implementation of the EU energy label and growing environmental awareness among 
consumers. However, various margins of progress exist to increase the energy efficiency of 
durable goods. 
Chapter 1 confirms that market failures are likely to reduce the impact of electricity prices 
on the energy consumption of sold appliances. Our econometric estimation shows that 
consumers may still underestimate energy costs by 35% on the UK cold appliance market 
despite the implementation of the EU energy label. Energy efficiency has become a salient 
product feature that can allow substantial mark-ups in a cold appliance market that is 
imperfectly competitive. As such, imperfect competition might become a thwart to the 
diffusion of energy efficient appliances if the mark-ups of energy efficient products are so 
high that consumers are encouraged to keep purchasing energy inefficient products. In our 
simulation, we find that the impact of imperfect competition on energy demand offset short 
run demand adjustments. This is only in the long run that electricity price increases lead to 
energy savings as manufacturers adapt by launching new, more energy efficient products. 
Chapter 2 points up that careful attention should be paid to the regulatory failures that can 
affect the implementation of energy efficiency policies. In particular, the EU energy label will 
be fully effective only if the promised energy savings correspond to the energy consumed by 
the appliances that are purchased. On the other hand, compliance with regulation for 
retailers and manufacturers is not effortless and policy-makers must be aware of the 
difficulties associated with compliance. In this direction, the simplification brought to the 
energy label with the replacement of texts by pictograms has eased the work of suppliers, 
no longer forced to adapt the label to the country of sale. On the other hand, the unification 
of the label into one single strip (instead of two) has made it easier for retailers to comply. 
In the second part of this PhD dissertation, we have focused on the impacts of climate 
change on energy investment behaviour. We have reviewed how the electricity sector will 
be put under pressure by climate change (chapter 3). Furthermore, our analysis of the 
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sensitiveness of residential energy demand to climate change (chapter 4) pinpoints that the 
decarbonisation of US electricity needs to be paid particular attention by policy-makers. 
Chapter 3 shows that investment decisions in the electricity sector are dependent on many 
climate variables, some of which climatologists are capable of predicting their evolution, 
such as temperatures and precipitations, whereas high uncertainty remains for some others, 
including above all winds, gale and lightening under climate change. For short run 
investments, the electricity sector will be able to adapt by progressively updating and 
replacing installations. On the other hand, many investments for the generation and 
transmission of electricity are long-term. For these investments, resilient strategies so that 
the equipment resist to future climate change will need to be adopted. Hopefully, the 
electricity sector has long experience in dealing with uncertainty for future load forecasting 
and the challenge therefore is for policy-makers to make available the relevant climate-
related information to investors. 
Finally, chapter 4 shows that households will adapt to climate change in the long run. They 
will tend to use more the electric equipment that is already installed while relying less on 
gas heaters in the winter. We also find that household may invest less in insulation under 
warmer temperatures, which could increase both electricity and gas consumption levels. We 
can furthermore provide information on the impact of climate change on future energy 
demand if we assume no change in the types of durables available to households for space 
heating and air-conditioning. Under this assumption, we predict a shift of demand from gas 
to electricity, due to the more intensive use of air-conditioning in the summer and reduced 
heating needs in the winter. Chapter 4 concludes by assessing the impact of these structural 
changes of residential energy demand on GHG emissions. We find that, with the current 
carbon footprint of electricity generation, the shift from gas to electricity would lead to 
additional GHG emissions, so that household adaptation to heat could interfere with climate 
change mitigation. However, provided that electricity is decarbonised in the 21st century, 
the shift from gas to electricity could accompany the policies aiming to mitigate climate 
change. 
The findings of our PhD dissertation may have practical implications for the design of energy 
efficiency policies and the adaptation to climate change of the residential sector.  
To improve energy efficiency in the residential sector, our findings encourage policy-makers 
to reinforce the implementation of the currently enforced information-based policies. At the 
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EU level, the amounts of surveillance activities undertaken by Member States in relationship 
to the EU energy label are uneven. In general, too little attention might be paid to the 
accuracy of the labels that are put on the appliances. EU level exchanges of information on 
product testing and more systematic tests in laboratories (on the accuracy of the 
consumptions presented on the energy labels) could be required. However, other 
instruments than information-based policies could be useful to avoid that apparently cheap 
but energy inefficient products stay competitive on the market. To offset the negative 
impacts of imperfect competition for the diffusion of energy efficient products, the 
enforcement of more stringent minimum standards may be a good decision. Policy-makers 
may need to evaluate their relevance in each Member States through consistent impact 
assessments. On the other hand, public authorities are often providing subsidies to 
encourage consumers to perform energy efficiency investments. Under imperfect 
competition on the markets of durable goods, the use of subsidies to foster energy 
efficiency is likely to be ineffective. 
Over the long term, the diffusion of energy efficient products could allow reducing 
substantially energy consumption and GHG emissions. At the same time, information about 
future climate change is becoming each time more precise and, for some climate impacts 
including temperature changes, it is now possible to make accurate impact assessments. For 
the electricity sector, a climate-sensitive sector, global warming is expected to put more 
stress on current generation and transmission facilities. At the same time, demand is likely 
to increase in some regions. Our research has shown that, in the US, the increase in 
residential electricity demand caused by climate change could be relatively important and 
add up to the other demographic and economic factors that are likely to drive demand 
upwards. With both the objective to mitigate and to adapt to climate change, our findings 
highlight that the decarbonisation of electricity should be planned with proper 
considerations being made to ensure both energy security and climate resilience. 
Moreover, our research suggests that the changes in US residential electricity consumption 
will be principally driven by modifications in the use of the major equipment already 
installed in houses whereas changes in household equipment are predicted to accelerate 
the decrease of gas consumption. In the meantime, insulation efforts from households may 
diminish under warmer temperatures. Policy-makers may therefore need to encourage 
households to adapt to climate change by improving home insulation and inform them 
about the pressure put on the electricity used by air-conditioners. 
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More generally, our research also shows that individual-level adaptations do have an impact 
on energy demand. Therefore, not only the big emitters of GHG emissions may need to 
adapt to climate change, but also the way cities and housing units are designed to respond 
to new needs resulting from progressive changes in lifestyles associated with climate 
change. This element is certainly important for energy use, but is likely to be also very 
relevant for other primary goods, in particular water and air quality. From the academia and 
not only economics, more research is required to better understand the relationship 
between climate and ways of life.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Complementary Tables of Chapter 1 
A1. Alternative choices for the nests 
A weakness of the nested logit approach is the fact that the nest structure is arbitrarily 
chosen by the econometrician. In Table A.1, we give the results for the sales equation with 
alternative nests (including the simple logit model without nests). The estimate of  γ varies 
across specifications, but remains well below 1. 
Table A.1: First difference GMM estimation results of sales with alternative nests 
Dependent variable: log. market share of product j 
Nests from:  
refrigerators vs. refrigerators-freezers No Yes No Yes 
Over/below median capacity No No Yes Yes 
Built-in/freestanding No No No Yes 
Importance of total electricity costs (γ) 0.8437** 
(2.41) 
0.7757*** 
(4.31) 
0.7106*** 
(4.34) 
0.5621*** 
(3.65) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0092* 
(1.66) 
0.0014*** 
(2.94) 
0.0072*** 
(3.55) 
0.0087*** 
(3.59) 
Within-group correlation of error term (σ) 
for the demand equation  
0.9508*** 
(39.1) 
0.8054*** 
(8.39) 
0.9206*** 
(6.57) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First difference Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,118 1,118 1,118 1,118 
Notes. Three instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing year-on-year changes in the 
price of upright freezers and washing machines, and the squared value of these fixed effects for upright freezers . 
t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on products. Results 
marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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A2. Construction of the instruments for the sales equation 
To calculate the implicit price of the two attributes (capacity and built-in vs free-standing), a 
hedonic pricing model is used. We run two regressions, one for freezers, and one for 
washing machines, to capture the evolution of the price of each subcategory of appliance. 
This is done by including by year by category of appliance (large/small and built-
in/freestanding) fixed effects in the regressions.  
We furthermore control for any difference in the sample of appliances that we observe from 
one year to the other, and could be susceptible to bias the estimation of the evolution of the 
average price of the various subcategories of appliances. To do so, we first restrict the 
sample to products that are observed at least twice bin the data. Then we include a set of 
variables describing product features as control variables, including the brand.  
To account for the panel structure of the data, I am using a random effect linear model. The 
results of the regressions are displayed below. 
Table A.2: Random effect linear regression to construct the instruments 
Dependent variable Price of freezers Price of washing machines  
Capacity (kg for washing machines, L for 
freezers) 
39.5534*** (3.76) 0.0771 (0.56) 
Energy consumption (kWh/year) 7.6906 (0.65) 0.0248 (0.35) 
Water consumption (L/cycle) -0.2834 (-0.63) - 
Height (cm) - 2.4483*** (10.32) 
Width (cm) - 1.1434*** (3.01) 
Depth (cm) -4.0868** (-2.08) - 
Presence of no frost system - 43.9519*** (4.05) 
Revolutions per minute 0.1999*** (9) - 
By year, by category of appliance fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes 
Small, 2002 (built-in for freezers) -20.001 (-1.15) -128.6418*** (-9.37) 
Small, 2003 (built-in for freezers) 
-16.0586* (-1.88) 
-149.8367*** 
(-10.61) 
Small, 2004 (built-in for freezers) -15.9936* (-1.87) -144.0661*** (-9.73) 
Small, 2005 (built-in for freezers) -39.5803*** (-3.58) -171.4195*** (-10.77) 
Small, 2006 (built-in for freezers) -43.0038*** (-4.34) -157.7355*** (-11.2) 
Small, 2007 (built-in for freezers) -72.053*** (-6.58) -166.7722*** (-11.84) 
Large, 2002 (built-in for freezers) 0 0 
Large, 2003 (built-in for freezers) -32.7897* (-1.94) -1.5064 (-0.13) 
Large, 2004 (built-in for freezers) -51.8796*** (-3.12) -14.3202 (-1.21) 
Large, 2005 (built-in for freezers) -75.4322*** (-4.47) -14.8558 (-1.11) 
Large, 2006 (built-in for freezers) -95.0692*** (-5.66) -50.9112*** (-4) 
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Large, 2007 (built-in for freezers) -116.1697*** (-6.72) -59.8531*** (-4.45) 
Small, 2002 (freestanding, freezers only) - -146.2432*** (-8.4) 
Small, 2003 (freestanding, freezers only) - -163.8439*** (-9.53) 
Small, 2004 (freestanding, freezers only) - -165.1285*** (-9.4) 
Small, 2005 (freestanding, freezers only) - -170.2961*** (-8.83) 
Small, 2006 (freestanding, freezers only) - -175.8264*** (-10.03) 
Small, 2007 (freestanding, freezers only) - -180.9685*** (-10.35) 
Large, 2002 (freestanding, freezers only) - -15.18 (-0.59) 
Large, 2003 (freestanding, freezers only) - -61.5426** (-2.32) 
Large, 2004 (freestanding, freezers only) - -54.6927** (-2) 
Large, 2005 (freestanding, freezers only) - -20.4393 (-0.57) 
Large, 2006 (freestanding, freezers only) - -70.5291** (-2.2) 
Large, 2007 (freestanding, freezers only) - -111.7238*** (-3.72) 
Energy label fixed effects Yes Yes 
Wash efficiency label fixed effects Yes - 
Brand fixed effects Yes Yes 
Random effects Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.64 0.80 
Number of observations 2,583 977 
Notes. t-statistics in brackets. Results marked with one to three stars are statistically significant at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Small means below sample median, large is above. 
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A3. Linear specification  
As mentioned previously, a standard approach in previous works consists in using a linear 
specification. Running this regression has two objectives: 1) to check the robustness of our 
results and 2) to run three tests to control that the instruments used in our base model are 
strong enough. In this way, we complement the information provided by the test of over-
identifying restrictions run for the non-linear model, which ensures that our base model is 
not over-identified. 
The results are presented in Table A.3 using a standard 2SLS estimator with two variants: a 
fixed-effect estimation and a first-difference estimation. The coefficients for the purchase 
price and electricity costs are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. They imply 
that a representative consumer would underestimate energy costs by 20-35%64. These 
values are in line with the 35% that we had estimated in the base specification. In addition, 
results show that the instruments exhibit the necessary properties as they pass all three 
tests (an under-identification test, a weak identification test and an over-identification 
test)65. In particular, the value for the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic ensures that the 
instruments chosen to run the base model are strong enough. There are however stronger 
in the fixed-effect model. 
                                                          
64
 This corresponds to 1-(0.0017/0.0023).  
65
 Note that there exist no reference values for the weak identification test under heteroskedasticity. 
In fact, the Stock-Yogo (2005) critical values only apply to homoskedasticity. They can only be used as 
a general reference. Therefore, we are confident that the estimation is not weakly identified 
considering that the Kleibergen-Paap rk Walf F statistic, that takes into account heteroskedasticity, 
provides a result above the critical value for 5% maximal IV relative bias. Furthermore, the IV 
regression was run assuming homoskedasticity and instruments passed all three tests 
(underidentification, weak identification and overidentification). 
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Table A.3: Linear IV regression for the market share equation, using either first differences or fixed 
effects 
Dependent variable: Fixed effects First differences 
Price (instrumented) (A) -0.0041*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0076*** 
(-3.54) 
Log. within-group market share (σ) (instrumented) 0.8766*** 
(22.2) 
0.7985*** 
(7.99) 
Lifetime electricity costs (B) -0.0032*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.0049*** 
(-2.86) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Product level fixed effects/First differences Fixed effects First differences 
Importance of total electricity costs, γ (A/B) 0.781*** 
(3.52) 
0.6476*** 
(3.98) 
Underidentification test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 24.72 15.71 
Overidentification test (p-value) 0.61 0.61 
Hansen J statistic 0.27 0.27 
Weak identification test (Max. IV size bias) <15% <25% 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 11.82 5.95 
Observations 1,911 1,118 
Notes. Three instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing year-on-year changes in the 
price of upright freezers and washing machines, and the squared value of these fixed effects for upright freezers . 
The nests on which σ is calculated distinguish refrigerators from combined refrigerators-freezers and appliance 
by capacity (over and below the sample median). t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The 95% confidence interval for γ is 0.35-1.20 in the fixed effect regression and 
0.33-0.97 in the regression on first differences. 
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A4. Implied discount rate  
Table A.4 gives the results of the sales equation where the discount rate has been chosen to 
induce an estimate of gamma equal to 1. The corresponding discount rate is 8.7%. 
Table A.4: First difference GMM IV estimation results with the implied discount rate inducing 𝛄 =1 
Dependent variable: log. market share of product j 
Electricity prices  
Discount rate 8.7% 
Importance of total electricity costs (γ) 0.9918*** 
(3.97) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0075*** 
(3.54) 
Within-group correlation of error term (σ) for the 
demand equation 
0.7972*** 
(8.04) 
Year dummies Yes 
First difference Yes 
Observations 1,118 
Notes. Three instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing year-on-year changes in the 
price of upright freezers and washing machines, and the squared value of these fixed effects for upright freezers. 
The nests on which σ is calculated distinguish refrigerators from combined refrigerators-freezers and appliance 
by capacity (over and below the sample median). t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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A5. Results using standard hedonic pricing method 
We run a random effect regression on panel data using the price of appliances as the 
dependent variable. The idea is to mimic a hedonic pricing approach, but using our panel 
data. With this method, we obtain 𝛾 ≈ 9%, which is far below the estimates obtained using 
the discrete choice model. The implied discount rate is 72%.  
Table A.5: Random effect linear regression on appliance price 
Dependent variable 
 
 
Discount rate 2.83% 72% 
Lifetime electricity costs -0.1406*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.991*** 
(-2.62) 
Height  0.363 
(1.05) 
0.3801 
(1.1) 
Width 6.3262*** 
(6.31) 
6.3201*** 
(6.31) 
Capacity 0.9906*** 
(5.84) 
0.9824*** 
(5.8) 
Appliance is a refrigerator-freezer 28.5633 
(1.49) 
18.0275 
(1.05) 
Appliance is built-in -171.9625*** 
(-16.65) 
-171.7999*** 
(-16.64) 
Appliance has a no-frost system 36.9998*** 
(3.69) 
36.3024*** 
(3.62) 
Random effects Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.64 0.64 
Number of observations 2,583 2,583 
Notes. t-statistics in brackets. SEs robust to heteroskedasticity with clustering of products. Results marked with 
one to three stars are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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A6. An alternative price equation  
If the total demand for refrigerators is inelastic, theory predicts that the price of energy-
efficient goods can increase. A specification capturing this prediction is then: 
                               𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝜂1𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂2(𝐶𝑗𝑡)
2
+ θ𝑋𝑗𝑡 + τ𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗,𝑡                                            
in which 𝜂1  is expected to be positive while 𝜂2 is expected to be negative. The table below 
gives the results with this specification. The results do not confirm these predictions.  
Table A.6: First difference GMM estimation results of the price equation assuming a non-monotonic 
relationship between the product price and the electricity cost 
Dependent variables  
Discounted electricity costs, η1 0.4911 
(1.14) 
Squared discounted electricity costs, η2 -0.0007** 
(-2.17) 
Fixed-effect derived from the price of upright freezers 
(by size by year) 
7.71* 
(1.75) 
Squared 0.0372** 
(2.08) 
Fixed-effect derived from the price of washing 
machines (by size by year) 
171.48*** 
(3.78) 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 1,118 
Notes. The price equation includes the instruments used in the market share equation as control variables for 
time-varying changes in production costs. t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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A7. Different assumptions for electricity prices 
In the base model, expected electricity prices at t + 1 are computed based on the 
assumption that consumers make expectations by using an ARIMA model and a financial 
discount rate of 2.83%. In the model (4), we assume that consumers make their decision 
based on the actual electricity price at time t. The effects found with the price expectations 
as modelled in the base specifications are accentuated: the underestimation would be 
smaller (10%). It is not surprising as the price of electricity was increasing over most of the 
study period, implying that ARIMA results underestimate the actual price. 
Table A.7: Summary table of sensitiveness analysis over electricity price expectations 
Dependent variable: log. market share of product j 
Electricity prices ARIMA model Current prices 
Importance of total electricity costs (γ) 0.6476*** 
(4) 
0.902*** 
(4.06) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0075*** 
(3.55) 
0.009*** 
(3.01) 
Within-group correlation of error term (σ) for the 
demand equation 
0.7967*** 
(8.04) 
0.7628*** 
(6.23) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
First difference Yes Yes 
Observations 1,118 1,118 
Notes. Three instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing year-on-year changes in the 
price of upright freezers and washing machines, and the squared value of these fixed effects for upright freezers. 
The nests on which σ is calculated distinguish refrigerators from combined refrigerators-freezers and appliance 
by capacity (over and below the sample median). t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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A8. Different assumptions for appliance lifetimes 
The calculation of the operating costs in the base model is based on AMDEA (2008) 
information about appliance lifetimes (12.8 years for refrigerators and 17.5 years for 
combined refrigerators-freezers). Table A.8 presents the results of alternative models, in 
which the lifetimes for the two kinds of appliances are assumed to 20% higher or lower. It 
shows that changes in our assumption have limited impact on the results. This is mostly 
because operating costs are discounted: electricity consumption in 10-15 years is given small 
importance in any case. 
Table A.8: Summary table of sensitiveness analysis over lifetime of appliances 
Dependent variable: log. market share of product j 
Assumptions on lifetime 
(years) 
AMDEA (2008) -20% +20% 
Refrigerators 12.8 10.24 15.36 
Combined refrigerators-
freezers 
17.5 14 21 
Importance of total electricity 
costs (γ) 
0.6476*** 
(4) 
0.7539*** 
(4.02) 
0.578*** 
(3.99) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0075*** 
(3.55) 
0.0075*** 
(3.55) 
0.0075*** 
(3.55) 
Within-group correlation of 
error term (σ) for the demand 
equation 
0.7967*** 
(8.04) 
0.7962*** 
(8.04) 
0.7971*** 
(8.05) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,118 1,118 1,118 
Notes. Three instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing year-on-year changes in the 
price of upright freezers and washing machines, and the squared value of these fixed effects for upright freezers. 
The nests on which σ is calculated distinguish refrigerators from combined refrigerators-freezers and appliance 
by capacity (over and below the sample median). t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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A9. Electricity price expectations with the ARIMA model 
Testing for different ARIMA specifications 
The ARIMA models can handle lags in the autocorrelation term or in the moving average 
term. They can furthermore be expressed in levels or in difference. We have tested for this 
series of possibilities and found that the best fit was provided by an ARIMA model with one 
lag for the autocorrelation term and one lag for the moving average term. These results 
clearly appear in Table A.9, which corresponds to the fit of various ARIMA specifications for 
the price expectations in 2007.66 
Table A.9: Presentation of different ARIMA specifications 
 
Base 
model 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Lag of autocorrelated term 0.9968*** 
(197.51) 
0.9976*** 
(227.27) 
  0.7134*** 
(17.41) 
 
Lag of moving average 
term 
0.5887*** 
(12.09) 
 0.9588*** 
(39.71) 
  0.5848*** 
(11.78) 
Constant 1.1748*** 
(4.47) 
1.180*** 
(4.44) 
0.9772*** 
(72.70) 
0.0015 
(1.52) 
0.016 
(0.78) 
0.015 
(1.37) 
Standard deviation of the 
white-noise disturbance 
0.0077*** 
(25.40) 
0.0099*** 
(27.44) 
0.0536*** 
(14.53)  
0.0098*** 
(25.38) 
0.0069*** 
(25.10) 
0.0077*** 
(25.21) 
Equation in first difference No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 133 133 133 132 132 132 
Notes. t-statistics in brackets. SEs robust to heteroskedasticity with clustering of products. Results marked with 
one to three stars are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The models are run on the price 
index of electricity corrected by the consumer price index (2005 = 1). 
Results of ARIMA model for the different years for which expectations are modelled 
Expectations for a given year are modelled with the data available from 1996 up to the last 
month of the previous year. For example, expectations in 2003 are assumed to be based on 
the information on electricity prices from January 1996 to December 2002. Table A.10 
presents the results of each ARIMA model used to produce price expectations in 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
                                                          
66
 ARIMA models in table 1 only include lags at t – 1. We have tested for the inclusion of more lags 
but, these models do not fit the data as well as the best specification. Whether one of the coefficients 
of the model was no longer statistically significant, as in (c), (d) and (e) or the models were not 
converging for all the years for which expectations need to be modeled. 
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Table A.10: Results of ARIMA models used to produce rational price expectations 
Year when the forecasts 
are to be made 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Lag of autocorrelated term 0.9964*** 
(58.85) 
0.9971*** 
(69.98) 
0.9972*** 
(83.93) 
0.9950*** 
(93.06) 
0.9945*** 
(78.12) 
0.9968*** 
(197.51) 
Lag of moving average 
term 
0.3931*** 
(4.29) 
0.3842*** 
(4.64) 
0.3732*** 
(4.85) 
0.4271*** 
(6.13) 
0.4632*** 
(7.12) 
0.5887*** 
(12.09) 
Constant 1.0001*** 
(10.17) 
0.9964*** 
(9.67) 
0.9994*** 
(10.27) 
1.029*** 
(13.02) 
1.057*** 
(6.84) 
1.1748*** 
(4.47) 
Standard deviation of the 
white-noise disturbance 
0.0064*** 
(21.45) 
0.0060*** 
(24.08) 
0.0058*** 
(26.74) 
0.0059*** 
(26.54) 
0.0062*** 
(25.76) 
0.0077*** 
(25.40) 
Equation in first difference No No No No No No 
Number of observations 73 85 97 109 121 133 
Notes. t-statistics in brackets. SEs robust to heteroskedasticity with clustering of products. Results marked with 
one to three stars are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The models are run on the price 
index of electricity corrected by the consumer price index (2005 = 1). 
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Appendix B: Monitoring Indicators for the Energy 
Label 
B1. Increasing awareness among consumers at the same time 
IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
Description: Percentage of interviewees that think that energy efficiency matters in their purchases  
Source of the indicator: Survey. Eventually to be added to the TNS/Sofres survey in France. 
HOW TO MEASURE THE INDICATOR 
Who can measure the indicator? Survey company 
What method should be 
implemented? 
It is preferable to ask this question at the beginning of an interview, to avoid potential 
biases brought by anterior questions on energy labelling and savings. The following 
question could be asked: “What degree of attention do you pay to the energy 
consumption of the products that you purchase?” 
Which degree of precision is 
necessary? 
The amount of interviewees should be high enough (over 5,000) 
What frequency is necessary to 
gather the indicator? 
Annual frequency is recommended. Two-year frequency is also possible, but the number 
of interviewees should then increase (10,000 or over). Requirements in terms of precision 
are high when the frequency is lower because measurement errors have stronger 
consequences: they impact the quality of the information available to public authorities 
over a longer time period. Increasing the amount of interviewees can limit the risks of 
imprecision. 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE INDICATOR 
What is the meaning of a change in 
the indicator? 
An increase in the percentage of interviewees means that consumer sensitiveness to 
energy efficiency may have increased. 
In which context the indicator is 
useful? 
The indicator can be used to measure, from one year to the other, the sensitiveness of 
consumers to the issue of energy efficiency. The indicator could eventually be used to 
define targets that public authorities would like to reach in terms of consumer awareness 
of energy efficiency. 
What precautions should be taken 
to interpret the indicator? 
There are no particular precautions required. 
RELEVANCE OF THE INDICATOR TO MONITOR THE ENERGY LABEL 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the stock 
of running domestic appliances? 
A higher attention paid to the energy efficiency of products should lead to reduced energy 
consumption levels in the stock of running appliances, along with a higher energy 
efficiency of purchased products. 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the 
energy label? 
A good value for this indicator means that the effect of the energy label on purchasing 
decisions could be high. 
 
  
 156 
 
 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT PRODUCT 
Description: 
Amount of money that surveyed people would declare to be willing to pay to increase the 
energy efficiency of the products that they purchase. 
Source of the indicator: Survey. Eventually to be added to the TNS/Sofres survey in France. 
HOW TO MEASURE THE INDICATOR 
Who can measure the indicator? Survey company. 
What method should be 
implemented? 
The willingness to pay can be calculated thanks to surveys. Many questions are possible, 
but formulating the question is delicate. Eventually, the question could be: « Imagine that 
you want to purchase a domestic appliance. In the shop, you first choose one model of 
appliance but the salesman encourages you to purchase an appliance which is a bit more 
expensive but also more energy efficient. To convince you, he tells you that this appliance 
consumes less electricity and that you could save € [a number] annually. How much would 
you be ready to pay extra to purchase the more energy efficient model?” 
Which degree of precision is 
necessary? 
The amount of interviewees should be high enough (over 5,000) 
What frequency is necessary to 
gather the indicator? 
Annual frequency is recommended. 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE INDICATOR 
What is the meaning of a change 
in the indicator? 
An increase in the average value taken by this indicator means that consumers are more 
aware of energy efficiency issues. 
In which context the indicator is 
useful? 
The indicator can be used to measure, from one year to the other, the sensitiveness of 
consumers to energy efficiency. The indicator could eventually be used each year to define 
targets and objectives in terms of consumer awareness. Moreover, the indicator can 
provide information on the existence of various types of consumers, more or less aware of 
energy efficiency issues. 
What precautions should be 
taken to interpret the indicator? 
The information gathered with this indicator should not only be presented as an aggregate, 
because consumer heterogeneity is also very interesting. There could be various types of 
consumer behaviour with respect to energy efficiency. 
 
Year after year, the indicator needs to be comparable even though there is the risk that 
technical progress could affect consumer’s perception for some products. Consequently, 
the indicator should not rely on values which perception may change with time or technical 
progress (“How much would you be ready to pay for an “A+” rated product instead of an 
“A” rated appliance), but instead on elements which perception are likely to be more stable 
over time. 
 
On the other hand, the indicator should measure consumer subjectivity. Consequently, it is 
better not presenting energy savings as certain, but saying that they are likely and will be 
obtained in the long run.  
RELEVANCE OF THE INDICATOR TO MONITOR THE ENERGY LABEL 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the 
stock of running domestic 
appliances? 
An increase in the indicator should be correlated with an increase in the market shares of 
energy efficient products. 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the 
energy label? 
The indicator provides information on the effectiveness of the energy label as a measure 
that allows orienting consumers towards energy efficient products. 
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B2. Matching displayed and real energy savings 
CONFORMITY TESTS OF ENERGY CONSUMPTIONS 
Description: 
Percentage of controlled products for which the rate on energy label corresponds to the 
real energy consumption. 
Source of the indicator: 
Tests on a sample of products. In France, collabouration with the Direction Générale de 
la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (DGCCRF) 
should be sought for the implementation of testing procedures or for the grant of the 
information necessary to construct the monitoring indicator. 
HOW TO MEASURE THE INDICATOR 
Who can measure the indicator? Independent verifiers (making the tests on the sample of products) 
What method should be 
implemented? 
Conformity tests consist in measuring the real energy consumption of a product and to 
compare it with the values displayed on the energy label. This should be done for a 
sample of products. 
Which degree of precision is 
necessary? 
The sample of products to be tested should be relatively large (≥100). 
What frequency is necessary to 
gather the indicator? 
The indicator could be collected each two years. The cost of the tests can be high. 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE INDICATOR 
What is the meaning of a change in 
the indicator? 
A decrease in the quantity of products whose energy label does not correspond to real 
energy consumption would indicate that the policy is more reliable, and would, in the end, 
imply a decrease in the energy consumption of purchased appliances. 
In which context the indicator is 
useful? 
This indicator can be used to measure the reliability of a system of labelling and can also 
be used to urge some suppliers to comply with regulation. 
What precautions should be taken 
to interpret the indicator? 
It is necessary that the sample of products that is tested is representative of the 
appliances that are purchased by consumers without allowing manufacturers to know in 
advance which models are the most likely to be tested. Random testing is the best for the 
accuracy of the indicator. 
RELEVANCE OF THE INDICATOR TO MONITOR THE ENERGY LABEL 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the stock 
of running domestic appliances? 
An increase in the indicator will lead to an increase of energy savings. 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the 
energy label? 
The indicator provides information on the reliability of the energy label to ensure energy 
savings to consumers. For consumers, an increase in the indicator could make them 
more confident about the energy label. 
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B3. Visibility of the energy label 
CONTROLLING VISIBILITY IN SHOPS AND ON THE INTERNET 
Description: 
Percentage of products controlled in shops and on the Internet for which 
regulation on the display of the energy label is respected. 
Source of the indicator: 
In-shop controls (unexpected by dealers) of the compliance of the display of the 
energy label. In France, cooperation with the DGCCRF to make the controls or 
to obtain the statistics is necessary to produce this indicator. 
HOW TO MEASURE THE INDICATOR 
Who can measure the indicator? 
National authorities (e.g. DGCCRF) or independent verifiers (subcontracted by 
national authorities). 
What method should be 
implemented? 
This is simply about verifying that the label is correctly displayed (e.g. in colour, 
on the appliances, etc.) in shops and on Internet pages. 
Which degree of precision is 
necessary? 
The amount of shops to be controlled must be high enough (≥100) and 
eventually be spread over a large geographical area (including rural and urban 
areas). Furthermore, new purchasing behaviours (e.g. on the Internet) should 
also be covered. 
What frequency is necessary to 
gather the indicator? 
We recommend making such controls at least each two years. 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE INDICATOR 
What is the meaning of a change in 
the indicator? 
An increase in the indicator would indicate that the energy label is more visible, 
and therefore more likely to trigger the purchase of energy efficient appliances. 
In which context the indicator is 
useful? 
This indicator allows measuring the presence of the energy labelling system. 
What precautions should be taken 
to interpret the indicator? 
The sample of controlled shops must be important enough (≥100) and covering 
both urban and rural areas so that the indicator is representative of a national 
situation. 
RELEVANCE OF THE INDICATOR TO MONITOR THE ENERGY LABEL 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the stock 
of running domestic appliances? 
An increase of this indicator may reflect indirectly an increase of the share of 
energy efficient products in the products that are purchased. 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the 
energy label? 
The indicator reflects the presence of the energy label in shops and therefore, 
its capacity to impact consumer purchasing behaviours. The more this indicator 
is high, the better can the policy direct consumers towards energy efficient 
products. 
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B4. Competitive and proactive markets  
MARKET CONCENTRATION OF DOMESTIC APPLIANCES 
Description: 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on market concentration for domestic appliances. 
The index is the sum of the squared market share of each supplier for a given year. 
Imagine that a market has three suppliers and that their market shares are 20%, 30% and 
50% in 2010. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is : 
202 + 302 + 502 = 400 + 900 + 2500 = 3800 
Source of the indicator: 
The indicator can be calculated using the data collected by the company GfK on the sales 
of products by supplier. The indicator requires that the market shares of each supplier are 
calculated. 
HOW TO MEASURE THE INDICATOR 
Who can measure the indicator? 
The indicator can be directly computed with data on market shares. This can be extracted 
from sales data such as the GfK data. 
What method should be 
implemented? 
The method consists in collecting, for each of the suppliers, its market share on the 
category of products of interest. Eventually, the indicator may also be calculated on the 
market share of each supplier in each energy efficiency category. 
Which degree of precision is 
necessary? 
It is necessary to know the market share of all suppliers. Unless the market is very 
concentrated, some measurement error on the market share of one supplier, taken 
individually, will have no major effect on the value taken by the indicator. 
What frequency is necessary to 
gather the indicator? 
We recommend calculating the indicator each year. 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE INDICATOR 
What is the meaning of a change in 
the indicator? 
The higher the indicator, the more concentrated the market. 
Below 1000, market concentration is low. It is at an intermediate level between 1000 and 
1800 and strong when the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is above 1800. 
In which context the indicator is 
useful? 
The indicator is used to measure market concentration within the hands of a few 
suppliers, and therefore the degree of competition between suppliers on a market. 
What precautions should be taken 
to interpret the indicator? 
No particular precaution. 
RELEVANCE OF THE INDICATOR TO MONITOR THE ENERGY LABEL 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the stock 
of running domestic appliances? 
In theory, suppliers’ margins are higher, along with their ability to increase their margins, 
when the indicator takes a higher value. If the indicator is applied on each energy 
efficiency class, the indicator can give some indicator on the categories of appliances for 
which margins are likely to be higher. 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the 
energy label? 
If the indicator takes a high value, providing information to consumers on energy 
efficiency may lead to an increase in the price of energy efficient products. This can affect 
the effectiveness of the energy label. On the other hand, high market concentration can 
reduce incentives to innovate, therefore limiting the long-term impact of the energy label 
on the energy efficiency of the products that are put on the market. 
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ENERGY EFFICIENCY OF THE MORE ENERGY EFFICIENT APPLIANCE67 
Description: 
Average and maximum taken by the energy efficiency rating of the most efficient product 
sold on the market and by each manufacturer. 
Source of the indicator: 
Survey on the most energy efficient product sold by each supplier, or sales data with 
information on energy efficiency. 
HOW TO MEASURE THE INDICATOR 
Who can measure the indicator? 
Survey institute or ADEME, whether asking directly manufacturers or by consulting 
specific websites such as Topten or dealers’ websites. Another possibility is to analyse 
sales data, such as GfK sales data. 
What method should be 
implemented? 
This is about collecting the energy efficiency rating of the most energy efficient models put 
on the market by each supplier. The values can then be treated to get an average and a 
maximum. It is not necessary to look for appliances with similar features/quality provided 
that only one category of products is analysed at a time (e.g. dishwashers with less than 
12 dishes). 
Which degree of precision is 
necessary? 
It is better to collect the energy efficiency rating of the most energy efficient appliance for 
a large sample of manufacturers. 
What frequency is necessary to 
gather the indicator? 
We recommend calculating the indicator each year. 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE INDICATOR 
What is the meaning of a change in 
the indicator? 
An increase of the maximum value (of the energy efficiency rating of the most energy 
efficient appliance on the market) corresponds to an enhancement of the technical 
capacity to produce energy efficient appliances. 
On the other hand, it is relevant to calculate the following ratio: 
(Maximum value obtained / Average obtained for all the suppliers)
Average obtained for all the suppliers
 
The higher this ratio, the more likely innovation occurs fast. 
In which context the indicator is 
useful? 
The market maximum energy efficiency rating corresponds to current technological 
frontier. The average of the maximum energy efficiency rating of the best product sold by 
each supplier gives information on the distance between a representative supplier and the 
technological frontier. 
What precautions should be taken 
to interpret the indicator? 
It is important to be sure that the indicator can be compared from one year to the other, 
which requires that all the suppliers are included in the calculation. Eventually, the value 
taken by the indicator could be weighted according to the market share of each supplier. 
RELEVANCE OF THE INDICATOR TO MONITOR THE ENERGY LABEL 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the stock 
of running domestic appliances? 
The higher the maximum value and the suggested ratio, the more it is likely that the 
energy efficiency of the products sold on the market increase in the medium run. 
What consequences does the 
indicator may capture for the 
energy label? 
If consumers cannot purchase innovating products, the energy label is much less useful 
for consumers that if it informs them about sharp differences between energy efficient and 
energy inefficient goods. 
                                                          
67
 Some regulations adopted in the EU within the framework of the Ecodesign Directive 
(2009/125/CE) provide information on the energy efficiency of the best appliances available at the 
time of enforcement of the legislation. This is the case for cold appliances (No 643/2009), for washing 
machines (No 1015/2010) and for dishwashers (No 1016/2010). 
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Appendix C:  Complementary tables and figures of 
Chapter 4 
C1. Example of test specifications related to the inclusion of 
interaction parameters 
Table C.1 displays test specifications related to the inclusion of interaction parameters into 
the fixed effect logit model on the probability of investing in major equipment. Similar types 
of specifications have been tested for all the equations of the home improvement model 
and for the equations related to gas and electricity consumption. 
Table C.1: Fixed effect logit model on the decision to perform investments according to the type of 
investments 
Independent 
variables 
(Base) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalised 
investments in 
major equipment, 
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 
-2.12E-4** 
(-2.52) 
2.78E-4 
(1.06) 
-4.94E-
4*** 
(-18.04) 
-3.19E-
4*** 
(-3.32) 
-1.43E-4 
(-1.08) 
-2.04E-4** 
(-1.98) 
-1.50E-4 
(-1.18) 
Capitalised 
investments in 
energy integrity
$
, 
?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 
7.10E-5*** 
(7.44) 
2.17E-4 
(1.45) 
7.45E-5*** 
(7.85) 
7.18E-5*** 
(7.53) 
-2.95E-5 
(-0.51) 
7.10E-5*** 
(7.43) 
3.29E-5 
(0.53) 
Capitalised 
investments in 
other indoor 
amenities, ?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡 
-5.46E-
5*** 
(-2.85) 
-3.52E-3 
(-0.64) 
5.98E-6 
(1.63) 
6.08E-6* 
(1.66) 
5.74E-6 
(1.57) 
-6.36E-
5*** 
(-2.79) 
-4.27E-5* 
(-1.79) 
Heating degree 
days, 𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡  
1.51E-4 
(1.06) 
2.17E-4 
(1.45) 
2.22E-4 
(1.45) 
1.97E-4 
(1.3) 
1.92E-4 
(1.26) 
1.96E-4 
(1.27) 
1.86E-4 
(1.21) 
Cooling degree 
days, 𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 
3.09E-5 
(0.14) 
2.78E-4 
(1.06) 
2.07E-4 
(0.83) 
3.35E-5 
(0.12) 
4.36E-5 
(0.16) 
-5.23E-7 
(0) 
3.94E-5 
(0.14) 
Past ten-year 
average amount of 
heating degree 
days, 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  
  
7.28E-4 
(0.99) 
  
-2.86E-4 
(-0.38) 
 
Past ten-year 
average amount of 
cooling degree 
days, 𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 
  
-7.44E-4 
(-0.85) 
  
-1.23E-3 
(-1.29) 
 
Interactions with 
𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  
       
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  -1.11E-8 
(-1.01) 
  
-6.92E-10 
(-0.06) 
-2.44E-8 
(-1.52) 
-1.66E-8 
(-1.35) 
-2.50E-8 
(-1.63) 
?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡      
1.36E-8* 
(1.83) 
 
5.97E-9 
(0.74) 
?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  1.09E-8*** 
(3.74) 
    
9.04E-9*** 
(2.98) 
6.35E-9** 
(1.99) 
Interactions with 
𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡 
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Independent 
variables 
(Base) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  -1.94E-
7*** 
(-5.79) 
  
-1.34E-
7*** 
(-3.76) 
-1.83E-
7*** 
(-3.83) 
-1.66E-
7*** 
(-4.33) 
-1.78E-
7*** 
(-3.85) 
?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡      
2.76E-8 
(1.46) 
 
7.23E-9 
(0.36) 
?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  2.56E-8*** 
(3.64) 
    
2.00E-8*** 
(2.94) 
1.39E-8** 
(1.97) 
Number of days 
with precipitations 
over 0.5 inches 
1.53E-3 
(0.23) 
-3.52E-3 
(-0.64) 
-2.37E-3 
(-0.43) 
-3.21E-3 
(-0.58) 
-3.36E-3 
(-0.61) 
-3.24E-3 
(-0.58) 
-3.55E-3 
(-0.64) 
Price of electricity -2.91E-3 
(-0.17) 
2.22E-4 
(1.45) 
8.11E-2* 
(1.7) 
8.79E-2* 
(1.9) 
8.21E-2* 
(1.76) 
 
8.17E-2* 
(1.75) 
Price of gas 1.53E-1*** 
(2.79) 
-7.44E-4 
(-0.85) 
1.84E-1 
(0.72) 
2.71E-2 
(0.1) 
-1.64E-2 
(-0.06) 
 
-2.27E-2 
(-0.08) 
Household income 5.72E-2 
(1.11) 
7.28E-4 
(0.99) 
1.05E-1** 
(2.22) 
9.97E-2** 
(2.11) 
1.00E-1** 
(2.12) 
1.00E-1** 
(2.12) 
9.97E-2** 
(2.11) 
Number of people 
in household 
3.55E-2 
(0.72) 
-2.37E-3 
(-0.43) 
3.88E-2 
(0.91) 
4.32E-2 
(1.01) 
4.19E-2 
(0.98) 
4.55E-2 
(1.06) 
4.49E-2 
(1.05) 
Household fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,291 6,291 6,291 6,291 6,291 6,291 6,291 
Notes. T-statistics in brackets. Results marked with one to three stars are statistically significant at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. $: Energy integrity corresponds to insulation, storm doors and 
windows, roofing and siding.  
 
  
 163 
 
C2. Example of linear regressions used to predict electricity and 
gas prices in the home improvement model 
The predictions of the model below were used in the logit model run to estimate the 
probability to invest in major equipment. 
Table C.2: Linear fixed effect regression on gas and electricity prices 
Independent variables Residential 
price of 
electricity 
Residential 
price of gas 
2-year lagged industrial electricity price 2.88E-1*** 
(20.7) 
4.43E-3 
(1.33) 
2-year lagged industrial gas price price -8.72E-2*** 
(-3.72) 
1.99E-2** 
(2.44) 
2-year lagged industrial electricity price in 
neighbouring States 
3.00E-1*** 
(14.21) 
2.14E-2*** 
(3.61) 
2-year lagged industrial gas price price in 
neighbouring States 
-2.40E-1*** 
(-6.5) 
2.02E-1*** 
(17.72) 
Capitalised investments in major equipment, 
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 
-3.43E-4*** 
(-4.37) 
1.59E-4*** 
(8.47) 
Capitalised investments in energy integrity
$
, 
?̂?2,𝑖,𝑡 
-2.48E-6 
(-0.33) 
-1.98E-7 
(-0.09) 
Capitalised investments in other indoor 
amenities, ?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡 
-7.71E-5*** 
(-5.37) 
-3.58E-5*** 
(-8.1) 
Heating degree days, 𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡  -1.21E-3*** 
(-15.75) 
-5.72E-5*** 
(-3.07) 
Cooling degree days, 𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 -3.29E-6 
(-0.03) 
-6.74E-4*** 
(-19.45) 
Interactions with 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡    
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  4.06E-8*** 
(3.84) 
-4.68E-9* 
(-1.85) 
?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐻𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  9.27E-9*** 
(4.1) 
3.61E-9*** 
(5.8) 
Interactions with 𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡    
?̂?1,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  1.19E-7*** 
(4.24) 
-7.34E-8*** 
(-11.22) 
?̂?3,𝑖,𝑡 x  𝐶𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡  2.50E-8*** 
(5.19) 
1.26E-8*** 
(8.07) 
Number of days with precipitations over 0.5 
inches 
-5.59E-3** 
(-2.06) 
1.92E-3* 
(1.89) 
Household income 5.66E-3 
(0.27) 
5.52E-3 
(0.64) 
Number of people in household -1.78E-4 
(-0.01) 
7.77E-3 
(0.76) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 31,436 31,436 
R2 0.71 0.82 
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C3. Capital in housing services in the simulation 
 
Figure C.1: Capital invested in major equipment (2011 dollars) 
 
Figure C.2: Capital invested in energy integrity (2011 dollars) 
 
Figure C.3: Capital invested in other indoor amenities (2011 dollars) 
12000
13000
14000
15000
16000
17000
18000
0 10 20 30 40 50
Period
Baseline Plus 1 Fahrenheit degree
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
55000
0 10 20 30 40 50
Period
Baseline Plus 1 Fahrenheit degree
85000
90000
95000
100000
0 10 20 30 40 50
Period
Baseline Plus 1 Fahrenheit degree
 165 
 
  
  
Investir dans l’utilisation et la production d’énergie pour lutter et s’adapter au 
changement climatique 
RESUME : Investir dans l’utilisation et la production d’énergie est une nécessité pour lutter contre le 
changement climatique, mais aussi un défi pour l’adaptation climatique. La première partie de cette 
thèse est consacrée à l’amélioration de l’efficacité énergétique des appareils électroménagers. Le 
Chapitre 1 analyse si les consommateurs prennent en compte les économies d’énergie des 
réfrigérateurs au moment de les acheter à partir de données de vente anglaises. Le Chapitre 2 
présente l’étiquette énergie européenne, ses effets sur l’efficacité énergétique ainsi que les facteurs 
clés de succès de cette politique de grande envergure. La deuxième partie de cette thèse étend son 
champ d’étude aux impacts que le changement climatique aura sur les comportements 
d’investissement. Le chapitre 3 s’intéresse à la sensibilité du secteur électrique au climat et propose 
des pistes de réflexion sur la prise en compte du changement climatique dans les décisions 
d’investissement. Le chapitre 4 est constitué d’une étude longitudinale de l’évolution du parc 
immobilier américain (1985-2011) et sa sensibilité au climat, dans le but d’établir des prédictions de 
long terme de l’impact du changement climatique sur la demande résidentielle de gaz et d’électricité. 
Mots clés : Changement climatique, adaptation, efficacité énergétique, appareils électroménagers, 
étiquette énergie 
Investing in energy use and production to mitigate and to adapt to climate change 
ABSTRACT: Energy investments are a requirement to mitigate climate change, but also a challenge 
for adaptation. The first part of this PhD dissertation focuses on improving the energy efficiency 
of domestic appliances. Chapter 1 analyses if consumers take into account energy costs when 
they purchase refrigerators with UK market data. Chapter 2 presents the EU Energy Label, its 
expected effects on energy efficiency and the key factors of success of such a large scale 
information-based policy. The second part of this PhD dissertation broadens the scope of 
analysis to the impacts of climate change on energy investment behaviour. Chapter 3 reviews 
the climate sensitiveness of the electricity sector and provides elements of discussion on how 
investments decisions could better take into account climate change in the future. Chapter 4 
provides a longitudinal analysis of the evolution of US housing (1985-2011) and its sensitivity to 
climate, with the objective of forecasting the long-run impact of climate change on both 
residential gas and electricity consumptions. 
Keywords: Climate change, adaptation, mitigation, energy efficiency, investments, domestic 
appliances, EU energy label. 
